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PREFACE 
Major General James Gillpatrick Blunt has become a 
forgotten figure of the American Civil War. He was 
victorious in seven major federal campaigns in the 
trans-Mississippi (Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, Indian 
Territory) theater of war, yet no extensive study of his 
military career exists. Information about his wartime 
exploits may be gleaned from books on related topics, such 
as Albert Castel's A Frontier State at War and Wiley 
Britton's Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War.l To 
relegate any mention of Blunt to a footnote or chapter, or 
worse, to ignore him completely, is to neglect a central 
and influential character in the far-western theater of 
war. 
Blunt characterizes and offers for study many 
different aspects of the Civil War. Most significantly, 
Blunt was one of the thousands of men who formed the 
backbone of the Union army--the volunteers. His career 
exemplifies a volunteer, unschooled in the military arts, 
who was able to use his personal, drive to win victories 
and rise to the highest volunteer rank, that of major general. 
Blunt's battlefield strategies were simple, which is not 
surprising considering his lack of a military background. 
Despite this lack of training, Blunt became a capable 
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general. Although he was probably not conscious of it, 
Blunt followed many of the principles of warfare codified 
before the Civil War by Swiss miiitary theorist Baron Henri 
Jomini. In books such as Traite des grandes operations 
militaires (1804), Histoire critique et militaire des 
guerres de la Revolution (1824), and Precis de l'art de la 
guerre (1837), Jomini advanced nine prinicples of war that 
became the basis for most military study in the first half 
of the ninetee~th century. They were: setting a clear 
objective; seizing and retainin~ the offensive; 
concentrating an army's mass at a critical point along its 
enemy's line; using an economy of force, or the minimal 
force necessary to obtain an ~bjective; accomplishing a 
mission with skillful_ maneuver; maintaining a unity of 
command so that everyone in an army is wor~ing toward the 
same goal; seeking the element of surprise; maintaining the 
security of one's army; and keeping plans and orders 
simple.2 The fact that .Blu~t unwittingly followed many 
of these Jominian principles points to the degree that they 
were based on common sense. Thris, success on a Civil War 
battlefield was not exclusively the domain of West Point 
graduates. Blunt exemplifies .the winning general who 
achieved victory through drive and determination. 
Blunt and his armies also provide insight into the 
character of the war and the armies in the 
trans-Mississippi west. The armies were small (Blunt's 
were generally no larger than a division by eastern theater 
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standards), they were led largely by unprofessional 
officers, and often composed of a mixture of white and 
Indian troops. The small size of the armies and the vast 
area of the trans-Mississippi made it difficult for armies 
to exploit success. Union and Confed~rate forces 
frequently clashed in skirmishes or fights, and more 
infrequently in full-scale battles, then retreated upon 
their lines of communication. 
Blunt also pro~ides an opportunity to. study 
abolitionist generals. His antislavery ideals led him to 
Kansas, the hotbed of pro-slavery and free-state 
factionalism in the ~850s, and ·eventually into the war. 
His career also of~ers historians a look at political 
generals, a br~ed of officer found in the Union army both 
east and west. Bluht iriitially rose to a general's rank 
not through military achieve~~nt but rather through the aid 
of his sponsor, Kansas Senator 'James H. Lane. This fact 
alone makes Blunt a poli~ical genera~ but he also became 
embroiled in political disputes within the army 
organization. ·These disputes show that the armies of the 
trans-Missi~sippi were just as politic~l as the more 
professional armies of the east. 
Blunt was born July 21, 1826, in Trenton, Hancock 
County, Maine. He displayed a taste for adventure early 
and in 1841, at age fifteen, he went to sea, serving five 
years on a merchant vessel. In 1848 Blunt enrolled in 
Starling Medical College at Columbus, Ohio, where he 
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studied medicine under his uncle by marriage, Dr. Rufus 
Gilpatrick. Blunt earned his medical degree one year later 
and began practicing medicine in New Madison, Ohio. There 
he married Nancy Carson Putnam~3 
Blunt was an abolitionist and while his anti-slavery 
activities were not numerpus they led Blunt into his 
military career. Blunt aided the underground railroad in 
Ohio and his poiitical ideals ptompted him to join members 
of his family, Dr. Gilpatrick included, in Kansas· in 1856 
w·here free-state men fought pro-slavery men over the 
admission of Kansas to the Union as a.slave or free state. 
' He pre-empted a land claim near Greeley, Kansas, where, he 
farmed and practiced medicine.~ Blunt became more active in 
the underground railroad, provisioning runaway slaves and 
giving them temporary' sanctuary in his horne. By 1859 Blunt 
had made enough of a·name for himself that he was able to 
run for, and win, election as Anderson County's delegate to 
the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention. It was under the 
Wyandotte Convention's free-state constitution that the 
United ~tates Corrg~ess eventuall~ admitted Kansas to 
statehood, January 29, 1861. Durlng.this time Blunt met 
two of Kansas• most famous abolitionists: John Brown, who 
would lead the raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers 
Ferry, Virginia, in 1859, and J_arnes H. Lane, self -appointed 
general of Kansas• free-state forces and future senator 
from that state.4 
Blunt's acquaintance with Lane helped him in the early 
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days of his military career; in 1862 Lane used his 
political influence to secure Blunt's general's commission. 
Blunt was a true political general, entering the Civil War 
1rith no military education or experience and achieving high 
rank only at the behest of his mentor. Lane's support of 
Blunt, however, was selfish and the senator appeared only 
interested in bringing a friendly general into his camp lvho 
could help control governmen"t contracts in Kansas while 
Lane attended Congressional duties-in Washington, D. c. 
Political enemies often suspected Blunt and Lane of fixing 
government military contracts, for their own profit, though 
they never proved such accusations. After securing for 
Blunt command of the Departmen:t of Kansas (a job for which 
Blunt was blatantly unqualified), Lane put forth little 
effort in promoting his prot~g~. Lane's wartime 
correspondence with Blunt is mi~imal, indicating that the 
senator left the geneTal. to make his mm reputation. This 
Blunt did in December, 1862, when he won his 
major-general's stars at the Battle of Prairie Grove, 
Arkansas. 
In the field Blunt, given his inexperience, showed a 
surprising affinity for military campaigning. He was not a 
brilliant general but neither was he shy of a fight: Blunt 
took the offensive in each of the eight campaigns he led. 
It is interesting to note that President Abraham Lin~oln 
never made much mention of Blunt, or corresponded with him 
to any great extent, when Blunt displayed the aggressive 
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battlefield characteristics Lincoln applauded. Blunt's 
generalship was not complex. He had no military training· 
and his battle dispositions were often straight-forward 
attacks, sometimes accompanied by uncomplicated flanking 
maneuvers. He understood,. thotigh, that cavalry could be 
used for more than just scouting missions.· Early in the 
war he employed his. horsemen as dismounted cavalry, often 
using them t~ an~hor key parts of his battle line. This is 
the same tactic used by Army of the Potomac .cavalry 
commander John Bdford on the f~r~t day's fighting at 
Gettysburg. One of the most com~o.n characteristics of his 
campaigns was spe~d. Blunt utilized forced marches and it 
was not unusual for his army to average forty miles per 
day.5 
Blunt led hi~ armies fr6m the ~ront, never from his 
headquarters tent. When a detachment of his division 
captured Van Buren, Arkansas, in December, 1862, Blunt 
galloped into town at the head of his cavalry. At the 
Battle of Honey Springs in Indian Territory, July, 1863, 
Blunt ignored a high fever· to di_rect ·the battle f~om 
horseback. The general's act.ions won h·im' the respect and 
confidence of his troops. After his escort and band were 
ambushed by Confederate guerrill~s near Baxter Springs, 
' 
Kansas, in Octciber, ~863, Blu~t took a party of nine ~en 
and followed his attackers until nightfall: One of his 
soldiers, Alexander McDonald, wrote to his brother that 
Blunt was "the bravest of the brave. No man living could 
have follow·ed an enemy as Blunt did. God speed him. n6 
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Like so many other Civil War soldiers Blunt believed 
personal courage was a weapon. It could make up for any 
number of disadvantages, including a lack of military 
training or even troops in the field. Blunt is an 
excellent example of the courageous soldier described in 
Gerald F. Linderman's recent work Embattled Courage.? 
Linderman theorizes that courage was the highest quality a 
Civil War soldier could possess. Courage equalled an 
heroic action undertaken without fear, for feeling fear was 
to be a coward, and cowardice could not co-exist with 
courage. The author maintains that Civil War officers, 
northern or southern, failed to earn the respect of their 
men unless they displayed personal courage in some way.8 
Bluht time and again asserte~·his courage in front of his 
men. Linderman also·sugg~sts that soldiers used courage as 
a form of assurance in battle: they believed that only the 
cowardly would die, the c~urageous would live.9 Again 
Blunt is an example of this idea. After the Baxter Springs 
ambush in Kansas, Blunt indicated his own belief that his 
personal courage -.;~auld prevent him ·from dying in. t'he vlar 
when he told two of his captains that "revolver bullets 
flew around my head thick as hail but not a scratch. I 
believe I am not to be killed by a rebel bullet·." For 
Blunt, courage was like a suit of armor.lO 
Blunt's strong-willed, aggressive character served him 
well on the battlefield but worked against him in his 
administrative duties and political dealings with other 
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officers. He made enemies of many of his superiors 
(including Major-Generals Henry w. Halleck and John M. 
Schofield) and subordinates alike. At times his behavior 
was so openly insubordinate that historian Castel has 
theorized that he was already.afflicted with the disease 
that put him in a Washington D.C. insane asylum in 
1879.11 Blunt died there in 1881 with what doctors then 
described as "softening of the brain."12 The general had 
plenty of contemporary detractors, among them his former 
adjutant general Colonel Thomas Moonlight. After 
historians discqvered a 117-page account of wartime 
memoirs, handvri~ten by Blunt, in the archives of the 
Kansas State Historical Society in 1896, they asked 
Moonlight to comment on the reminiscences. Moonlight 
started to edit Blunt's memoirs but thought better of it, 
saying that he had already done enough for Blunt. "But for 
myself Blunt would not stand.in history with the same 
military victories attached to him," said Moonlight, 
specifically noting Blunt's battles at Old Fort Wayne, 
Indian Territory; Cane Hill, Prairie Grove and Van Buren in 
Arlcansas; and Honey Springs, Indian Territory. Moonlight 
said he might have a further comment to make later. He 
never did, thus leaving his own allegation 
unsubstantiated.i3 
There was always a hint of scandal around Blunt, 
though it did not detract from his effectiveness on the 
battlefield. There is some evidence to suggest he took 
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·"female servants" with him while campaigning and drank 
heavily in camp.14 Yet in the majority of allegations 
leveled against Blunt, neither drunkenness nor womanizing 
were mentioned. The most persistent controversy that 
followed Blunt was the allegation of government contract 
fixing, which accusers never proved. In the post-war 
years, which is .beyond the scope of this work, Blunt became 
a solicitor of claims for Indians. In 1870 the federal 
government charged Blunt with taking $30,000 from a group 
of Quapaw Indians he represented, and in 1873 he again 
faced charges of defrauding the federal government and a 
group of North Carolina Cherokee. The government dropped 
both charges.15 
Civil War scholars have ignored Blunt. More than 
likely it is because he was a minor figure in the overall 
story of the war, fighting in the back areas of the 
conflict. Blunt le~t behind a paucity of documents. 
This lack of source material can b~ attributed in part to 
the Baxter Springs ambush in which guerrillas burned 
Blunt's baggage wagon, which carried his official 
documents, including his general's commission. 
It is the purpose of this work to shed much-needed 
light on Major General Blunt, one o~ the central figures of 
the trans-Mississippi theater of operations in the Civil 
War, his generalship and his campaigns. Blunt's career 
proved that unprofessional officers could still lead 
victorious armies in the early 1860s. Their battlefield 
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successes point to the indispensable role played by 
volunteers in the United States army of the Civil War. 
This work will study, through the political infighting in 
which Blunt submerged himself, the politicization of the 
United States Army, even in the far-west where leaders were 
not professional military men. This work will also study 
Blunt's career as that of an abolitionist general, although 
his pro-black stance was largely in name only. Blunt 
played a relatively minor part in pre-var Kansas 
abolitionist activities. During the Civil War he used 
black troops in battle only minimally and he did not 
recommend any black soldiers for promotion, even after 
writing glowing reports of their courage. 
In the completion of this work I am indebted to many 
people. First and foremost I want to thank my wife, Judi, 
for her patience, encouragement, research help, and 
assistance with the maps which accompany this work; my 
parents, Bob and Pat, for all the things they have done 
(which are too numerous to mention); Judi's family for 
their encouragement, and my friends, especially B. and s., 
for all their support. 
I owe a special thank you to Dr. James Huston at 
Oklahoma State University for his guidance and forebearance 
of the topic; to Dr. Joseph A. Stout and Dr. Bryant T. 
Ragan for their work on my committee; to Dr. Elizabeth 
Williams for stepping onto my committee at the last minute; 
to Mr. Wayne Lane and Dr. Tim Zwink, both at Northwestern 
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Oklahoma State University'in Alva, for their friendship and 
special input on this project; to Bertha L. Inhat, archives 
assistant for manuscripts at the Ohio State University 
Archives, for helping me research Blunt's scholastic 
background; to Sheryl K. Williams, curator of the Kansas 
Collection at the University of Kansas Libraries, and Jo 
Ellen Kerksiek, University of Kansas graduate student in 
history, for helping me explore Blunt's relationship to 
Senator James H. Lane; and to John Mark Lambertson for 
making Judi and me feel welcome and not quite so lost at 
the Kansas State Historical Archives. 
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CHAPTER I 
BLUNT'S FIRST COMMAND 
1861 
When James G. Blunt entered the United ?tates Army 
after the fall. of Fort Sumter in April 1861, he was little 
different from thousands of other men offering their 
service to the Union. He had never been a soldier and did 
not claim to know anything about military strategy or 
command. He enlisted out of patriotic fervor and strong 
abolitionist conviction. Blunt's anti-slavery sentiment 
earned him several political acquaintances in Kansas and 
one of them, Senator James H. Lane, quickly promoted Blunt 
through the ranks. Again Blunt ~as not unique as political 
promotions were common throughout the Union army. But 
before the year was over Blunt proved that he had an 
affinity for command and was not content to rely on 
political friends to secure his reputat·ion .. 
Blunt entered the American Civil War with no military 
experience. He had served briefly in 1857 on Major-General 
Lane's staff in the First Kansas Militia Regiment but his 
experience with that organization could not qualify as 
military training. Lane hastily organized the regiment 
in December 1857, to protect free-staters from pro-slavery 
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retribution after the two factions skirmished at Bayne's 
Fort, an abolitionist stronghold. No fight came and Lane 
disbanded the regiment, but he left Blunt behind with 
thirty men to protect free-staters if trouble arrived. 
Apparently Lane selected Blunt for the job on the 
recommendation of fellow abolitionist James B. Abbott. 
Abbott suggested Blunt because he was "courageous" and 
"1vould not be rash." Blunt's rear guard faced no 
opposition and disbanded. Subsequently Blunt's assignment 
involved no fighting or maneuver and was a command only in 
the loosest sense.l 
Though his greatest contributions to the Union war 
effort were his victorious campaigns through Arkansas and 
Indian Territory in 1862 and 1863, Blunt joined the army 
with no martial training or preconceived notions of his 
military capabilities. In fact, he volunteered for a 
position entirely commensurate with his training, that of 
private in the Tenth Kansas Volunteer Infantry.2 
Authorities disbanded the regiment, though, when it failed 
to draw enough recruits. Blunt then learned that James H. 
Lane was recruiting troops for three new regiments and he 
volunt~ered to help abolitionist James Montgomery organize 
the Third Kansas. The men of the regiment elected 
Montgomery colonel and Blunt lieutenant-colonel. That a 
man of Blunt's inexperience could become second in command 
of a regiment was not unusual by Civil War standards. The 
ranks of colonel and lieutenant-colonel generally went to 
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the men who recruited the regiment, their election by the 
rank and file being merely a traditional formality.j 
The Third Kansas joined Colonel William Weer's Fourth 
Kansas and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles R. Jennison's Seventh 
Kansas Cavalry to form James Lane's "Kansas Brigade" (more 
popularly k~own as the Lane Brigade), which earned a 
reputation early in the war for its jayh~wklng, or 
retaliatory, raids into Missouri. The raids were 
essentially a continuation of the border violence that 
occurred in the 1850s when free-state men fought Missouri 
pro-slavery men ]{nm·m as "bord,er. ruffians." In 1861 most 
Kansans believed all Missourians were secessionist. This 
was not true. One-third to one-half of the people in 
western Missouri were either Unionist or neutral. 
Jayhawking raids, accompanied by stories of Kansans freeing 
Missouri slaves, often drove these loyalists ·and neutrals 
into Confederate ranks.~ 
James Montgomery, colone~ of the Third Kansas, was of 
a breed of Kansas Jayhavkers,knovn as "practical 
abolitionists" who preferred not to wait for legal measures 
to erase slavery bu,t rather to take immeqi,ate action 
against it themselves. Charles R. Jennison, 
lieutenant-colonel of the Seventh Kansas Cavalry, also 
belonged to this group. They chose to take their 
extra-legal measures to their enemies--the slave-holding 
Missourians--and by the end of July 1861, they had made 
several plundering and slave-stealing raids across the 
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border. Blunt joined the Third Kansas as its 
second-in-command on July 24, 1861, and thus missed most of 
the summer jayhawking escapades. He no doubt approved of 
Montgomery's tactics, though, as he had given the man 
sanctuary in hfs home during the pre~war days .. Blunt's 
wife Nancy recalled that Montgomery arrived at the Blunt 
home "for safe keeping after one scrape on the border in ,, 
·which he had not taken part." Montgomery brought with him 
a black house servant named Elizabeth, the first 'of several 
fugitive slaves to seek refuge in the Blunt household.5 
In early August 1861, the Topeka State Record quietly 
applauded the completion of the Third Kansas .Regiment. The 
newspaper's account also tacitly acknowledged its 
Jayhawking background. "This r~giment will be called 
anti-slavery and Black Republican," read the news report, 
"but most people will, we trust, just call them 
abolitionists and be· done with it."6 
Blunt's first re~l taste of military action ·did not 
come until late September 1861". and it was in an 
independent command. On August 10, 1861, the same day that 
rebel ·generals Sterlin"g Price and Benjamin McCullock 
defeated federals at Wilson's Cre~k in southwest M{sso~ri, 
James H. Lane moved the Lane Brigade to Fort Scott in 
southeast Kansas to counter a feared Confederate attack. 
Price's army did not strike to~ard Kansas but instead moved 
north to the Missouri River and the Lane Brigade also 
marched north, endeavoring to stay on Price's left flank. 
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Figure 1. Blunt's Theater of Operations 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Blunt did not accompany the brigade. For 
no apparent military reason Lane placed Blunt in command of 
the Sixth Kansas Cavalry and assigned him to stay' behind 
and protect Fort Scott. While Blunt garrisoned Fort Scott 
a group of Missouri guerrillas led by John Mathews, an 
Indian trader uhom Blunt described as "the terror of 
southern Kansas," raided an¢! burned the tmm of Humboldt, 
Kansas, forty m:Lles west of Blunt's position. ·Immediately 
after learning of the attack Blunt mounted up two huridred 
troopers and took t~em in pursuit of Mathews. Blunt rode 
his men hard, opting to travel by night and take cover 
during the day. .After three successive nights of m.arching 
Blunt's command (along vith nineteen'other men from Emporia 
also seeking Mathews) found the guerrilla gang near the 
i 
' ' Quapaw Indian'Agencj. Blunt's night movements had given 
him the element of surprise and he did not tip his hand 
until daylight when he unleashed his cavalrymen on the 
•, 
unsuspecting marauder camp. The federals lcilled Mathews 
and two other guerrillas and dispersed the rest. Even 
though the punitive expedition was small-scale, really only 
a police action, Lieutenant-Colonel Blunt ~ad scored his 
f irs·t victory. 7 
In the pursuit of Mathews Blunt revealed several of 
the characteristics that would make him a capable· field 
' ' 
commander and, though he may not have know~ anything about 
them, he followed at least four of the nine Jominian 
principles of warfare, specifically objective, offensive, 
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maneuver (movement or mobility), and surprise. Blunt's 
objective was clear and simple, to capture or Jcill the 
Humboldt marauders. ~vhile the task 1vas infinitesimally 
small in the scheme of the war, it is significant that 
Blunt, acting on his own initiative, put his ~uo hundred 
cavalrymen in the field immediately upon hearing of the 
guerrilla raid, thus assuming the offensive. The 
lieutenant-colonel never relinguished the offensive, 
prodding his men on the night marches which capiialized on 
the small command's rriobi1i ty"' By utilizing th.e night 
marches Blunt also successfully gained the element of 
surprise on his quarry. His well-guarded approach allowed 
him to attack quickly, his cavalry having the eftect of 
shock troops, and achieve his goal without loss to his 
command. 
Blunt was an educated man ·and accustomed to large 
amounts of reading, out there is no inC.ication he studied 
anything during his college career other than what was 
necessary for his medical curriculum.B Jomini's books, 
Henry Wager Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science, 
published in 1846, and Willia~ ~. Hardee's Rifle and Light 
Infant'ry~ Tactics ( 1855) vere all hvai.lable prior to the 
vrar . Whether Blunt read these attemp~s at defined 
military strategy we do not know. 
Blunt was cer'tainly not alone in his lacl< of military 
experience prior to the Civil War. While the Mexican War 
provided training for many Civil War generals, graduates of 
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the fourteen West Point classes since that war could point 
to few experiences that prepared them for the type of 
combat they would face in the Civil War. Of course those 
graduates had the opportunity to oversee t~oops but the 
United States Army of the 1850s consisted of less than 
sixteen-thousand men scattered across the nation. 
Skirmishes with Indians provided some combat experience but 
none in full-seal~ campaigning.9 For this reason Mexican 
' ' 
War veterans such' as Ulysses s~ Grant, George B. McClellan, 
and William T. Sherman were in demand at t'he outbr~ak of 
the Civil War. But they did not fight,the war alone. The 
inexperienced volunteer officer corps formed the leadership 
backbone of the Union army. 
Blunt did have access to at least one army veteran who 
may have passed on his c;>'wh limited military Jmowledge--
his political mentor,,~am~s H. Lane. ,In 1846 Lane, a 
politically ambitious, thirty~two-year-old Indiana lawyer, 
organized a company of Indiana,volunteers to serve in the 
Mexican War. His men eiected him captain of the company 
and later colonel of the regiment to which his company 
belonged, the Third Indiana. Lane had no prior military 
experience and his men received only two weeks of- training 
before leaving for Mexico. Lane's Third Indiana served 
vith General Zachary TayLoi at the ~attle of Buena Vista, 
February 22-23, 1~47. On the first day's fighting Lane and 
his men waited in reserve until mid-afternoon when Mexican 
infantry and cavalry began to engage Colonel Jefferson 
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Davis and his Mississippi Rifles. Lane received orders to 
join with Davis in a counterattack which lasted until 
Taylor ordered a cease-fire, the Mexicans having sent 
forward a flag of truce. The white flag, Americans 
learned, was merely a ruse to allow'Mexican reinforcements 
to slip into the mai~ battle line. Lane and Davis resumed 
the fight. The fight culminated when Mexicans mounted a 
lancer charge on Lane and Davis, deployed on the slopes on 
either side of a ravine. The Mexican charge was oblique, 
meaning that the attackers did not present a square side to 
either American regiment, thus' limiting their exposure to 
fire. Davis stayed put, lessening his riflemen's 
effectiveness but Lane, acting on his mm initiative, moved 
the Third Indiana to a position where it faced the 
attacking Mexicans head-on. He did not give the order to 
fire until the attackers were within twenty-five paces and 
the resulting volley dispersed the charge. The next day 
Lane again acted on his own and interjected his regiment 
between a Mexican force and an American battery it was 
about to overrun. The term of enlistment for the Third 
Indiana ended ~oon after Buena Vista and although Lane 
recruited another regiment, the Fifth Indiana, it did not 
see combat.lO 
Lane's ovn background obviously did not discourage him 
from entrusting another young man 1vi thout military 
experience, Blunt, with a field command. If Lane gave 
Blunt the benefit of his military knowledge such an 
9 
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exchange is not recorded. And if he did, Lane must not 
have told Blunt about the flag-of-truce-triclc: Confederates 
used a similar ploy on Blunt in Arkansas in 1862. 
Blunt's expedition against Mathews vas significant for 
one other aspect: it established him as a commander 
willing to spearhead his own campaigns. Blunt could just 
as easily ~ave sent the tvo hundred troopers into the .field 
while he stayed behind at Fort Scott. But this time, just 
as he would on every other expedition of his origination 
except one, Blunt subjected himself to the same grueling 
march as his men. By doing so Blunt displayed his personal 
stamina and courage, a sure uay to gain the respect of his 
men. 
With the killing of guerrilla leader Mathews to his 
credit, Blunt was eager for mo~e fighting. Fearing that he 
would miss a general engagement with Sterling Price's 
Confederates, newly victorious at Lexington, Missouri, 
Blunt asked Lane for permission to relinquish command of 
Fort Scott and rejoin his regiment, the Third Kansas, at 
Kansas City. Lane agreed and Blunt left Fort Scott. Once 
at Kansas City Lane ordered Blunt to ride east with four 
hundred men and scout Price's army. Again Blunt marched by 
night, this time in the rain. Again Blunt relied on a hard 
march to fulfill his mission and the pace was grueling. He 
left Kansas Cit~ at sundown and by sunup was forty-five 
miles away at Lone Jack, Missouri. Price's army, trying to 
slip away from the concentration of federals at Kansas 
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City, had left Lone Jack only hours before Blunt's arrival. 
Learning that Price was trying to effect a safe retreat to 
the Osage River, Blunt turned his command and rushed back 
to Kansas City to inform Lane. Once there he found that 
Lane had been reinforced by three thousand men under 
Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis', but that Department of 
the Mississippi commander Major-General John c. Fremont, 
fearing an ~ttack by Price, had ordered them tq evacuate 
Kansas City. Fremon~•s directive v~s ludicrous ~n light of 
Blunt's reconna~ssance and Lane ahd Sturgis ~evoked the 
order. Instead they moved their army sout-heast tow-ard 
Springfield, Missouri, in pursuit of Price.11 
As the Kansans moved out of Kansas City on October 18, 
1861, La_ne gave Blunt a .new job, that of cavalry commander 
for the entire Lane Brigade. As far as Union cavalry'use 
in the early stages of the war went, Blunt had proven 
himself an effective cavalry leader. Until mid-1863 
federal commanders principally u~ed cavalry for scouting 
patrols. Blunt's patr~l had be~n excellent. He had 
accomplished his goal, brought back useful information, and 
done it uith s,peed. The troops arri yed a:t Spring.field on 
Novembei 1, but Blunt had little opportunity to exercise 
his neu command. Blunt _said he saw_ nothing but "the 
feathers of secesh poultry and the debris of disloyal 
beegums," on the march.12 
At Springfield Blunt and the rest of the Kansans 
discovered that General Fremont was on the field to lead 
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the federals, now numbering forty-five thousand, in a 
campaign against Price's twenty-five thousand men. But 
Fr~mont did not bring on a fight and the men of the Lane 
Brigade were disappotnted that they had marched from Kansas 
City for no appar~nt re~son. President Abraham Lincoln was 
also upset with Fr~mont's inactivity a~d sent Major-General 
David Hunter to relieve Fr~mont of his command. He did so 
on November 2, 1861, the day after Lane's ·men arri vee.'. 
Believing that Price had eluded battle, Hunter ordered the 
federal army to disperse and he sent the Lane Brigade back 
to Fort Scott, Kansas. Unhappy with the prospect of a 
countermarch and revealing his aggressive character, Blunt 
said he and his companions felt _",disgust for our new 
profession of arms~ and lamented.that with more such timid 
federal campaigning "it ivould take a long time to put dmm 
the rebellion."13 
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CHAPTER II 
BLUNT BECOMES A GENERAL 
1862 
James G. Blunt had the makings of a good soldier but 
as a politician he was a failure. During the first months 
of the Civil War Blunt showed some of the characteristics 
that would makechim an effective field commander: the 
ability to identify his objectives and use speed and 
mobility to achiev.e them. But, he also displayed a 
character flaw that would plague him throughout his 
military career, namely, a propensity to quarrel with his 
superiors. During an uneventful.winter in Kansas, Blunt 
began a feud with the state's first ~overnor, Charles 
Robinson, that would be the first of many such arguments 
Blunt would have with superiors during the war. Blunt 
suspected Robinson~ whom he said was ''assiduously engaged 
in his effo~ts to deprive me, and other officers,,from 
further duty," of trying to rid Kansas regiments of 
officers not politically allied with 'the governor.1 
Robinson was indeed atte~pting to clean his political 
enemies out of Kansas regiments, but ,Blunt, as evidenced by 
his comment, tool~ the governor's efforts too personally. 
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In fact Robinson's actions were more of a lashing out at 
his old political enemy, James H. Lane, than against the 
cadre of field commanders to which Blunt belonged. 
16 
Robinson and Lane had been enemies since the days 
before Kansas statehood when their respective conservative 
and radical sections of the Free State Party (later the 
Republican Party) vied for control in the state. The two 
men's contempt for each othe~ turned to pure hatred when 
they campaigned for one of Kansas' first two senatorial 
seats in 1861. Lane won, but only through last-minute 
political realignments and a wild day of voting that saw 
the ninety-eight members of the Kansas state legislature 
present cast 297 different ballots. Lane joined Samuel c. 
Pomeroy, who captured Kansas' other senate seat, in 
Washington D. C., and Robinson remained in the governor's 
office. Their feud continued. After the war began Lane, 
whose own military career was limited but nonetheless 
served as the basis for his political success, claimed a 
brigadier-general's commission from the United States War 
Department. Upon hearing of Lane's new title Robinson 
declared his senate seat vacant, explaining that Lane 
should have given up his senatorship when he accepted the 
commission. Robinson sent a replacement senator, Frederick 
Stanton, to Washington D. C. but rather than force Lane out 
of the senate chamber Robinson's action only caused Lane to 
relinquish his general's commission. Undeterred, Lane 
secured a brigadier's commission from Oliver P. Morton, 
governor of Lane's old home state of Indiana. This 
commission enabled Lane to return to Kansas, both as a 
senator and general, and recruit .the Lane Brigade.2 
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On April 1, 1862, Robinson scored a minor victory over 
Lane when he asserted his powers as governor over state 
regiments. Robinson ordered the break-up of the Third and 
Fourth Kansas Regiments with the transfer of some troops to 
other regiments and the consolidation of others into the 
Tenth Kansas Regiment. Since his own politics leaned 
toward the radical faction and Lane had become his 
political-military mentor, Blunt rightly feared for his 
colonelcy and prepared to leave the army after a brief and 
relatively unspectacular career.3 
Once again, thoug?, James Lane stepped in and kept 
Blunt's military career on track, this time with a 
brigadier-general's commission and command of the vast 
Department of Kansas. Blunt claimed that he never sought 
the position and was completely surprised yhen he received 
notice of his promotion. He was not the only one 
surprised. The Leavenworth Daily Times recorded disbelief 
on May 6, 1862, when it said it knew nothing of Blunt 
(apparently ignoring or forgetting the fact that he was one 
of the signers of the state's Wyandotte Constitution) 
except that he had been a lieutenant-colonel and was now a 
brigadier-general. "He may have al'l the qualities 
requisite for skillful administration of the affairs of the 
Department, he may be a thorough soldier . we simply 
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say we don't know it." Governor Robinson, visiting 
Washington D. c. when he heard the news, was naturally 
appalled at Blunt's appointment, which he said should be 
"condemned almost as an insult to Kansas troops."4 
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The Department of Kansas of which Blunt assumed 
command May 5, 1862, was massive. Along with the 
Department of the Missouri, it was carved out of the old 
Department of the Mi~sissippi and included all of Kansas, 
Colorado, what is now Nebrask~, the~Dakotas, and parts of 
Wyoming and Montana. That a man of Blunt's limited 
experience, esp~cially in military administration, should 
command such a department was absurd. It is likely that 
Lane supported Blunt for the position because Lane believed 
he could control Blunt and thus solve his problem of how to 
be a general in Kansas while serving as a senator in 
Washington D. c.5 
In securing Blu~t's commission and assignment Lane 
capitalized on a political alliance with Abraham Lincoln 
that he had spent several years cultivating. Lane escorted 
Lincoln on a Kansas visit in 1859, campaigned for him 
during the 1860 presidential election, ,and ofEered·to 
provide Lincoln with a bodyguard on the president-elect's 
trip to Washington in 1861. As a senator Lane arrived in 
the capital just after the fall of Fort Sumter. When fear 
of a Confederate invasion gripped Washingtonians Lane 
gathered Kansans (most of whom were in the city seeking 
patronage appointments from Lane and Pomeroy) into the 
"Frontier Guards" and protected the Potomac River bridge, 
winning Lincoln's gratitude.6 
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In agreeing to Lane's suggestion of Blunt for 
department command Lincoln showed the extent to which he 
wanted to secure broad political support ior his 
prosecution of the war. Lincoln's approval of Blunt's 
commission and promotion secured prominence and political 
recognition of Lane's radical abolitionist faction, a group 
to which Lincoln certainly did not belong. Lincoln not 
only tapped radical Republicans for generals but also 
Democrats as well. While Major-General George B. McClellan 
is one of the most notable Democratic general to serve in 
the Union army during the Civil War his appointment to 
command, first as chief of the Department of the Ohio, then 
commander of the Army of the Potomac and briefly as 
general-in-chief of the whole United States Army, was 
neither surprising nor questionable given McClellan's 
military background. He was a graduate in 1846 of West 
Point and a Mexican War veteran. The Army sent him to 
Europe to observe the Crimean War and later he achieved 
fame with the United States dragoons as the inventor,of the 
McClellan saddle, which was light and comfortable to both 
horse and rider. Despite McClellan's performance later in 
the war, Lincoln's initial appointment of the.young man (he 
was thirty-four at the time, a few years younger than the 
average age of Union generals, thirty-eight) had sound 
military basis. But Lincoln also chose Democratic generals 
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for no other reason than political necessity. He named 
Illinois Democrat John A. McClGrnand a brigadier-general 
only to secure southern Illinois in the Union. McClernand 
participated in Ulysses s. Grant's February 1862, campaigns 
against Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee and fought in 
April 1862, at Pittsburgh Landing, Tennessee, but did more 
to establish himself as an egotist and self-promoter than 
an able commander. He performed poorly at Fort Donelson 
and later, with no particularly grand military laurels to 
point to, .McClernand pleaded with Lincoln to give him 
independent command of an expedition against Vicksburg, 
Mississippi, the key to control of the Mississippi River. 
Such a command would allow him to recruit more southern 
Illinois Democrats for the war effort, he argued, and 
Lincoln agreed. Generals Halleck, Grant, and William T. 
Sherman, all convinced of McClernand's incompetence, 
maneuvered to start the campaign.under Sherman's 
supervision while McClernand was away. McClernand was 
angry but went along with the expedition, still as a 
subordinate. When he perceived that Grant had decided on 
siege warfare to capture Vicksburg, McClernand wrote an 
inflamatory letter ·to his troops, calling upon them for 
aggressive action in an attempt to establish himself as the 
true Union fighter on the Mississippi River in case Grant's 
efforts failed. Grant got wind of the letter, charged 
McClernand with insubordination, and relieved him of 
command. Lincoln did not help McClernand, for to do so 
would be to risk losing Grant. Nevertheless, Lincoln had 
gotten all of the political use he could out of 
McClernand.7 
That Blunt had no experience commanding a large force 
also made no difference in obtaining Lincoln's approval. 
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He had set such a precedent before when he approved Major 
Irvin McDowell's brigadier-general's commission and 
appointment to command of the Army of Northeastern Virginia 
in 1861. Lincoln made the appointment largely at the 
behest of McDowell's political sponsor, Secretary of the 
Treasury Salmon P. Chase. Even thou~h ,McDowell was a 
graduate in 1834 o( West Point graduate and a 
twenty-three-year regular army veteran, he had never led 
any large force. McDowell presided over the first 
significant Union defeat at First Bull Run, July 21, 
1861.8 
Thus Blunt was certainly not the only inexperienced, 
political general whom Lincoln appointed. In the first 
year of the war the president_commissioned sixteen generals 
who possessed no military background. At the end of 1861 
12.7 percent of the Union's generals, compared to 7.9 
percent of the Confederacy's, had no martial training. 
And, out of forty-four political appointments Lincoln made 
in 1861, only seven of them were West Pointers.9 
Blunt knew that he did not have the experience or 
education to handle his new appointment which, he said, 
"brought me into a new field, and imposed upon me greater 
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responsibilities than I would voluntarily have assumed." 
Blunt said he accepted the job as he believed it was the 
first duty of a soldier to obey orders. Even so, he 
commented that department command put him in "an unpleasant 
and embarrassing position."lO 
Given the obvious handicaps he carried into the new 
job, Blunt hoped to rely on the "indulgence and 
cooperation": of both Kansas civilians and soldiers in the 
execution of his duties. But a-lmost immediately Blunt was 
in the middle of.the political turmoil so characteristic of 
the Kansas military. Blunt said his assignment to command 
was "the signal for a combined attack of all my personal 
and political opponents," not the least of 1vhom \vas 
Governor Charles Robinson. Robinson, again trying to 
thwart Lane's military control in Kansas, attempted to load 
Kansas regiments with officers of his own choosing, often 
issuing two or three commissions for one position to 
friends and patronage-seekers. Blunt correctly deduced 
that Robinson's plan was to foist upon the new general so 
many conservative commission claimants that Blunt would be 
unable to extract himself from a political quagmire, and 
thus either have to resign or be relieved. Blunt ordered 
the post commander at Fort Leavemvorth, Kansas, to deny the 
muster of any officer holding a Robinson commission until 
Blunt himself approved it and went so far as to warn state 
officials against "tampering" vli th troops in United States 
service. Blunt's parry of Robinson's maneuver was 
successful. If Lane told Blunt how to respond it is not 
recorded but no doubt the end result pleased the 
senator.ll 
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With his command just over a week old, Blunt became 
the subject of a fellow Union general's ire. On May 13 Ben 
Loan, Missouri State Militia brigadier-general and 
commander of the District of Northwest Missouri, complained 
about Blunt to Brigadier-General John M. Schofield, 
commanding the Missouri State Militia, charging him with 
sanctioning renewed border violence between Kansans and 
Missourians. Loan's allegations stemmed from an incident 
in early May wheri a man named Atchison and a woman named 
Boyer, both Kansans, went into Missouri looking for a horse 
stolen from Boyer's husband (whom Missourians believed to 
be one of Charles Jennison's men in the old Lane Brigade). 
They found the horse near Farley, Missouri, with William 
Walker and when the Kansans took, the horse, Walker summoned 
his neighbors for help. The Farley men caught Atchison and 
held him for trial in Platte City, Missouri, but before the 
hearing could begin a federal contirigent from Fort 
Leavenworth rode into town and demanded the arrest of all 
connected with Atchison's arrest. The Kansas troops 
claimed Blunt sent them. Not knowing the validity of the 
orders the Missourians allowed the Kansas soldiers to 
arrest five of the Farley men. 
Loan demanded an explanation from Blunt, who replied 
through his assistant adjutant-general Thomas Moonlight. 
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Moonlight said the case was pending ~t Fort Leavenworth but 
that Missourians who had visited the fort had failed to 
prove the horse belonged to Walker, intimating that a 
hearing would find in favor of Atchison and Boyer. 
Moonlight said it was Blunt's intention to prevent border 
trouble and as such would try to keep Kansas raiding 
parties from crossing into Missouri. He also warned 
Missouri border raiders crossing into Kansas that federals 
would catch them and try them before a military 
committee.l2 
While it may have been Blunt's professed intention to 
halt border trouble his actions nonetheless appear liJ.ce an 
extension of the old Kansas-Missouri border war. An order 
he issued on June 26, 1862, indicated that Blunt was more 
concerned with catching and punishing Missourians who might 
brealc the peace rather than Kansans guilty of doing the 
same. He condemned guerrilla warfare and seemed t9 
classify it as a purely Confederate tactic. He described 
"bushwhacking" as warfare where "rebel fiends lay in wait 
for their prey to assassinate Union soldiers and citizens." 
Blunt ordered that any bushwhaclcer captured not be treated 
according to the rules of war but rather be tried by 
drum-head court martial and if found guilty be immediately 
shot or hanged. "No punishment can be too prompt or severe 
for such unnatural .enemies of the human race," he said. · 
Blunt also was involved in the creation of the notorious 
group of Kansas guerrillas Jcnown as "Red Legs" for the red 
leggings they wore. Blunt and Brigadier-General Thomas 
E1ving, Jr., of the Eleventh Kansas R'egiment created the 
group as border scouts to warn of raids by Missourians. 
Eventually the Red Legs earned a reputation as robbers and 
murderers both in Missouri and Kansas, and Blunt later 
condemned the organization.13 
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Blunt's policy of severe treatment for Missouri 
bushlvhackers no doubt stemmed in part from the Kansas 
notion that all Missourians were pro-slavery secessionists. 
It was also a manifestation of the abolitionist zeal that 
led him into the political circle of James H. Lane's 
radical Kansas Republicans (and as far as any 
Blunt-initiated administrative policy is concerned one must 
always question to what extent_it was inspired by Lane 
himself). But it was as typical of Blunt's aggressive 
nature, which had alr~ady_ exhibited itself in forced night 
marches and would play an essential role in his field 
generalship. 
But Blunt's aggressiveness often turned on him and 
sparked childish, often protracted arguments with his 
superiors. Soon after he had assumed ·department command 
the War Department requested that Blunt send five thousand 
troops from Kansas to help Major-General Henry Wager 
Halleck, who vas then threatening Confederates at Corinth, 
Mississippi. Blunt obeyed but when he learned that Halleck 
had let the rebels slip away Blunt became furious. He 
railed at Halleclc for taking Kansas troops on a failed 
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mission. In fact, Blunt became so angry at Halleck that he 
refused to communicate in the future with the general, even 
when the latter became United States Army general-in-chief. 
While he remained a department commander, Blunt 
corresponded only with Secretary of War Edwin M. 
Stanton.14 
Blunt's encounter with Halleck, as well as the way he 
handled the run-in with.Governor Robinson, showed that 
Blunt, at least in dealing with administrative problems, 
was very characte~istic of his name--blun~. He had little 
finesse in handling people. Even though Robinson was 
governor of the state that sent the largest number'of 
troops to Blunt's department, the general made no attempt 
to appease him, but just assumed he could do his job and 
ignore the former. The same with Halleck. Blunt displayed 
the type of hard-nosed personality that, when faced with a 
personal affront or .slight, would not let him seek some 
sort of workable agreement with the offender. Instead it 
forced him to turn a~ay from ~hem in a huff and pretend 
that by ignoring them he had made the problem go away. For 
a man attempting to administer an entire military 
department this was a critical personality flaw and one 
made worse by his lack of military education. 
Blunt's single-minded attitude made him much more 
adept at actual military campaigning, and while he 
initiated his first large-scale campaign barely a month 
after assuming department command, his administrative 
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duties kept him from its head. It was a campaign into 
rebel-held Indian Territory south of Kansas and was the 
first Union expedition into that area since federals 
abandoned it in April 1861. It was the only campaign which 
Blunt originated but did not accompany and it met with only 
marginal success. 
Blunt's purpose in mounting the Indian Territory 
expedition was three-fold: to disperse ~mall.Confederate 
bands operating in the territory; to restore Unionist 
Indians --whom Confederates had driven i~to Kansas--to 
their homes; and to cover Kansas and southwest Missouri 
from rebel attack. Keeping in mind the nine principles of 
warfare Blunt's objectives outlined the expedition well, 
but he faltered wpen he selected a leader for the campaign. 
He picked former Wyandotte, Kansas, lawyer and Lane Brigade 
regimental commander Colonel William Weer. Fellow officers 
considered Weer a capable commander, at least when he was 
not drunk.15 Blunt offered no explanation for his 
selection of Weer to lead the mission but it is possible 
that Weer's old affiliation with the radical Lane regiments 
had a bearing on ~is decision. 
The major accomplishment of the· Indian Territory 
expedition was the organization of refugee Indians into 
fighting Union regiments. They were the First (Creek) 
Regiment, Third (Cherokee) Regiment, and S~cond (mixed) 
Regiment; Weer assumed the task of organizing them. He 
found it no easy job. On June 5, 1862, Weer complained 
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that his Indians were in want of everything from clothes to 
wagons and he had to call back some of the expedition.' s 
1vhi te troops, under the command of Colonel Charles 
Doubleday, who had already marched for the border. As the 
expedition was intended in part to restore the Indians to 
their homes, Weer told Doubleday he did not thinlc it wise 
for the command to march without them. On June 13 Weer's 
supplies were en route to him but he wrote to Blunt's 
adjutant, Thomas Moonlight, that training the Indians 
caused him a "thousand and one difficulties." They wanted 
to Jmov; if they could tal;:e the property of rebel Indians in 
the territory, they wanted revolvers to fight with and, 
naturally, they wanted to know what they would do when the 
expedition concluded~ Their inquisitiveness was simply a 
display of their desire to get under way. "To-night they 
have a grand war dance," sa.id Weer. "They have all taken 
their medicine and c~nsider them~elves bullet-proof."16 
With his Indians ,confident in their war-medicine ~'Veer 
ordered the six thousand man force to leave June 14. They 
crossed into Indian Territory on an old military road 
leading.to Fort Gibson, the majo.r: army post in the 
territory. Weer learn~d of a Confed~rate fQrce twenty 
miles in front of him and he split his force on both sides 
of the Grand River, sending his supply train down the west 
side so that the, river itself formed a barrier. between the 
train and the rebels. Weer scored the one victory of the 
expedition when he surrounded a unit of Missourians at 
Locust Grove and captured 110 of them along with their 
baggage, powder, and sixty wagons.17 
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Weer then moved his command to 1vi thin tvTel ve miles of 
Fort Gibson, when the Indian Territory expedition fell 
apart. Weer refused to move further and his commanders 
began to believe that rebels had cut them off from the 
supply train. Troops sweltered in the July heat. Fearing 
for their safety in the advanced position Weer '·S officers 
revolted and arrested'him. Colonel Frederick Salomon of 
the Ninth Wisconsin Regiment took command of the expedition 
and reported to Blunt that Weer had been "abusive and 
violent" to his officers and "notoriously intemperate." 
Salomon said the column remained idle near Fort Gibson for 
ten days and Weer made no attempt to re-establish his 
communications. Rations had dwindled to a three-day supply 
when the officers rebelled. Salomon said he assumed Weer 
was either "insane [or] .. . his grossly intemperate 
habits had produced idiocy." Salomon said Weer's arrest 
was the only alternative open to him. Nov that the column 
was under his command he ordered it back to Kansas, 
intending to leave only the Indian regiments in the 
territory.18 
Salomon's withdrawal outraged Indian agents. E. H. 
Carruth and H. w. Martin vrote to Blunt that the retreat of 
the column left Unionist Indians in the territory in a 
dangerous position. They believed the three Indian 
Regiments would not be enough to protect the Indians and 
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white missionaries who had proclaimed their loyalty when 
Weer's column entered Indian Territory. Such people, they 
said, would be "ruthlessly murdered . . by the gangs of 
cut-throats which will infest the country.rrl9 
The commanders of the three Indian regiments v;rere not 
as skeptical as the Indian agents, though. Colonel R. w. 
Furnas, commander of the Indian Brigade and the First 
Indian Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel D. B~ Corwin, 
" 
commanding the Second Indian Regiment, and Colonel Wil·liam 
Phillips commanding ~he Third Indian Regiment, consolidated 
their troops for protection and secured a section of 
artillery from Saiomon's retreating column. With this 
force (the Second Indian Regiment vas depleted by 
desertions following Weer's arrest), the commanders 
occupied all of the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas 
River. "I have no doubt but I. can hold the Indian country 
and protect the loyal people from pillage and murder," 
Furnas told Blunt.20 
Blunt sent orders to Salomon to halt his column where 
ever he received the order. Then Blunt rode for Fort 
Scott .. But when. he arrived there, much to his chagrin, he 
found Salomon who had ignored Blunt's order·and continued 
his retreat. Blunt convened a court martial to investigate 
the apparent mutiny in the field, but, recognizing that 
virtually all of the officers accompanying the expedition 
were involved in some way, the general dissolved the court 
and reorganized the command.21 
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Blunt considered the ex~e~ition successful since it 
had encouraged John Ross, principal chief of the Cherolcee 
Nation, to reaffirm his allegiance to the Union. The 
Cherokee had split when the war broke out and Blunt had 
long believed a Union presence in the territory would bring 
many Cherokee back under federal aegis.22 
When compared to Blunt's plans for the e~pedition, 
though, the campaign failed. Before he stopped moving, 
Weer was almost one hundred niles into Indian Territory but 
after the retreat (caused by Salomon alone and not by enemy 
resistance) the Indian Brigade clung tentatively to their 
hold on the territory, occupying it only from the safety of 
the Kansas border. Certainly the ~rigade would not be able 
to fight any rebel army that might mass before them much 
less guard Kansas or south1;est Missouri from a determined 
Confederate attack. The expedition did not relieve the 
problem of the refugee Indians either. Those who 
accompanied the force did not return to their homes and as 
late as November, 1862, Blunt stiil sougpt to restore them 
to their homes. 
The failure of the mission, at least in part, was 
Blunt's fault. He chose a known alcoholic to organize and 
lead the mission, and he uas tardy in ordering supplies to 
its units. Weer was not able to operate 160 miles south of 
his base of operations, Fort Scott, Kansas, and almost one 
hundred miles inside enemy territory and still maintain his 
composure. It is not surprising that, in so dangerous a 
position, the expedition's commanders panicked when they 
saw Weer acting strangely. 
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Whether the mission would have been successful with 
Blunt at its head we can only speculate. Blunt did have a 
clearly defined set of objectives and from Weer's comments 
before embarking he apparently communicated them 
effectively to the colonel. Blunt's mistake was in picking 
Weer to lead the expedition. While Blunt learned a hard 
lesson about picking the 'lrong commander for a campaign, he 
apparently also learned to trust no one but himself at the 
head of his armies. His unwillingness to delegate large 
responsibilities went hand-in-hand with his condemnation of 
other officers, such as Fremont and Halleck, and created 
the impression that he believed he was the only commander 
in the immediate theater who could lead an army. In any 
event the Indian Territory campaign was the first and last 
expedition under Blunt's supervision that operated without 
him as its leader. 
Following the marginally successful Indian Territory 
campaign, Blunt began to enter another group of political 
Union generals, that of abolitionists. Again Blunt was not 
able to exercise his new military influence in th1s area 
without the aid of Senator James H. Lane. 
Blunt had been a devout abo~itionist since his days as 
a young physician in Ohio. His anti-slavery activities 
began in earnest on the frozen banks of the Ohio River 
outside Cincinnati in the winter of 1855-56. There a group 
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of slaves from nearby Newport, Kentucky, used the frozen 
river as a bridge from slavery to freedom. Cincinnati 
Negroes asked local abolitionist and Underground R~ilroad 
leader Levi Coffin to help the slaves effect their crossing 
and when he arrived at a Negro home ¥here the fugitives 
were to rendezvous he brought along a friend--Dr. James G. 
Blunt. Blunt was eager to accompany Coffin. "I have never 
had the pleasure of seeing a fugitive slave, and I would 
like to see one,'' said Blunt. He noted that there had been 
runaways near his home in New Madison, Ohio, but he had 
never seen them. Before the fugitives proceeded north 
Underground Railroad conductors gave them weapons and 
ammunition. Seeing the armsd negroes Blunt became excited 
and emotional and delivered to them an impromptu speech. 
"Let your watchword be liberty or death," he said. "Die in 
your tracks, boys, rather than be talcen back to. slavery." 
Then Blunt emptied out his pockets and gave the runaways 
all the money h~ car~ied, save.for a little he needed 
himself to return home.23 Blunt· followed his 
abolitionist ardor to Kansas in the midst of the 
pro-slave/free-state· struggle and consequently to the 
acquaintance of James H. Lane and a subsequent military 
career. 
Abolitionist generals were not a novelty during the 
Civil War and they began t6 make news very quickly. 
Major-General Benjamin F. Butler (hims,elf a political 
general with a limited militia background whom Lincoln 
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found it politically expedient to grant a major command) 
first took action on the slavery question on May 23, 1861. 
That day three slaves ran into Butler's lines at Fortress 
Monroe, Virginia. Butler refused to return them to 
Confederates, labeling the blacks "contraband of war." 
Butler's action eventually led' to the use of "contrabands" 
within military lines. , Major-General John c. Fremont, 
commanding the Western Department at St. Loui~ ~. Missouri, 
in August, 1861, issued a proclamation which declared 
martial law in Misso~ri, confisca~ed the property of anyone 
in rebellion against the United States, and freed their 
slaves. Presiden~ Lincoln di~avowed Fremont's action, not 
yet wanting to put the war on an anti-slavery footing, and 
certainly toolc Fremont's proclamation into consideration 
when he removed the general from command in November. 
Still the incident marked the 'second time that the slavery 
question had been broached by,~enerals in the field. 
Major-General Samuel R. Curtis, a West Point graduate and 
old regular army office~, took no such specific action with 
regard to slaves,, but Lincoln deemed him radical enough in 
his abolitionist beliefs thcit.he had·to remove him from 
command of the Department of the Missouri in 1863. Lincoln 
was almost apologetic about removing Curtis, saying the 
general did not appear able to work with conservative 
Missouri governor Hamilton Gamble, who had been 
instrumental in keeping that state in the Union.24 
In August 1862, James H. Lane returned to Kansas ready 
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to enlist blacks into United States military service. Lane 
brought with him permission to open a recruiting station at 
Fort Leavenworth, claiming his recruiting commission gave 
him the right to enlist blacks as well as whites. Even 
though Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and 
General-in-Chief Henry w.·Halleck denied that Lane had such 
authority, the senator-general persisted .. Naturally Blunt 
offered his help.25 
Their task was not easy. While it is likely" that men 
of the Lane Brigade stole Missouri slaves and brought them 
back to Kansas for military service, there was only a small 
pool of free blacks in Kansas from which to draw recruits. 
"They [Lane a:nd Blunt] had great difficulty in getting the 
niggers to enlist,"· said Benjamin F. Van Horn, a friend of 
Lane's and Kansas state representative from Madison County. 
Van Horn furnished beef to the refugee Indians in southern 
Kansas and discovered that the Indians had brought with 
them about one hundred blacks when they fled rebel 
occupation of the Indian Territory. The blacks were on 
short rations, though, as the government did not contract 
for their food .. · They· ate. only what the Indians gave 
them. 26 
Lane and Blunt became very excited at Van Horn's news 
and they insisted, as he was familiar with the blacks, that 
Van Horn recruit· them for federal seryice. When Blunt 
fetched him pen and paper to make a requisition list for a 
new company of blacks Van Horn protested. "I did not know 
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anything more about what I would want than the man in the 
moon," he said, but Blunt simply filled out the requis·ition 
himself and soon Van Horn found himself fitted out with 
enough equipment for an eighty-man co~pany. The supplies 
included cooking utensils, rations, ~all-tents, wagons and 
teams, and rifles and ammunition. The fact that Blunt and 
Lane readily ,armed the blacks ran counter to Lane's promise 
to Congress that,he would not give them weapons.27 
Carrying a recruiting lieutenant's commission, Van 
Horn left Fort Leavenworth and with1h twenty-five days had 
his black company-filled and marching to Fort Scott. "When 
I got their old rags off and [them] a~l dressed in new 
uniforms ... they were as proud as a little boy with a 
red wagon," said Van Horn. His company became part of the 
First Kansas Colored 'Infantry. 28 
Lane's and Blu-nt.' s stubborn recruitment of blacks was 
an extension of their abolitionist zeal but it caused 
trouble for the First Kansas Colored in 1863. Without 
proper federal sanction, the troops seldom got paid. Men 
became disgruntl~d and left the regiment. In April 1863, 
regimental commander Colonel 'James Williams suspended w6rk 
at Camp Emancipation, Kansas, to let the ·tempers of his 
troops cool. With th~ organization oE the United States 
Bureau of Colored Troops in May 1863, federal authorities 
finally authoriz~d the First Kansas C~lbre~ and reorganized 
it as the Seventy-Ninth U. S. Colored Infantry, but not 
until 1864 did the men get paid.29 
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Despite his pro-black, abolitionist background and the 
fact that he later also helped raise the Second Kansas 
Colored Regiment and Eleventh United States Colored 
Regiment, General James G. Blunt did little to promote the 
use of blacks in combat. Now, in mid-August, he was ready 
to embark on a series of campaigns that would win him 
military recognition. He took with him no black troops. 
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CHAPTER III 
BLUNT TAKES THE FIELD 
1-862 
The best political generals of the Civil War always 
found a way to distance themselves from their political 
sponsors or motivations and fight Confederates. Ulysses 
s. Grant is a prime example. Grant, a Democrat, can be 
classified as a political general_as Lincoln commissioned 
him at the urging of ~llinois congressman Elihu B. 
Washburne. From then on, though, Grant was a fighting 
general initiating an attack on Belmont, Missouri, as early 
' 
as November 1861. He, al\vays kept any political vievs he may 
have had to himself and made Lincoln's polic~es his own. 
The worst political generals, McClernand and Fremont among 
them, could not distance themselves from their political 
agenda. As bad as their generalship was and as sparse as 
thei~ military ~ccomplishmerits were, both men persist~d in 
making themselves political thorns in Lincoln's side as 
they knew they brought to the. war,effort the support of 
War Denocrats and Radical Republicans.1 
In order for Blunt to make any effective contribution 
to the Union fight and earn a military reputation for 
hinself, it was necessary for him to distance himself, 
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physically if not philosophically, from James H. Lane. 
Blunt saw his chance in early August, 1862, and he took it. 
Once he placed himself in the field Blunt became a general 
in the Ulysses s. Grant mold, abandoning political concerns 
and taking a battering ram approach to his main 
goal--whipping rebels. 
Blunt's opportunity to take charge of his military 
fortunes came when a thousand-man force of Confederate 
irregulars pushed into western Missouri and began enlisting 
recruits for a march to the Missouri River. 
Brigadier-General E. B. Brown of the Unionist Missouri 
State Militia sent an urgent message to Blunt on August 6, 
asking if the Kansan could cross the border and occupy 
Newton and Jasper Counties in Missouri. Blunt had to 
reorganize his command in the wake of the failed Indian 
Territory mission, bbt he wasted little time. By August 11 
he was ready to mount his expedition, with himself at its 
head, and the ensuing campaign likely saved Kansas from a 
rebel invasion. 
Blunt still carried with him into the field very 
little in- the way of military experience ahd the plan he 
devised was characteristically uncomplicated. He intended 
using his and Brown's armies as ;th~ jaw's of a pincers and 
trap the invading Confederates between them. Blunt 
realized speed wai of the utmos~ im~ortance and speed was 
something that Blunt could deliver. He had done so in his 
hunt for the guerrilla Mathews and again in his 
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reconnaissance out of Kansas City for Jim Lane. He could 
no doubt do it again, but just to make sure his infantry 
did not slow down his cavalry and horse-drawn artillery, 
Blunt put the foot-soldiers into wagons, a form of 
early-day personnel carriers. Blunt's counter-invasion was 
fast, but not quite fast enough: by the time he_ struck the 
Confederate trail it was a d~y old. B~unt stopped near 
Johnson, Missouri, and rested his men, but only .for three 
hours. Then he marched day-and-night northbound, hoping to 
catch the rebels before they crossed the Missouri. Sixty 
hours and one hundred miles after ·leaving Fort Scott Blunt 
caught up with his quarry at Lone Jack, Missouri, on August 
17.3 
Despite Blunt's hell-bent-for-battle pursuit he had 
been a day too late to prevent thirty-two hundred rebels 
under Colonels Vard Cockrell and John T. Coffee from 
defeating eight hundred Missouri militiamen at Lone Jack. 
The five-hour battle was particularly bloody, with 
Confederates lcilling or wounding nearly every Union 
officer. The battle swirled around the militia's two-gun 
battery which was captured and retake~ twice. Rebels 
killed or wounded two~thirds of the battery's service crew. 
Finally, their horses dead or scattered, the militiamen 
spiked their guns and ran. The total Union loss in lcilled, 
wounded, and missing was 272, or almost one-third of the 
troops who went into battle.4 
But now Blunt was on the field with four thousand men 
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and he intended to destroy the Confederates. Even before 
his whole command was on hand, Blunt threw out skirmishers 
to probe the rebel line, indicating not only his haste to 
bring the enemy to battle but also that he had learned some 
battlefield tactics during his year in the army. The 
almost automatic deployment of skirmishers by Civil War 
generals was a relatively'new tactic, necessitated by 
widespread use of rifled ·shoulder arms. A rifle's kill 
range (about five hundred yards co~pared to a smooth-bore 
musket's one hundred yards) forced Civil War commanders to 
form their armies farther apart, to stretch their battle 
lines, and reduce th~ density of men in a combat zone. 
Skirmishers, advancing in widely spaced ranks, could occupy 
a wide area more .safely than a densely packed line. 
Skirmishers could cover an advance as well as disrupt an 
enemy line in a way that artillery no longer could. 
Fieldpieces had not advanced .in step with rifled shoulder 
arms. Most were still smoothbore and did not have the 
effective range of rifles. Consequently, riflemen could 
kill artillerists before the latter were in effective 
range. This situation made Civil War artillery more 
valuable to defender~ than attackers.5 
As the van of his army came on the field Blunt 
prepared his attack but an August thunderstorm halted his 
assault. Under d~rkness the Confederates took refuge in a 
six-mile expanse of timber, slipped around Blunt's right, 
and escaped. 
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The storm and nightfall prevented Blunt from pulling 
his men out of line and giving immediate pursuit, but at 
daybreak he had his army dogging the Confederate rear. 
Blunt's column pressed their enemy so relentlessly that 
rebel horses died from exhaustion, their riders taking to 
the brush for cover. Blunt's advance guard led by Colonel 
William Cloud skirmished with the rebels on August 19, 
killing a handful of them. They followed the raiders to 
Carthage, in southwest Missouri, where Blunt broke off the 
chase, his men and stock exhausted. As Cloud's advance 
returned to the main body of Blunt's force, stopped at 
Montevallo, Missouri, they bumped into a group of 
Confederate riders led by guerril~a chieftain William C. 
Quantrill and Colonel Joseph Oliver ''Jo" Shelby, a cavalry 
leader who styled himself after General J. E. B. Stuart, 
even to the point of wearing a plume in his hat. They 
outnumbered Cloud's three hundred men almost four-to-one 
and after a brief skirmish ip which he lost five men killed 
and fifteen wounded Cloud abandoned the fight and resumed 
his march. Blunt's command was back at Fort Scott, Kansas, 
by August 26; the Lone Jack expedition over.6 
Blunt's first campaign was a success, albeit a 
qualified one. The ~ajor characteristic of the mission was 
the speed and determination with which Blunt carried it 
out, a characteristic the g~Qeral had dis~layed before and 
would display again. From the time Blunt left Fort Scott 
to the time he broke off the chase five days later, his men 
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marched two hundred miles, an average of forty per day. 
Blunt's use of wagons facilitated this type of forced 
march, though it was unlike rebel General Thomas .J. 
"Stonewall" Jackson's famed "foot cavalry" who.often 
'. 
achieved the same rate of march on foot alone. Blunt 
prepared the expedition with liitie notice arid his men took 
the field without tents or sufficient rations. The last 
two days of the outing they lived off enemy forage. 
In the Lone Jacl~ campaign Blunt exhibited an eagerness 
' ' ' 
to fight. When a fight at Lone Jack did not develop he did 
not hesitate to trail the enemy and try to bring on 
another. While this campaign is {nsignificant compared 
' ' 
with Ulysses s. Grant's attacks on Forts Henry and 
Donnelson earlier in the year, Blunt and Grant shared some 
of the same pers6nal .characteristi~s. Neither man shied 
from a 'fight. Blunt was certainly willing to fight in a 
summer storm and Grant captured Henry and Donnelson in 
Winter 1 a time When mo'st COmmanderS preferred tO be in 
camp, and marched ~is men through February snows to do it. 
Grant was a West Pointer and Mexican War veteran and used 
his experience coupled with common sense to trap 
Confederate General John B. Floyd at FGrt Donnelson. Had 
Blunt possessed more experience he might have been able to 
anchor off the six-mile width of woods on the Lone Jack 
battlefield and pre~ent a r~bel e~cape. Certainly courage 
and aggressiveness had to take their places alongside 
military skill in a _general's make-up. At Lone Jack Blunt 
showed he definitely had the first two.7 
After resting and regrouping at Fort Scott, Kansas, 
Blunt sent brigades under newly-commissioned 
Brigadier-General Frederick Salomon, the man who aborted 
Blunt's Indian Territory expeditidn, and Colonels Weer and 
Cloud back into Missouri to guard against a large rebel 
force federals believed to be in the southwestern part of 
that state. As Blunt prepared to join the commanders in 
the field w·ord ar.:t;"i ved that he ivas no longer commander of 
the Department of Kansas. In fact'· the department no 
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longer even existed. Major-General Samuel R. Curtis, the 
~bolitionist and.victor of the March 1~62, Battle of Pea 
Ridge, Arkansas, sent news to Blunt that the War Department 
had consolidated the'Kansas department with the Department 
of the Missouri and had given Curtis command of the.larger 
unit, which retained the title of Department of the 
Missouri. The War Department ·offered Blunt command of the 
smaller District of. Kan~as. and he a.ccepted it ui thout a 
fuss. Judging from his· comments upon assuming command of 
the department, he was no dou.bt glad to leave the job. He 
had accomplished little as department commander and his 
best mi li taxy succes::'i came on the Lone JacJ<: ·expedition. 
where he was· in the field leading his army. Blunt's new 
position detailed him to return to the field. His orders 
were to take his troops, now known as the Army of Kansas, 
into Missouri and' link up with militia leader 
Brigadier-General John M. Schofield's Army of Southwest 
Missouri. Curtis decreed that this collective force would 
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be called the Army of the Frontier and Schofield would be 
its commander. Under this arrangement Blunt's Army of 
Kansas would also be known as the First Division, Army of 
the Frontier.8 With this reorganization Blunt became 
essentially a division commander, a position more in line 
with his experience. Blunt's political sponsor, James H. 
Lane, was silent on the change. He doubtless did not care 
as Blunt still directly commanded Kansas troops and General 
Curtis was radical enough in his abolitionist views to fit 
Lane's philosophical criteria. 
On October,1 Blunt left Fort Scott. At midnight he 
learned that six thousand rebels under Generals Douglas H. 
Cooper and Jo Shelby had engaged Frederick Salomon and the 
Army of Kansas' advance guard near Newtonia, Missouri, and 
had driven them back to Sarcoxie, Missouri. Blunt rode on 
to Sarcoxie where he met Schofield and the two generals 
planned to fight the enemy at Newtonia.9 
Schofield was a graduate in 1853 of West Point and had 
served on garrison duty in South Carolina and Florida, and 
as assistant professor of natural and experimental 
philosophy.at West Point and professor of physics at 
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He had no 
combat experience until the Civil War started. Then 
Brigadier General Nathanial Lyon, the abolitionist who 
successfully fought to keep Missouri from seceding, made 
Schofield his chief of staff in the summer of 1861. 
Schofield fought with Lyon in actions at Dug Springs, 
Missouri, on August 2, and Curran Post Office, Missouri, 
August 3-4, and at the battle of Wilson's Creek, Missouri, 
on August 10, where rebel gunfire killed Lyon. As such, 
Schofield's actual combat experience was limited to a span 
of just over a week.10 
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Assuming Cooper and Shelby expec~ed a frontal attack, 
Schofield and Biunt dedided to smash simultaneously into 
the Confeder~te flanks. The plan called for flawless 
orchestration of the two armies which no doubt put a strain 
on the two Union generals of i{mited battlefield 
experience. Blunt was to move through Granby, Missouri, to 
the enemy's left flank. Schofield would move by a less 
circuitous route to the east of Newtonia and assail the 
rebel right. At twenty-five miles Blunt's route of march 
was five miles longer .than Schofield's, but one which, 
given his propensity for speed and hard marching, he was 
well qualified to make. Each man would fire a signal gun 
when his troops were in p~sition and ready to attack.ll 
Schofield and Blunt led their armies out of Sarcoxie 
early on October 4. Before his army even reached Granby, 
Blunt's advance guard encountered stiff resistance from 
rebels in a narrow defile who succeeded in stalling Blunt's 
march for what he called "a considerable time." Blunt's 
soldiers finally brushed the Confederates aside and pressed 
on, only to encounter a regiment of rebel cavalry at 
Granby, six miles from Newtonia. The horsemen fell back 
but the delays had put Blunt behind the mission's time 
schedule and destroyed his element of surprise. Blunt 
could see Cooper's and Shelby's men before him and he 
assumed Schofield was on the other Confederate flank, 
itching to start the battle. Blunt drew up on the rebel 
position arid fired his si.gnal' gun. There 11as no reply. 
Schofield was not in p~sitibn and Cooper and Shelby were 
preparing to run. Blunt was sure that .his a~rmy was big 
enough to beat the C~nfedera tes (as v1as Schofield • s; the 
generals had agreed on the pincers movement to prevent the 
possibility of a· rebel escape) and he opened fire in an 
attempt to bring on a battle. The Union volley only 
hastened the Con~ederate retreat.12 
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What could have been a brilliant.capture of nearly six 
thousand Confederates turned into a dismal failure. After 
Newtonia Blunt severely criticized Schofield for his 
tardiness and came to hate him bitterly. "He had five 
miles less distance to march thqn I had, did not encounter 
even a picket, and yet failed to carry out his part of the 
arrangement," Blunt complained. Schofield offered-Blunt no 
explanations and the incident sparked a venomous feud 
between.the two generals that would last through the 
remainde~ of the war.13 
Schofield mounted a pursuit 'of the Confederates but it 
was slow and hampered by rains. The Army of the Frontier 
travelled only forty-five miles in ten days, reaching Pea 
Ridge in northwest Arkansas on October 15. Blunt condemned 
Schofield's inactivity "w·hile the enemy kept just far 
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enough in our advance to avoid danger." When the Army of 
the Frontier went into camp at Pea Ridge, Cooper and Shelby 
camped only twenty-five miles away at Elm Springs. There 
another six thousand troops under West Point graduate 
General John S. Marmaduke reinforced them. Diligent 
campaigning on Schofield's part could have prevented such a 
union and possibly beaten the Confederate forces piecemeal. 
Blunt claimed that Schofield spent all this time making a 
"geographical and topographical" survey of the country. He 
said Schofield consulted him for the first time since 
Newtonia on October 20 when he learned that the rebels had 
split their force, with one-half moving into the Indian 
Territory, and the other moving east. General Cooper led 
the army entering Indian Territory and he appeared to be 
planning an attack ort Fort Scott, Kansas. Marmaduke led 
the east-bound army~14 
Blunt suggested that Schofield let him take the Second 
and Third Brigades of his,First Division and follow Cooper 
into Indian Territory. He would leave his First Brigade, 
commanded by Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, in the 
rear to guard supplies if Schofield would take the other 
two divisions, under Generals'James Totten and E. B. Brown, 
in pursuit of Marmaduke. Whether it was Blunt's or 
Schofield's idea, it was a convenient plan: Blunt and 
Schofield would be rid of each other and Blunt would be rid 
of Salomon, the man who scuttled the Indian Territory 
campaign four months earlier. Schofield put the plan in 
the form of orders that same day.15 
Blunt lost little time putting his army in motion. In 
so doing he began six weeks of campaigning that would 
include three major fights, ending with the signal battle 
of his career at Prairie Grove, Arkansas. The very day 
Schofield penned the orders Blunt tool~ his thirty-five 
hundred men five miles to Bentonville, Arkansas, and 
bivouacked there October 21 while his supply train closed 
up.16 
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Scouts brought Blunt word that Cooper and rebel 
General Stand Watie, the Cherokee Indian who had gone south 
when the tribe split in 1861, uere camped uith from four 
thousand to seven thousand men at Old Fort Wayne, near 
Maysville, Arkansas, on the Arkansas-Indian Territory 
border twenty-five· miles avray. Determined to defeat the 
Confederates the nex~ day, Blunt put his army on the road 
the evening of October 21, directing his supply train to 
rest a few hours, then follow at daylight. Blunt again set 
a rigid marching pace, speed again being a lynchpin of his 
plan. But travel in Arkansas was rougher than in 
north-central Missouri where he had marched to Lone Jack. 
The route of march to Old· Fort Wayne went U? and down hills 
and through dense \VOOds. When the command. stopped briefly 
at 2 a.m. many soldiers fell asleep at the side of the 
road. Blunt let them rest only thirty minutes. 
After marching another five miJes the command came to 
an open prairie of about five miles in length. Blunt saw 
that he would have to order his men across the prairie if 
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he intended to reach the rebel camp, but he hesitated to 
expose his troops without better knowledge of enemy 
positions. Seeing a house at the edge of the prairie Blunt 
conceived a clever idea for getting the information he 
wanted. Blunt and three other men disguised themselves as 
rebels and rode to the house. There they found a woman who 
was in the house alone, her husband having joined the 
Confederates a ~ew miles away. Blunt told her he and the 
three men were Confederates themselves and had just escaped 
from the advancing Yankees. They wanted desperately to 
reach the safety of Cooper's army! he said, asking if she 
knew· where it vras. The 1voman fell for· the tricJc and told 
Blunt where Cooper had posted his pickets, where he had 
made canp, and the strength of his army, which she placed 
at seven thousand men. She told Blunt that two Texas 
regiments had reinforced Cooper the previous day. 
Blunt wanted to pitch into the Confederates at 
daylight but the first phase of the engagement did not go 
as well as his earlier reconnaissance effort. He sent two 
companies of the Second Kansas Cavalry to circle Maysville, 
enter the tmvn from the rear, 'and drive in Cooper • s 
pickets. But the pickets heard the troopers approaching 
and scampered back to their camp. Then Blunt discovered 
that, of his two brigades, only three companies of the 
Second Kansas Cavalry had made it to this advanced position 
with him. The rest of the force vas seven miles behind 
him. Blunt could do nothing but send back a messenger to 
hurry them up, then go to Maysville with the one remaining 
company of cavalry. 
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There he discovered that his element of surprise was 
gone. Fearing a repeat of Newtonia, Blunt decided he would 
not wait for the rest of his force to come up, but would 
engage Cooper's seven thousand with his three companies 
instead. But Cooper's men camped near a prairie surrounded 
by a tangle of woods. Blunt found a'Negro--a~ "intelligent 
contraband," he called him--to whom he promised his freedom 
if he served as a guide. The slave's owner was with Cooper 
so the man knew the area. This one incident 1ras the only 
sign Blunt showed of his old aboiitionist ardor since he 
had helped Jim Lane recruit black troops in Kansas. 
Rebel pickets hid across the prairie, about three and 
one-half miles from Blunt. Committed to his plan even 
though the absence of most of his troops severely depleted 
his attack force, and without attempting to probe the enemy 
line, Blunt spurred his three companies of cavalry across 
the prairie and engaged the pickets, driving them back 
through the woods; Just at that time the bul~\: of the 
federal Second Kansas Cavalry, bringing with them two 
mountain hovri tzers, galloped onto the field. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Owen A. Bassett of the Second 
dismounted his troopers (another tactic that rifles had 
forced as they could cut dovn shock cavalry attacks before 
they were effective) and sent them into the woods to 
skirmish with the rebels. Then he found an opening in the 
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timber through which he saw the Confederates, now being led 
solely by Stand Watie who took over when Cooper fell sick, 
positioned on a road south of some fields. He reported 
this to Blunt, who ordered the Second Kansas Cavalry to 
assault the enemy troops before they fled. By the time 
Bassett's men were in line, so were the Confederates, two 
fences and a few hundred yards separating the forces. 
Blunt ordered the two mountain howitzers to within two 
hundred yards of the enemy line where they opened fire, 
drawing return fire from Cooper's three six-pounder smooth 
bores and one twelve-pounder howitzer. Blunt told Bassett 
again to dismount his cavalrymen and advance them through 
the fence toward the enemy. The men fired volley after 
volley into the Confederate ranks, driving them from their 
first position vithin five minutes. 
,, 
Cooper's men formed another line and began a 
fifteen-minute cannonade in an attempt to cover a flanking 
move on the federal left. Bassett's sharpshooters 
scattered the rebel gunners and the Second Kansas Cavalry 
moved up to the cover of another fence. Then, their rifles 
loaded and capped, they jumped over the fence, drove the 
rebels from their second line and chased them into the 
woods, capturing the battery as they went. The rest of 
Blunt's brigades arrived just as the battle was ending. The 
Second Indiana Battery opened fire on the retreating 
Confederates and Blunt sent the Sixth Kansas and Third 
Cherokee regiments in pursuit. They slcirmished with the 
rear of Cooper's column for seven miles then gave up the 
chase. 
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Casualty reports for the battle at Old Fort Wayne vary 
wildly. Blunt reported he lost five dead, one killed 
outright and four who died from mortal wounds, and another 
four wounded. He estimated rebel Jcilled and wounded at 
150. Cooper (who was sick at the time of the fight and 
claimed he lost because he was outnumbered and unable to 
consolidate his poorly provisioned Indians) placed his own 
losses at only three killed, twenty-five wounded, and 
thirty-five missing. He said Blunt's losses were "three or 
four times" that number. Confusing casualty reports, 
however, were one characteri~tic of battles in the 
trans-Mississippi theater. 
Cooper's claim that· he was outnumbered was true at the 
end of the battle, but not at the beginning. When Blunt 
attacked with only parts of the Second Kansas Cavalry the 
forces were about equal ana remained so for the bulk of the 
fight. Before arriving at Old Fort Wayne Cooper lost his 
four Texas regiments in a command reorganization. Cooper 
planned to_meet the remaining Indian regiments_at Old Fort 
Wayne before the advance on Fort Scott, yet when Cooper 
arrived at the meeting plac~ October 17 he found the 
various regiments scattered. They reassembled slowly and 
piecemeal. In his report of losses Cooper said he had only 
the First Cherokee and Second Creek Regiments and only one 
battery of artillery on the field when Blunt attacked.17 
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Neither Blunt nor Cooper knew how many men his army faced 
that day. Blunt, acting on the information he gained from 
the Confederate woman, believed he was attacking seven 
thousand, which makes his attack with three companies of 
cavalry all the more incredible. Cooper believed a whole 
federal division was about to hit his three regiments. 
Interestingly, even though pickets sounded Blunt's 
arrival at Old Fort Wayne, Confederates did not entrench to 
repulse his attack. In fact, Blunt's enemies in 1862 and 
1863 never entrenched even though the. benefits of defensive 
' ' 
works, coupled with the use of the· rifle, had been well 
illustrated at such plac~s in the eastern theater as 
Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg. Fighting in 
the trans-Mississippi theater' however, was sporadic and 
fluid without much of the military posturing that 
accompanied battles in the east. Hence, opposing generals 
rarely had time to comprete defensive works even if they 
were inclined to do so, which they were not. The building 
of complicated works and the digging of elaborate trenches 
was to an extent a manifestation of military education, 
especially for West P9int graduates, many of whom were 
engineers. The war in the trans-Mississippi west was an 
amateur's war, with largely untrained commanders leading 
armies (of both sides) in the field. Thus it is not 
surprising that soldiers did not immediately begin 
"digging-in" \vhen they occupied a position.18 
It is fortunate for Blunt that his enemies never 
learned to eptrench, fpr his tactics were similar to those 
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which some historians believe wrecked Confederate armies 
when used against defensive works. Blunt preferred to take 
the offensive at all times and, with the exception of 
isolated instances during combat, he did maintain the 
offensive. In their book Attack and Die: Civil War 
Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, authors Grady 
McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson state that this need to 
seize and hold the offensive :bled the. Confederacy to death. 
By examining casualty lists McWhiney and Jamieson conclude 
that "Confederates d~stroyed themselves by making bold and 
repeated attacks." .. Rebels were on the offensive in 
ninety-one percent of the battles in which they suffered 
heaviest and were on the defensive in eighty-nine percent 
of the battles in which they suffered least. Certainly 
McWhiney and Jamieson do not claim that southerners were 
the only ones who suffered 1n offensive charges, for in a 
study of twelve major battles United States troops took the 
offensive in five of them, the most notable being 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, in December, 1862. There 
federals assailed rebel defensive works atop Marya's 
Heights and lost 10,884 of 100,007 men engaged .. Rebels 
lost only 4,656 out of 72,497 men engaged. Using such data 
McWhiney and Jamieson maintain that southerners would have 
had a better chance at winning the war had they stayed on 
the defensive, behind works or in trenches, and let the 
Union make the assaults.19 
McWhiney and Jamieson claim that southerners' fondness 
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for frontal assaults was due to the South's Celtic (Scotch, 
Scotch-Irish, Welsh, Cornish, and Irish) heritage. They 
argue that the Celtic experience was warlike and that 
heritage imbued the South with a glorification of war which 
made it unthinkable for tradition-bound southerners to 
fight a war for their own independence from a trench.20 
But James G. Blunt came from New England, where ideas 
of warfare were not so gallant, according to McWhiney and 
Jamieson. Blunt's affinity for the offensive was an 
extension of his bull-headed personality and the fact that 
he was an amateur volunteer soldier. Without formal 
military training Blunt appears to have known no other 
tactic than to seize the offensive and assault his enemy. 
Blunt realized a large ~easure ·of success with this simple 
tactic because, in the Trans-Mississippi, he and his men 
fought other commanders and soldiers who had equivalent 
training -- little or none. ·.Relatively light casualty 
statistics in the theater indicate that both Confederate 
and United States troops in service there were poor shots, 
thus Blunt and his enemies may have never fully realized 
the deadly capabilities of the rifle. If so Blunt never 
had any real incentive to abandon the offensive and rebels 
never had any real reason to entrench. 
Even though it was small, Old' Fort Wayne 1vas James G. 
Blunt's first major battle; at Lone ~~ck he had deployed 
but not fought, at Newtonia the enemy had slipped away. As 
such Blunt made mistakes. Certainly he had defined his 
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objective--to defeat Cooper and forestall the possibility 
of a Kansas invasion--and achieved it by capitalizing on 
his army's mobility and his fondness of hard marching to 
hit Cooper before the southerner could consolidate his 
command. Once on the battlefield Blunt brought the mass of 
his combat force to bear on Cooper by delivering an 
uncomplicated hammer blow· to the Confedera'te line. But in 
allowing the bulk of his army to lag seven miles-behind him 
Blunt broke the battlefield principle of security. Had 
Cooper been better prepared, and had scouts been watching 
Blunt's approach, he could have conceivably slipped between 
Blunt and the rest of his force and defeated them one by 
one. Blunt also erred in his collection of intelligence. 
Had he relied on his spies he might have known that 
Cooper's seven thousand troops were scattered, and that 
those individual rebel units posed a potential threat to 
his own flan1cs or rear. Nev~+theless, the fact that Blunt 
attacked when he assumed he was outnumbered proved his 
' 
courage on the field, unlike Major General George McClellan 
who3e intelligence information on his approach to Richmond, 
Virginia, the.previous spring als? erred on the inflated 
side. Rather than attack, though, McClellan let the 
intelligence intimidate him into inaction. Old Fort Wayne 
vas a skirmish by eastern theater standards, but there, for 
the second time in three months and in a rough, self-taught 
fashion, Blunt prevented Confederate regulars from invading 
Kansas. 
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After the battle Blunt was eager to move south to Fort 
Smith, ArJcansas. From there, he told Schofield on October 
24, he could protect Indian Territory and encourage 
Unionist sentiment in western Arkansas. But Schofield 
wanted Blunt to move south only to a point parallel with 
Fayetteville to support the Army of the Frontier's Second 
and Third Divisions in case of attack. Blunt was already 
angry at Schofield, not only because of the debacle at 
Nevtonia, but also because the latter had retreated to 
Fayetteville without fighting Marmaduke and Shelby. Blunt 
could not see any danger to Schofield's command, but 
decided if he had to be near Fayetteville he might as well 
stay at Old Fort Wayne. There was a direct road linking 
the two places and besides, Blunt's men were already 
grinding grain at an abandoned mill. Blunt's disgust with 
his commander flared again on November 10 when he learned 
that Schofield, without telling Blunt, had evacuated 
Arkansas and gone back to Missouri, leaving Blunt's First 
Division at an exposed position at Old Fort Wayne.21 
Blunt could not imagine why Schofield abandoned 
Arkansas. Sarcastically he mused (in a comment that 
reveals some disdain for professional soldiers) that it was 
"part of West Point tactics for a superior officer to 
abandon his subordinates . . in the face of the enemy." 
Alone in northwest Arkansas Blunt did what he did best--he 
advanced. His men were exhausting the forage near 
Maysville and Blunt still believed the Arkansas River 
should be the goal of the Union armies. Blunt sent Colonel 
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William Phillips and his Indians into Indian Territory to 
garrison Fort Gibson (which Blunt had wanted the erratic 
William Weer to do baclc in the summer), then planned to 
move the rest of his army south on November 11 unless 
Schofield specifically called him back. Blunt believed his 
men had milled enough flour to supply the expedition and, 
besides, he 1·1as waging a sort of "depleted earth" policy in 
Arkansas: he bought all the wheat, cattle, and forage that 
the could from Unionists, then sent them north with his 
empty supply trains; he confiscated what he needed from 
rebel sympathizeri and left them to their own devices. 
"This country will afford short living for a bushwhacker 
1vhen I leave it," he said. 22 
Before he left Maysville Blunt sent out scouting 
parties and on November 1~.a ~etachment under Colonel 
William Cloud returned. They had run into three hundred 
rebels near Cane Hill, A~kansas, chased them to near Van 
Buren, Arkansas~ on the Arkansas River, and captured and 
burned their vagons. Three days later Blunt learned more 
information. Five thousand Missourians and four ~ieces of 
artiliery under Qrigadier General John s. Marmaduke (the 
' < , 
West Pointer whom Schofield had chased, but had not fought) 
were at Rhea's Mill near Cane Hill, o~erating salt works 
that Blunt's scouts had abandoned for fear of their 
advanced position. Blunt had no doubt that Marmaduke was 
preparing an invasion of Missouri and consequently an 
attack on his First Division. "I am prepared to meet them 
and shall not retreat one inch," he said emphatically, 
though he hesitated to attack them himself for fear of 
stretching his communications too far.23 
Blunt had apparently learned the risks of using 
indigenous intelligence at Old Fort Wayne. Now he made 
good use of his own spies and reconnaissance parties and 
learned that, for some reason, Marmaduke had pulled back 
south of the Boston Mountains,· which lay between Cane Hill 
and the Arkansas River. But on November 26 one of the 
federal scouting detachments rode back into camp and 
reported that Marmaduke, with seven .to eight thousand men 
and eight pieces of artillery, was back at Cane Hill. 
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Spies whom Blunt had sent south of the Boston Mountains 
began returning with,news that Confederate Major General 
Thomas c. Hindman was massing a large army of over twenty 
thousand men south of the mountains, preparing to join 
Marmaduke. Blunt suspected this rebel buildup meant an 
attempted invasion of Missouri. ,With his First Division in 
danger Blunt lcnell he had two alternatives. "[I could] 
follow the example of my supeiior [Schofield] and abandon 
the country ... or ... advance," he said. Blunt 
characteristically chose the latter. Cane Hill was thirty 
miles south and he proposed to ,march the next day and 
attack Marmaduke November 28 before Hindman could reinforce 
him. 24 
In opting to attack, Blunt showed he was gaining 
strategic skill. He realized that, camped in enemy 
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territory, he had no Union posts to defend. His division 
was compact and mobile and he did not have to worry about 
defending excessively long lines of communication. On the 
other hand, if he retreated Blunt \Tould have to worry about 
defending both Springfield, Missouri, and Fort Scott, 
Kansas, which would necessitate splitting his forces. Such 
a move would not only allow Hindman and Marmaduke to 
consolidate but also give them a chance to defeat Blunt 
piecemeal. "Besides," said Blunt, "to' [retreat] in the 
face of the enemy would . . discourage and demoralize my 
mvn command." Blunt lcnew his small army could act as a 
strike force if h~ deployed-it with his characteristic 
speed.25 
Blunt lived up to his reputation. Early November 27 
Blunt took five thousand cavalry and infantry and began the 
thirty-five mile march to Can~ Hill. He set a steady, 
determined pace, yet one'which was still tiring considering 
the rough, mountainous Arkansas terrain, and by nightfall 
the troops had made twenty-five ~iles. 
Having learned to trust and use his own spies, Blunt 
sent some into Marmaduke's camp. When they returned they 
told Blunt that the rebel general was expecting the 
federals, and furthermbre, expected them to arrive by 
either the Fayetteville or ,State Line road.. As such 
Marmaduke had placed pickets on both roads to intercept 
Blunt. Marmaduke was correct in his assumption. Blunt 
intended to make his advance along the Fayetteville Road, 
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but his spies returned in time for Blunt to avoid a trap. 
Blunt's guides found a rarely used country road between the 
two main roads and Blunt quickly turned his troops down the 
new route. Along this road, at 5 a.m. the next day, Blunt 
quietly slipped his army to within one-half mile of 
Marmaduke's camp. 
Through trial, error, and field experience, General 
Blunt was improving as a combat leader and, whether 
consciously or not, he was following .most of Jomini's nine 
battlefield principles. Blunt's objectives were clear, if 
simple -- engage ~nd defeat the enemy. He seized the 
offensive before the fight at Old Fort Wayne and maintained 
it even now on the march to Cane Hill. His ability to 
concentrate the mass of his combat force and achieve his 
objective with an economy of fprce was in a sense limited 
by the small size of his army, a characteristic of all 
trans-Mississippi Civil War armies which were generally of 
ten thousand men or less. Such sm~ll armies necessitated 
throwing a whole command into a battle, leaving some troops 
behind as a transportation guard such as Blunt did with 
Salomon at Old Fort Wayne and now ag~in at Cane Hill. 
Trans-Mississippi generals rarely thought about the 
principle of economy of force: they,used what soldiers 
they had and usually worriec about having too few men 
rather than too many to achieve an objective. Blunt was 
becoming a past-master at the art of speedily moving his 
troops, though, and now, at Cane Hill, he had obtained the 
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element of surprise over Marmaduke by marching down the 
little-used road. 
68 
Even though Blunt was learning to use spies to improve 
the security of his army the fight at Old Fort Wayne a 
month earlier apparently failed to teach him about another 
aspect of security and unity of command. Just as he had at 
Old Fort Wayne, Blunt arrived on the battlefield at Cane 
Hill with the bulk of his combat force seven miles behind 
him. On the march Blunt allowed the hills and rough 
Arkansas roads to disperse hi~ army. When he silently drew 
up next to Marmaduke's camp he only had with him two 
hundred men of hiS favored Second Kansas Cavalry, their two 
mountain howitzers, the Second Indiana Battery and his 
personal staff and body guard. Blunt's failure to keep his 
army intact was in part due to the rough terrain and to the 
fact that Blunt's subordinates, just as he was, were not 
formally schooled in warfare. But it also indicates 
Blunt's bulldog personality. He insisted on riding at the 
head of his army, a characteristic which made for popular 
generals in any Civil War army. But once at the front of 
his column, Blunt. apparently never looked back. Nor .did he 
effectively work with his subordinates to keep the marching 
order of the army intact, a character flaw remarkably 
similar to his inability (or refusal) to work with his 
superiors. Blunt simply assumed--and expected--that if he 
was able to cross rough terrain with speed the rest of his 
army should be able to do so as well, and that once he 
arrived at their destination they would be right at his 
back. 
The fact that his army was scattered vas bad enough. 
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But at Cane Hill Blunt committed an almost unpardonable 
battlefield sin, or at least it would have been had it not 
displayed a measure of the aggressivenes~ ~hich the North 
so desperate~~ needed in the fall of 1862. Without ever 
realizing that the bulk of his combat force was still 
almost an hour's march away, Blunt committed the regiments 
with him to an attack. 
Not only did Blunt hastily go into battle, he appears 
to have done so without adequate battlefield 
reconnaissance. This seems to be another characteristic of 
Blunt's battlefield demeanor. Never in his battle reports 
does he show any indication that he probed rebel lines to 
find their weak spots or defensive strengths. While Blunt 
showed a willingness (perhaps because it was all he knew 
how to do) to throw his·armies squarely against his foe, 
such a tactic was not necessarily an intelligent use of his 
combat force. Had he actually probed and scouted rebel 
defem:live positions~ he might ,h.ave been able to us'e. his 
army more creatively, by maneuvering his enemy out of 
position or splitting his force (which would have been 
risky with his s~all arm~, but not out of Blunt's 
character) to create a feint and then deliver a crushing 
blmv. 
Blunt may have been able to slip close to Marmaduke 
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without detection but the rebel general knew Blunt was 
coming sooner or later and as such chose high, easily 
defended ground on which to make camp. Marmaduke placed 
his camp at the end of a' gorge that ran between two hills. 
One of the hills hid the rebels from the advancing federals 
and Marmaduke placed an advance guard at the throat of the 
gorge. When Blunt ordered an attack his troopers quickly 
drove in the Confederate guard, but as the Yankee~ dashed 
from behind the hill on their right they found themselves 
squarely facing Marmaduke's army, waiting on elevated 
ground with its battery aimed at the road below. An 
expanse of timber protected the rebel rear. Both Blunt and 
Colonel William F. Cloud, commander of the Third Brigade as 
well as the Second Kansas Cavalry, insisted they had 
completely surprised Marmaduke. The Confederates' 
disposition, and the artiller~ duel that commenced when 
Blunt's men swung into on the opposite side of the hill 
suggest otherwise. With most of his army still several 
miles behind him Blunt could do little except trade 
artillery rounds with Marmaduke's gunners. The cannonade 
lasted an hour, and finally ended !vhen fire from the Second 
Indiana Battery forced Marmaduke to abandon his position 
for another one located three-quarters of a mile farther 
south where he had left his reserves. Both Blunt and Cloud 
admitted that they co'uld have destroyed- Marmaduke's force 
had Blunt's First Division been consolidated at the opening 
of the attaclc. 
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Marmaduke's new position was just north of 
Boonsborough and protected by rugged terrain. Blunt placec 
the Second Kansas Battery on high ground and ordered the 
cannonade resumed. The federal shelling dismounted one of 
the rebel guns and forced another Confederate retreat, this 
time to an elevated and easily defended strip of land south 
of the towna Marmaduke, the West Pointer, fighting a 
masterful retrograde action, gave Blunt just enough time to 
deploy his men'in line, then fell back again. Blunt's 
artillerists could only lob a few ineffective shells into 
the enemy rear. 
The Confederates fled south toward the Boston 
Mountains on a road that alternately traversed farmland, 
deep ravines, and thicl~ 1wods. For three miles the federals 
nipped at the rebels. Then, at the foot of the Boston 
Mountains, Marmaduke's men turned to make their stand. 
Marmaduke's cavalry commander, Major-General .Jo Shelby, 
came up with the idea that thirty companies, placed 
individually along the line of march, could cover the rebel 
retreat better than a single brigade trying to form in the 
rugged mountains .. .As such he created thirty firing 
. ' 
positions leading up into the Boston Mountains. Shelby did 
not expect the soldiers to hold any, of the positions, but 
rather pester approaching federals. After one position 
fired it vould get up and run to the southernmost end of 
the line, reload, and prepare to fire again as the rebel 
retreat sucked the federals into the Boston Mountains. 
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A single passage, guarded by Marmaduke's artillery, 
led into the mountain stronghold and Blunt could see that 
the terrain made his own artillery useless. Failing to see 
any other way to get at his fleeing enemy Blunt decided his 
only option was to sto~m the mountain. He dismounted the 
Second Kansas Cavalry and sent them up the mountainside, 
followed by Colonel William Phillips' Cherokee regiment 
(having returned from the Indian Territory), and the 
Eleventh Kansas InfantryL Blunt made the,assault on the 
first mountain more dramatic than it probably was. He said 
the three regiments "1vi th a vlild shout rushed up [the 
mountain], contesting every inch of ground, steadily 
pushing the enemy' before them," until the rebels fled in 
"disorder." Blunt never realized that the Confederates had 
fled, not because of anythin~ Blunt's assault had done, but 
as part of Shelby's plan. The Confederate retreat turned 
into a three-mile shooti~g match, Shelby's thirty companies 
offering resistance at intervals along the way. Blunt rode 
at the head of his attackers, shooting at rebels himself 
with a Henry repeating rifle. 
Darlmess was approaching when the rebels final~y 
descended to the Cove Creek Road, which ran through a 
" 
valley toward Van Buren, Arkansas, and deployed their six 
pieces of artillery for a last defense, Shelby's cavalrymen 
standing guard one-half mile ahead of the guns. Doggedly 
pursuing, Blunt decided the ground was suitable for a 
cavalry attack. Three companies of the Sixth Kansas 
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Cavalry, headed by Colonel William R. Judson, 
Lieutenant-Colonel L. R. Jewell, and Major w. T. Campbell, 
volunteered for the charge. With a flash of sabres and the 
craclcle of small arms fire they galloped into the valley 
and smashed into the Confederate rear guard. The Union 
horsemen drove their enem:y baclc upon the artillery, vrai ting 
where the valley funnelled into a narrow passage. But the 
retreat of Shelby • s cavalry had been another ·ruse. to draw 
Blunt's riders deeper into the passage. As the federals 
rode in Confederates waiting in ambush on a mountainside 
hit them with a tierce flanking fire. ·Jewell f~ll mortally 
1vounded. 
With the Uniofr charge stalled the Confederates poured 
into the valley. in a .counter-attack. Blunt and his 
commanders succeeded in rallying the Sixth Kansas Cavalry 
and rolling up four mountain howitzers which stopped the 
rebel threat. Still Marmaduke's men shoved no signs of 
retreating further. Blunt, determined to go through the 
pass, ordered the howitzers and a section of the Second 
Indiana Battery pushed into position by hand and loaded 
wit4 double canister. Here Blunt intended to use his 
artillery as the main .part of his assault, not as infantry 
support. His decision to use double canister (a 
particularly lethal arti~lery round consisting of two 
charges which resembled coffee cans, each packed with 
one-and-one-half-inch diameter cast-iron shot) indicates 
that the armies had come close to each other, probably to 
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within 350 yards, as canister was designed for close 
combat. No doubt Blunt thought he could achieve quick, 
effective results with his artillery thus loaded. Blunt 
ordered that the artillery barrage be followed by a cavalry 
charge, but just as he vTas about to give the order to fire, 
a man displaying a 1vhi te flag galloped from Marmaduke's 
lines. The Battle of Cane Hill was over.· 
Marmaduke's messenger requested that the Confederates 
be allowed to gather their dead and wounded. Thinking that 
some of his mm vmunded w·ere behind enemy: lines and might 
be "brutally murder[ed]," Blunt agreed to the truce. But 
Marmaduke (just like Mexicans who had done the same to 
Blunt's mentor, James. Lane, i~ the Mexican War) used the 
cease-fire to gather his artillery and slip away to safety. 
Blunt kne1v he had been· the yictim of a "covTardly tricl(" but 
darkness and an exhau~ted army forced him to give up the 
chase. 
Casualties were slight. Blunt listed his own dead at 
eight and wounded at thirty-two. From the debris on the 
battlefield Blunt estimated (probably over-estimated) rebel 
casualties at sev~nty-five dead~ wound~d unknown.26 
At the end of the day, November 28, 1862, General 
Blunt controlled the field at Cane Hi~l. As such he was 
the victor. But his victory must be qualified. From the 
beginning of the day, when he let most rif his 
five-thousand-man-army lag behind him, to the end when 
Marmaduke duped him with a white flag, Blunt was never in 
75 
control of the battle. Knowing they could not stand 
toe-to-toe with Blunt's army and win, Marmaduke and Shelby 
decided their military objective should be the safe removal 
of their army to the opposite side of the Boston Mountains 
where they expected General Hindman to reinforce them. If 
they could wear down the enemy federals in the process, so 
much the better. Th~y did both and completely outgeneraled 
Blunt in the· process. -If part of Blunt's objective had 
been to prevent Marmaduke and Hindman from joining, he 
failed by allowing Marmaduke to slip back through the 
Boston Mountains where such as junction would be easier. 
In such a scenario Blunt needed to interpose his army 
between Marmaduke's ~rid Hindman's. Marmaduke skillfully 
kept the Boston Mountains at his own back to prevent Blunt 
from doing just that. Blunt fought on ground of 
Marmaduke's and Shelby's choosing. Blunt consistently held 
the low ground and that, 'coupled; with the fact that he was 
the attacker, put him at a disadvantage from the start. 
Considering Blunt's own objectives, the battle at Cane Hill 
very nearly equaled a federal loss. Still, at the end of 
the day the rebels w·ere gone and, even though that ;;v-as 
exactly what the Confederates wanted, Blunt claimed another 
victory. 
Marmaduke fell back south of the Boston Mountains 
where he joined General Hindman's army. Blunt still stood 
between the mountains and the Arkansas-Missouri border, but 
Hindman still intended to invade Missouri. Hindman 
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steadfastly denied that he ever intended to launch an 
invasion as he had "barely ammunition enough for one 
battle, and not sufficient subsistence and forage for seven 
days at half rations." He said it 1vas his intention to 
clear Blunt out of northwesterri Arkarisas, then fall back to 
the safety of Little Rock, Arkans~s. Other evidence 
suggests Hindman did plan an invasion. Throughout the 
summer of 1862 Hindmaq covertly prepared for an invasion by 
giving colonel!s commiBsions to guerrilla fighters Joseph 
Porter, J. A. Poindexter, John T. Hughes, Gideon Thompson, 
and Upton Hayes and sen~ing them .into Missouri. He ordered 
them to disable federal communications and put together an 
assemblage of southern sympathizers lvho ·would rise up when 
Hindman entered the state.27 
Blunt, camped at Cane Hill, also believed Hindman 
< 
plotted an invasion. On.December 2 he learned that 
Marmaduke had jo~ned Hindman, making their combined 
strength twenty-five.to thirty thousand men. His 
information was faulty, though, as Hindman only had about 
eleven thousand men. Nevertheless Blunt's own First 
1 L c I 
Di vi sl.on had· only about eight ,thousand men. Despite what 
he believed was a tremendous force massing against him 
Blunt resolved to hold his ground. Still he knew his army 
was in danger and he had received no communications from 
his superior, Schofield. Before the fight at Cane Hill 
Blunt learned from a St. Louis nevrspaper that Schofield had 
put the Second and Third Division into winter quarters and 
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had gone to St. Louis to recover from an illness. Blunt 
believed Schofield was trying to secure a major-general's 
commission, but regardless, with Schofield absent Blunt 
tool~ emergency action and assumed command of the entire 
Army of the Frontier. He had no intention of abandoning 
northwest Arkansas to Hindman and on December 3 he 
telegraphed Brigadier-Genera~ Francis J. Herron, commander 
of the Second and Third Divisions, and ordered him to march 
to his support. Camped at the old Wilson's CreeJc 
battleground Herron was 140 miles north of Blunt. He had 
no time to losG and he put his divisions on the road 1rithin 
hours of receiving Blunt's telegram.28 
Meanwhile, Hindman put his army on the Cove Creek road 
and began his northern push. Blunt sent picJ.cets six miles 
south of Cane Hill to cover the intersection of the Cove 
Creek road with the Fayetteville-Van Buren road. These 
pickets drove Hindman's, vanguard baclc on December 5 but 
abandoned the intersection the next day when Hindman's 
troops renewed their attack.29 
Hindman intended to use the road to flank Blunt but on 
the evening 9f December 6 he learned that Herron, who had 
exhibited Blunt's own style of marching and covered 
thirty-five miles per day, was at·Faxetteville and 
preparing to join Blunt at Cane Hill. Hindman changed his 
plans. Hindman had fought at Shiloh and knew that General 
Don Carlos Buell's sudden reinforcement of Ulysses S. Grant 
at that battle had spelled Confederate defeat the previous 
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April and he determined to prevent Herron from joining 
Blunt. He planned to use the Fayetteville road to slip 
east of Cane Hill (Blunt's left) and get between Herron and 
Blunt. Then he could defeat the separated pieces of the 
Army of the Frontier in detail, Herron first, then 
Blunt.30 
Blunt, now on the defensive for the first time since 
October, knew of the threat on his left and ordered 250 men 
of the Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry under 
Colonel John M. Richardson to watch the road. Richardson 
marched his men- seventy-three miles to reach Blunt and when 
he offered his command for service the general gave him the 
guard duty. Blunt expected battle the next day and told 
Richardson to resist any Confederate advance ''to the last 
extremity" and send vord immediately to Blunt's 
·headquarters. But Blunt reg·retted that he "connitt[ed] the 
folly of talcing [Richardson] upon his own recommendation." 
During the night Hindman's men s~ipped around Blunt. 
Richardson claimed he sent Blunt word that rebels were 
nearby early in the night, but could not offer resistance 
as his force was too small. Blunt said he never go.t 1mrd 
of Hindman's maneuver until 10 a.m. December 7. At least 
one soldier thought Hindman got around Blunt for a 
different reason. Blunt was either "sound asleep or 
sitting up vlith some female hangers-on," he chargect.31 
At Old Fort Wayne, Cane Hill, and now at Prairie 
Grove, Blunt set a dangerous pattern. At each place he 
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failed to apprise himself of the situation on the perimeter 
of his army. At Old Fort Wayne and Cane Hill Blunt's 
laxity resulted in his arriving at a battle site with a 
diminished combat force. Now at Prairie Grove it resulted 
in an enemy separating Blunt from his reinforcements. 
Since 7 a.m. Blunt's men had been fighting what he 
believed to be Hindman's main advance. ·When he rGalized 
the Confederates had slipped by him and that the action at 
his front was only a feint, he sent the First Division 
toward Fayetteville twelve miles away. But six miles south 
of that town at Prairie Grove Herron's men, tired from 
marching, had been battling rebels for three hours. 
Herron's men arrived in Fayetteville the evening of 
December 6. The general posted guards in front of private 
homes to keep his own men from iooting them, but most of 
his soldiers, exhausted by the grueling winter march 
through mountainous country, fell asleep by the roadside or 
in homes. Their rest.was short, though. By daylight 
Herron had his two divisions marching toward Blunt. The 
battle began when they ran into Marmaduke's advance guard. 
Herron rallied his men and fo~ced the rebels four miles 
back to Illinois Creek where he ran into the ,;hole of 
Hindman's army forming in line. Herron used two pieces of 
artillery to draw th~ attention of rebel gunners while he 
sent his own artillerymen to cut their way through a 
section of woods. Concealed by the timber they lined up 
eighteen guns opposite Hindman's center. At 10 a.m. {just 
as Blunt was realizing his predicament to the south) 
Herron's gunners ran their fieldpieces to the edge of the 
woods and commenced an eight-hour artillery duel. Infantry 
combat began an hour later 11ith a rebel charge. Federals 
repulsed the attack and captured a rebel battery in a 
counterattack. Infantry fighting continued until 5 
p.m.32 
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At 4 P·~· Herron heard artillery fire from his right 
and two shells landed amongst his skirmishers. The general 
feared Hindman's soldiers had flanked him, but soon he 
realized the fire came from Blunt's army joining the 
battle. Herron dashed off a dispatch for Blunt's gunners 
to change their fire. 
Blunt's arrival did in fact break up a rebel flanking 
attempt but his choice of tactics was questionable. The 
road Blunt took to Prairie Grbve brought him onto the 
battlefield in front of the Confederate left where he found 
the enemy massing for attack. But by pulling into line 
next to Herron Blunt negated the advantage that his troops, 
fresh from a night's rest and a short march, had over the 
combatants on the field. He also gave up two opportunities 
to mass his combat force effectively and destroy Hindman's 
command. Trailing Hindman to Prairie 'Grove Blunt vlas in a 
good position either to strike Hindman from behind, 
catching the rebel in a deadly vice between the Union 
armies, or slam into Hindman's left flank and roll up his 
line -v;hile Herron held it in place for a whipping. All 
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Blunt succeeded in doing was ignite a general engagement up 
and down the line. 
Three of Blunt's batteries, including a battery of 
black, rifled Parrot guns, opened fire on the far right of 
the rebel line, raking southerners with shot and shell 
until they fled into the woods, opening the way for a 
charge by Herron's infantry. Seeking to silence the new 
threat Hindman turned his attention to Blunt's center and 
touched off rene1red infantry combat that lasted another 
three hours. Before his men went into battle Hindman 
encouraged them to aim at federal officers. With that in 
mind some rebel sharpshooters positioned themselves in a 
house at Blunt's left and began firing at the general and 
his staff. Blunt ordered some of his artillery to shell 
the house. "In a felv moments the house was in flames," he 
said. 
Twice Blunt ordered his six ten-pounder Parrot guns 
trained on rebel infantry massing to attac}c across open 
fields. The fire from his guns was so intense it drove 
each assault back into the woods. Finally one Confederate 
assault charged through the woods only to run headlong into 
lvhat Blunt called a "perfect storm of canister [·which 
produced] immense slaughter in their ranJ(s and compell[ed] 
them to again retire." It was one of the last charges of 
the battle as darkness brought a gradual end to the 
fighting.33 
Blunt and Herron planned to resume the fight the next 
83 
morning. They ordered ammunition passed out to the men on 
the field and Blunt called Frederick Salomon's brigade, 
which he left in reserve at Rhea's Miss, to the front. But 
during the nighh Hindman's men tore up their blankets, 
wrapped them around the wheels of their wagons and gun 
carriages, and quietly began to retreat. Hindman bought 
extra time for his getaway, the next morning when he secured 
from Blunt, under a truce, permission to care for his dead 
and wounded. Blunt said he was aware the rebels were 
waving the white flag at him as a tricl<:, just 'as they had 
at Cane Hill, and that he only allowed the ruse because he 
had previously seen the rebe~s leaving the field.34 
Prairie Grove was the bloodiest battle Blunt had yet 
fought. The Army of. the Frontier suffered 1,251 
casualties: 175 killed, including eight officers; 813 
wounded; and 263 captured or missing. The casualties 
represented about ten percent·, of Blunt's force. Hindman 
placed his own casualties at 1,317: 164 killed; 817 
wounded; and 336 missing, or about tvelve percent of his 
army. Even though the battle was a Union victory the 
statistics show the armies fought to' a qrau. Hindman 
maintained that he controlled field the night of December 7 
and only retreated because his men were outnumbered and 
exhausted.35 
In the battles of Cane Hill and Prairie Grove Blunt 
thwarted Hindman's plans. Even if Hindman only intended to 
rid northwest Arkansas of federal occupation forces, as he 
adamantly insisted, he failed. Blunt's Army of the 
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Frontier was battered a little, but still held the 
northwest quadrant of the state. If Hindman intended an 
invasion of Missouri, as was probably the case, Blunt 
stopped him and destroyed any Confederate hopes of invading 
the state for another two years. No~ until General 
Sterling Price's. Missouri raid in September 1864, would an 
organized rebei force re~enter the state. Blunt's victory 
at Prairie G~ove had affected r~bel plans even more 
extensively than he knew. Even before he had ventured 
north of the Bo~ton Mountains Hindman ha~ re6eived orders 
from co~mander of the rebel Trans-Mississippi Department, 
Lieutenant-General Theophilus Holmes, to fall back to 
Little Rock. The Confederate ~ar Department was pressuring 
Holmes to send troops from his'department to reinforce the 
Mississippi River stronghold pf Vicksburg, Mississippi. By 
December, Union gunboats (under the plan originally devised 
by politician-general John McClernand) were already 
dropping down the ri~er to attack Vicksburg. Hindman 
crossed the mountains an~ fought Blunt instead and by the 
ti~e he had retreated from Prairie Grove back to the 
Arkansas Rfver his ar~y had dwindled, from casualties; 
skulkers, and desert~rs, to around four thousand men. With 
such a small for~e all that remained in Arkansas to protect 
Little Rock from federals on the Mississippi River, Holmes 
' ' 
chose not to serid th~~ on to Vicksburg. Thus, in an 
indirect way, General James G. Blunt prevented an extra ten 
thousand men from reinforcing Vicksburg.36 
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Even though victory was his, Blunt blundered his way 
to success at Prairie Grove. While Marmaduke and Shelby 
outgeneraled Blunt at Cane Hill, the Kansan doggedly 
pursued the rebels in his own hard-nosed style. Given the 
mountainous terrain at Cane Hill it is doubtful that Blunt 
could have done anything else. But Prairie Grove was his 
worst battlefield performance of the war. Schofield, upon 
later resuming command of the Army of the Frontier, charged 
-
Blunt with bungling the battle. ,He may not have been far 
from 1vrong. Blunt can be creditGd for accurately surmising 
Hindman's intentions and immediately 'calling for Herron's 
help. He also underptood that Hindman could cut him off 
from Herron when rebels uncovered the Fayetteville road. 
Still Blunt allowed Hindman to slip around the First 
Division. Whether women in his headquarters tent 
distracted the general or Colonel Richards6n failed to 
guard the road does not m~tter. Blunt did not learn the 
lessons that the fights a~ Old Fort Wayne and Cane Hill had 
tried to teach him and he failed to provide for the 
adequate security of his army. As commander it was Blunt's 
mistake and one that left Herron and his road-wea~y 
soldiers alone and outnumbered thoughout most of the 
battle. In fact Blunt's ~ivision sufiered less than one 
quarter of the total Union casualties at Prairie Grove.37 
When Blunt finally realized his error he marched in his 
own characteristic manner to Herron's aid, but he had 
essentially turned the offensive over to the rebels, 
something he had not previouoly allowed. He also gave up 
any advantage of mass he had in a fresh combat force 1-rhen 
he arrived on the battlefield. At Prairie Grove Blunt 
proved that a military education was not a prerequisite to 
victory, but it certainly might have made victory more 
complete. 
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Union victories were a scarce commodity 'in December 
1862 (a month,which included General Ambrose Burnside's 
sacrifice of federals at Frederi~~sburg) and Blunt gained 
national notoriety because of Prairie Grove. Though he and 
Herron both earned major-general's stars for the victory, 
the public granted Blunt most of the credit. In January 
1863, Harper's Weekly published a detailed account of 
Blunt's fall campaigns, complete with a line drawing 
depicting the general in fl,lll "beard. "Men lilce Blunt are 
in demand," praised the newspaper. 
man! n38 
"Blunt is the coming 
In camp December 26 Blunt learned that his superior, 
General John Schofield, had apparently recuperated from his 
illness and had ordered Blunt to risk no further battle 
unless confident of success. Blunt, ever scornful of the 
man who had abandoned Arkansas, wrote a note to Department 
of the Missouri commanC.er Major-General Samuel Curtis 
inforTiing him of his intentions. "I am in command of the 
[army] and until General Schofield arrives and assumes 
command by general orders, I shall direct its movements," 
said Blunt. 
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But Blunt was doing very little directing of 
movements. Blunt did not pursue Hindman following the 
battle of Prairie Grove. The Army of the Frontier sat idle 
for almost three,weeks and Blunt and Herron blamed their 
inactivity on winter weather, but the weather was not bad 
enough to prevent General Hindman and the remainder of his 
army from reaching Van Buren, near Fort.Smith on the 
Arkansas River. On December 26 rebel deserters and spies 
informed Blunt of Hindman's location.39 
Blunt and Herron determined to push Hindman from his 
nev position. ~he next morning, with eight thousand troops 
and thirty fieldpieces, they began their fifty-mile 
journey. They marched all day and night over treacherous 
ground, teams of fifty or more soldiers manhandling the 
guns up steep mountainsides. At 3 a.m. December 28 the 
army arrived at a pla~e called Oliver's Store, eighteen 
miles north of the Arkan~as River. Reviewing new 
information about enemy dispositions, Blunt and Herron 
formed their cavalry into an advance guard and rode ahead 
with the troopers. Blunt showed little capacity for 
learning from his own mistakes. He !did not bother to take 
any route to Van Buren except the straight one, which led 
him to a confrontation with rebel picket~ three miles to 
the south. The pipk~ts broke and fled but, just as they 
had done at Newtonia and Old Fort Wayne, took with them 
news of Blunt's approach. They ran to Dripping Springs, 
Arkansas, where a full Confederate regiment heeded their 
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warning and formed into a line of battle to wait for Blunt 
and Herron. When he arrived, Blunt sent his cavalry in to 
batter the line, which they did and sent it fleeing toward 
Van Buren, another ten miles away. 
Blunt's vanguard pursued closely. The rebels tried 
three times to fight off the federals but failed each time. 
Herron said the cavalry covered the last ten miles to Van 
Buren in one hour, galloping all the way. First Lieutenant 
Charles Wesley DeWolf, in the midst of the chase, said 
Confederates discarded blankets, coats, and wagons as they 
ran. The Union cavalrymen gathered up one hundred 
prisoners and forty wagons as they pr~ssed the 
Confederates. The chase continued into the streets of Van 
Buren, said Herron, ·"to ·the great surprise and astonishment 
of the citizens, vho had heard nothing of our coming.n40 
From vhere they sat on a hill overlooking Van Buren, 
Blunt and Herron saw three steamboats, loaded with rebel 
supplies, trying to escape up the Arkansas River. Cavalry 
troopers sped through town to the river where they galloped 
along the banks in pursuit of the steamers. They finally 
overtook the boats and vli th vollc=y of rif.le fire convinced 
them to stop. One steamboat ovmer, vaving a flag of truce, 
crossed over to the f~derals in a small boat to surrender. 
Blunt himself vent back to the steamboat to take 
possession. That night Union troops removed as much of the 
sugar and supplies from the boats as the army could 
transport. Blunt burned the boats and the rest of the 
rebel supplies, including thirteen thousand bushels of 
corn. Upriver at Fort Smith Hindman ordered the supplies 
removed from two other steamers between Van Buren and Fort 
Smith and the boats burne6. 
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At about 2 p.m. rebel gunners on the banks of the 
river opposite Van Buren began shelling the federals in the 
town. Blunt and Herron narrowly escaped death in the 
bombardment, which Herron described as "diabolical ... 
the town being full of uomen and .children." He said rebel 
shells damaged at least one hundred homes-but injured only 
one Van Buren qitizen. 
Hindman made good his escape irom Fort Smith with only 
token federal pursuit as Blubt.had already decided he' did 
not want to stay south of the Boston Mountains. Ever since 
he marched to Old Fort Wayne in October Blunt had 
endeavored to capitalize on his small army's mobility by 
not tying it down with lines 6f communication and supply 
that stretched all the ~ay·back to Missouri. Such a tactic 
was daring (Major-General .William T. Sherman would use it 
when he marched through Georgia in 1864) but it meant that 
the Army of the Frontier.woul~ have ~o live off the land. 
After crossing the Boston Mountains, Blunt saw that 
Confederates had already depleted the forage to such an 
extent that the federals could not.long subsist in the 
area. For this reason he decided to leave Van Buren on 
December 30. _ 
With bands playing and banners waving as the Union 
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army stormed into Van Buren, the capture of the tovn was 
the epitome of the romantic Civil War battle. Blunt 
scattered the last vestiges of Hindman's army and lost only 
five or six men in the process (again pointing up the poor 
marksmanship of trans-Mississippi soldiers). At Van Buren 
Blunt again took the offensive and, although his rowdy 
charge into the town ruined any element of surprise he may 
have had, his personal courage at the head of his column 
did much to further Blunt's popularity with his men. On 
December 29 as the army marched back through Van Buren, 
Lieutenant DeWolf noticed Blunt and Herron standing on a 
street corner. The appearance of the generals caused 
soldiers to march with a "joyous and light" step, said 
DeWolf. The young soldier commented on the ''honest, 
fearless look" on Blunt's face. "His name is 
characteristic of the man, Blunt."41 
Throughout the fall of 1862, from Newtonia to Van 
Buren, Blunt showed that personal courage, stamina, and 
bull-headed aggression still counted for something in 
battle. But it must be remembered that Blunt was an 
amateur soldier, a volunteer 11ith nothing behind him except 
an abolitionist spirit (vhich had not shown itself since he 
promised the negro guide his freedom on the prairie at Old 
Fort Wayne) and a desire to whip rebels. Yet he fought men 
who had as little training as he. Blunt had no formally 
trained militarists on his staff or leading his brigades, 
but their counterparts, too, vere equally ill-trained. 
When Blunt did engage a West Pointer--Marmaduke at Cane 
Hill--he came out the lesser general and was only able to 
credit himself with a victory because Marmaduke's primary 
objective was escape. 
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Blunt was belligerent to hig supe~iors and tended to 
cling to the civilian idea of doing things his own way and 
ignoring the military chain of command if he chose. It 
seemed difficult for Blunt to learn from his ·mistakes. 
While Blunt did not allow large portions of his army to lag 
behind him on his marches to Prairie Grove a~d Van Buren, 
it took him two fights, Old Fort ~vayne and Cane H111, to 
learn that lesson: Whether Blunt would have fared as well 
in an eastern theater, where t~e armies were more heavily 
populated with formally trained, regular soldiers, is 
purely speculative. ~t the end of 18~2, in the amateur 
army of the trans-Mississippi' west, Blunt was the hero of 
the hour. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BATTLES AND MINORITY SOLDIERS 
1863 
For a man who had made a reputation for himself by 
hard campaigning, Blunt's battlefield successes in 1863 did 
not equal those Of 1862. He took to the field only once 
in a major campaign during whic~ he won victories at Honey 
Springs, Indian Territory, and Fort Smith, Arkansas. At 
Honey Springs Blunt again marched his men hard and fast, but 
also employed maneuvers that were more complicated, albeit 
only slightly, showing ~hat he had grown ih miiitary thought 
since August 1862 .. Blunt did not end the year victoriously, 
however. In October 1863, he lost most 6f his escort to 
a guerrilla ambush at Baxte~ Sp~lngs, Kansas. During the 
year Blunt commanded two groups of minority soldiers, 
Indians and BlacJ.cs. ·while soldiers of both groups performed 
ably at Honey Springs, Blunt commended none of them for 
recognition and everitually came to ha~e the Indian troops. 
The fact that Honey Spr~ngs was the first and only time 
Blunt used a large conting~nt.of. Blacks in battle says 
little for his willingness to promote the cause of Blacks, 
even though he stood among the ranks of abolitionist 
generals. 
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Blunt departed from the Army of the Frontier in early 
January 1863, and returned to Kansas to take care of 
administrative duties in·his District of Kansas that he had 
neglected since he left to join Schofield the previous 
August. One of the administrative problems he left 
unsolved was that of the refugee Indians. He had 
originally authorized the organization of the Union Indian 
Brigade in the summer· of 1862 not only with the intention 
' 
of supplying Colonel William Weer '·s Indian Terri tory 
expedition with extra soldiers, but also of returning the 
refugees to their Indian Territory homes. Weer'~ own men 
arrested him and then aborted the expedition in mid-summer, 
withdrawing from the Indian Territory. Consequently 
Blunt's problem wfth the refugees remained. 
Blunt tried to ~olve the problem.again as he prepared 
to join Schofield in Missouri:prior to the fall, 1862, 
campaign. On September 13 ~e instructed Creek Indian agent 
George A. Cutler to prepare a list of supplies needed to 
remove the Indians under his supervision to their homes. 
Blunt said he would see that Cutler. received any such 
supplies. "It is my design. to remove . ail _the refugee 
Indians to their homes with as little delay as possible," 
said Blunt. And he pad several reasons for wanting a quick 
removal of the Indians. Weer's expedi~ionr albeit 
curtailed, had brought a portion of the Indian Territory 
into Union hands. Blunt believed the Indian regiments 
could hold the territory themselves. They were also 
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anxious to return to their homes and Blunt thought they 
could better support themselves there. Blunt also wanted 
the Indians to get away from "speculating contractors" whom 
he said preyed on the refugees: Blunt concluded his 
comments to Cutler by saying he expected the agent's 
"hearty cooperation."! 
Blunt's directive to Cutler, however, angered w. G. 
Coffin, superintendent of In~ian Affairs in the Department 
of the Interior's So~thern Indian Superintendency. Coffin 
told Blunt he was:trespassing in matter~ where he had· no 
business. He said Blunt certainly had the authority to 
give orders to Indians enlist'ed in the army, but not to 
other refugees, such as the families of Indian troops whom 
Blunt also wanted to remove to the Indian Territory. "I 
have no doubt you 1vill discharge your duty," Coffin told 
Blunt, ". . and I hope you .wil.l. allow me to attend to 
mine."2 
Blunt did not let the matter drop. In November he 
pleaded the case of the refugee Indians before Secretary of 
the Interior Caleb B. Smith. Blunt told Smith about Weer's 
expedition, adding ~hat several thousand moie Indians 
followed the army back out of Indian Territory, worsening 
the refugee situatio~ in Kansas. 'He said most of the 
refugees gathered near Fort Sc9tt and faced the winter with 
shabby clothing. "They could occupy their own house," said 
Blunt, "instead of. passing the winter . . without roof or 
shelter, and compelled half-clad to [shiver] by a log fire 
in the open air." 
100 
Blunt charged that government officials and 
speculators conspired to keep the Indians in Kansas as long 
as possible so they could "[rob] the Indians and the 
government of every dollar they could." Not only did Blunt 
call for an investigation into the matter but he urged 
Smith to authorize the removal of all the Indians before 
the fall so they could plant crops the next spring. If 
not, Blunt said, the government would have to feed them for 
another year and once again they would fall prey to 
"corrupt officials and swindling contractors." Blunt 
believed that Superintendent Coffin and Kansas Governor 
Thomas Carney, who succeeded Charles Robinson, were among 
the former, plotting the "'ivholesale plunder of the poor 
unfortunate Indians."3 
Finally, in December, 18~2, while he was in Arkansas 
Blunt addressed an appeal to the "Humane and Philanthropic 
Citizens of Kansas" whom he hoped would help the refugee 
Indians. He called attention to the "great destitution" 
that existed among the refugees and asked for donations of 
second-hand clothing. He embellished his plea with a 
patriotic theme, saying that "[the retugee's] husbandS, 
fathers, brothers and sons are in the federal army, bravely 
battling for the Union.~4 
Blunt finally got his chance to send the Indian 
Brigade back into Indian Territory in February, 1863. 
Loyal CheroJ(ee Indians had called a meeting at Tahlequah, 
northeast of Fort Gibson. Fearing that Confederate 
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Cherokee would attempt to break up the meeting, Blunt sent 
the Indian Brigade into the territory under Colonel William 
A. Phillips, a fellow Kansan and commander of the Third 
(Cherokee) Regiment during the 1862 Indian Territory 
expedition and in the fall, 1862, Arkansas campaign. 
Phillips and his three thousand men reached Tahlequah 
safely and protected the Unionist council while it repealed 
the Indians' Confederate alliance treaty of 186L When the 
' ' 
meeting ended Phillips moved his command to Fort Bibson 
near the conflu~nce of the Arkansas and Grand Rivers, 
placing that rnilit~ry post in federal hands for the rest of 
the war.5 
Phillips' occupation .of Fort Gibson set the scene for 
the Battle of Honey Springs. _In May sporadic fighting 
broke out around Fait Gibson after Phillips and six-hundred 
cavalrymen bro~e up a Confederate Cherokee meeting at 
Webbers Falls. In retaliation rebel Indians tried to 
scatter Phillips' remuda of horses and later attaclced a 
supply train coming frdm Fort Scott. Extended 
communications back to Kansas were Phillips' main weakness 
' in his advanced position at F.o,rt 'Gibson and one which 
Confederates continuously harassed.6 
In the meantime:the War Department drastically reduced 
Blunt's command in early _June. In May President Lincoln 
replaced Major-General Samuel R. Curtis as commander of the 
Department of the Missouri with Schofield. The reason for 
the change was political, not military, as Schofield had 
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not yet scored a battlefield victory and had not 
' ' participated in a major fight since Wilson's Creek, 
Missouri, in August, 1861. Curtis had driven Confederate 
General Earl Van Darn's rebels from Arkansas at the Battle 
of Pea Ridge, March ~-8, 1862, but was an abolitionist whom 
Lincoln felt sided too much with the radical Lane faction 
in Kansas and against Missouri conservatives. Schofield 
was a conservative and his appointment implies that Lincoln 
was no longer concerned about keeping Jim Lane and the few 
soldiers he repr~sented happy. Lincoln realized that, with 
Ulysses S. Grant maneuvering before Vicksburg, the fate of 
the Confederacy in the west would be decided on the 
Mississippi River, not the scattered battlefields of the 
Trans-Mississippi west. 
Once in command, Schofield cut Blunt's District of 
Kansas in half. He le~ Blunt retain command of that part 
of Kansas which was below the thirty-eighth parallel, the 
western tier of counties in Missouri and Arkansas also 
below that line, and Indian Territory. This new section 
Schofield called the District of the Frontier. He gave the 
other half of Blunt's old district to fellow Missouri 
. ' 
conservative Brigadier-General Thomas Ewing, Jr.7 
Blunt still retained command over the Fort Gibson 
contingent, though, and became so alarmed by the increased 
activity at Fort Gibson that he sent the First Kansas 
Colored Infantry and a section of the Second Kansas Battery 
to reinforce Phillips. The First Kansas Colored was the 
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same regiment of Black soldiers that Blunt had helped Lane 
raise in August, 1862. They had distinguished themselves 
in action against guerrillas near Butler in Bates County, 
Missouri, in October, 1862, and fought another small action 
at Cabin Creek, Indian Territory, on their way to Fort 
Gibson. 
Continued skirmishes near Fort Gibson convinced Blunt 
that the situation was degenerating and that the post was 
in jeopardy. Characte~istically he decided to take the 
field himself to handle the situation. Blunt gathered four 
companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry~ three companies of 
the Third Wisconsin Cavalry, and two sections of the Second 
Kansas Battery and on the evening of July 5 set out on the 
170-mile march to Fort Gibson.8 
Blunt's column averaged twenty-eight miles per day and 
reached Fort Gibson July 11. Remembering the value of 
spies and scouts from his Arkansas campaign, Blunt sent 
them out to glean information from south of the fort. They 
soon returned with news that Blunt's enemy from Old Fort 
Wayne, General Douglas Cooper and six thousand men were 
camped south of the rain-swollen Arkansas River opposite 
Fort Gibson. Cooper expected three thousand reinforcements 
under rebel Brigadier-General William Cabell to arrive from 
Arkansas at any time. Toge~her they intended to re-occupy 
Union-held northeast Indian Territory.9 
Blunt did not intend to let the rebels recapture the 
territory and decided to cross the Arkansas River and 
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destroy Cooper's force before Cabell arrived. The river 
was too deep to cross on foot or horseback and Blunt 
ordered his soldiers to build boats for the purpose. Then 
the general became ill with a high fever on July 14. He 
said he "got out of a sick bed 'tvith a burning fever" at 
midnight July 15 to start the expedition. He later 
admitted that campaigning and the fever caused the "fat 
boy," as he referred to himself, to lose thirty pounds in 
July .10 
Early on the morning of July 16, despite his fever, 
Blunt took 250 cavalrymen and some artillery and marched 
along the north bank of the Arkansas River on a brief 
reconnaissance patrol to prepare the way for the main force 
to cross. This is the first time prior to an expected 
battle that Blunt accompanied a small scouting contingent 
on such a mission, indicating he had learned and come to 
§ 
respect the value of such an endeavor. Blunt again gave up 
the element of surprise, though, when his troopers 
scattered rebel pickets thirteen miles from the fort. 
Crossing the river, Blunt led his cavalry down the south 
bank to a point opposite Fort Gibson where he met the rest 
of his army waiting to cross. They crossed unopposed but 
three of Blunt's Indian soldiers drowned in the 
process.11 
By 10 p.m. Blunt's army was across the river and ready 
to march toward the rebel camp, twenty-five miles south on 
Elk Creek. Blunt led his command on another forced night 
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march and encountered Cooper's advance guard five miles 
north of Elk Creelc the next morning. Blunt ordered in his 
cavalry which drove the rebel guard back to their main 
line. Cooper claim~d the federals would never have routed 
his guard had a heavy rainstorm not ruined his troops' 
paper cartridges. 
Cooper ~ad deployed his men in a one-and-one-half mile 
line in the timber on the south side of Elk Creek. The 
Confederates were so effectively hid~~n that Blunt could 
not see them, even though he approached down 'the Texas R6ad 
which bisected Cooper's line. For the first time in his 
field experience Blunt ordered a detail to scout the 
Confederate line. Naturally he rode along. Through his 
telescope Blunt could not see 'cooper's artillery, but he 
was confident gunners would give themselves away when the 
battle opened. As he turned back to his small army rebel 
riflemen began firing at his scouting party, shooting one 
of its members out of' his saddle. 
At about 10 a.m. Blunt ordered his men into line. He 
divided his force into tvw columns and assignee: the First 
Brigace under Colonel William R. Judson to the· right of the 
' ' ' 
Texas Road, the Second Brigade under Colonel Phillips to 
the left of the road. Blunt instrbcted them to maintain 
tight formation to disguise their small strength and only 
fan out into battle formation when opposite the rebel 
defenses. While this plan is simple it marks the first 
time that Blunt actually paused while within sight of an 
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enemy and made pre-battle dispositions. It is also 
important to note that all of Blunt•s army arrived on the 
field at the same time, not piecemeal with one part lagging 
behind another,as had happened at Old Fort Wayne and Cane 
Hill. 
Blunt moved his men to within four hundred yards --
easy rifle range -- of the Confederates before he deployed 
his line. In five minutes the federals covered the entire 
length of the rebel line. Blunt again rode in the advance 
and encouraged his men, then he ordered them to attack. 
Again Blunt's assault was frontal and again the rebels were 
not entrenched. "The attack w~s one of the prettiest I 
ever 1vi tnesseo," said Blunt, commenting that his men "moved 
up to the rebel lines as cool and steady, as if g<;>ing on 
dress parade." 
Blunt anchored both ends of his line with artillery 
and federal gunners began tiring in concert with the 
attack, drawing fire from the hidden rebel canon. Rebels 
attempted to flank Blunt•s left but three dismounted 
companies of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry rushed into the brush 
' ' 
where the flankers hid. Thirty minutes-of fighting and a 
charge by the First Indian Regiment broke up the flanking 
attempt. Combat on the left ended ·when Phillips• men, 
under the cover of artillery fire, crossed the creek. 
The turning point of the battle came at the Union 
center. There a group of Texans doggedly defended their 
ground against the approximately five hundred Union blacks 
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of the first Kansas Colored Infantry. Determined to stay in 
contact with Phillips, the blacks and the Second Indian 
Regiment crossed the creelc as well. Colonel James Williams 
told his Black troops to hold their fire until he gave the 
command, then to "keep cool, ... aim deliberately and· 
below· the 1raist." The men· kept cool and marched to l'li thin 
forty pace~ of the rebel line~ They were so close, in 
fact, that Confederates may have mist~ken Williams' order 
to "fire" for their mm as the two sides unleashed a 
cacophonous volley· of musketry at the same in~tant. 
Williams fell with a ch~st ~oun4 and Lieutenant-Colonel 
John Bowles assumed command. Members of the Second Indian 
Regiment impeded· his assault, however, when they marched in 
front of Bowles' men. He ordered the soldiers -of the 
Second Indian to fall back out Qf the crossfire but again 
the close proximity of the armies played a part in the 
battle. Texa~ Colonel Charles DeMo~se heard Bowles' order 
and, suspecting the Unio~ ·l~ne was crumbling, ordered his 
own regiment to attack~ The Texans advanced ''like true 
soldiers," said Bmrles, :Out the Black troops held their 
fire,· dra-v1ing Confederates . to within tventy-f i ve paces. 
Then they fired a volley that disintegrated the rebel 
ranJcs. Their regiment in chaos, the, Texans fled, leaving 
their colors on the field. 
The battle lost, Cooper began withdrawing his men to 
their supply depot at Honey Springs to the south. Blunt 
ordered his men t.o pursue. ~vhile rebels loaded what 
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supplies they could in a wagon train and set fire to the 
rest, a small squadron of cavalry covered the northern 
approach to the town and Cooper himself directed a group of 
Choctaw Indians in a charge ag~inst a federal battery a 
thousand yards north of the depot. "The Choctaws vrent at 
them giving the war-whoop," said Coop~r, and the attack 
stalled the feder~l advance. Cooper sent his baggage train 
east instead of south trying to convince Blunt that Cabell 
was about to reinforce him. Cooper believed he had tricked 
Blunt when the federal commander pulled his troops bacl:: to 
the north but Blunt said he had always expected Cabell to 
arrive that day ahd chose to let him make the first move. 
Cabell, with three thousand men, did arrive about 4 p.m. 
Blunt bivouacked on the battlefield and chose to "risk a 
battle in the morning if they desired it." But Cabell did 
not desire it and instead fled during the night back to 
Fort Smith. 
Blunt's losses at Honey Springs were thirteen J~illed, 
sixty-two wounded--another· light casualty list considering 
the close proximity of combat. Cooper's losses were 134 
killed and w·ounded, forty-s_even. captured. The Battle of 
Honey Springs was the largest Civil War battle fought in 
Indian Territory.12 
At Honey Springs Blunt used the same basic battlefield 
technique that he had throughout his 1862 Arkansas 
campaign, that is, find the enemy and attack him. Again 
Blunt's tactics are very similar to the ones McWhiney and 
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Jamieson decry in Attack and Die. For Blunt they were 
effective but once again he attacked an enemy who had not 
entrenched. While Cooper anchored his line in the creek 
brush his soldiers dug no works. The rebels were 
apparently hindered by ruined rifle cartridges, if Cooper's 
complaints about wet ammunition were true. Both 
considerations gave Blunt the edge at Honey Springs, but 
the Kansan also displayed that e~perience had taught him a 
few lessons. For instance, he made, sure that units of his 
Army of the Frontier kept in contact with e~ch other on the 
march from Fort Gibson. At the crossing of the Arkansas 
River July 16 he waited until all his soldiers had crossed 
before starting 'his march. Again Blunt marched quickly and 
steadily, emphasizing his trademark ability to capitalize 
on his force's speed and mobility. The march to Honey 
Springs, however, also pointed up Blunt's personal drive 
and determination as he suffered a high fever throughout. 
At the battlefield the ge?eral made a pre-battle 
reconnaissance of Cooper's line, something he had not done 
previously, and while it was not the same as probing the 
enemy line with skirmish~rs, it 1 did offer Blunt some 
information about rebel dispositions. Blunt's infantry 
assault, however, was straightforward and covered by 
artillery, resembling to a great degree Blunt's 
dispositions at Old Fort Wayne, Cane Hill, and Prairie 
Grove. 
While the battle at Honey Springs effectively broke up 
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any Confederate attempt to regain Fort Gibson, it more 
significantly marked Blunt's first use of black troops in 
combat. The First Kansas Colored marched to within 
fifty-two yards of the opposing Texans at the center of the 
line and fought at that" distanc.e for twenty minutes, 
suffering two killed and thirty wounded, or almost 
forty-three percent of all Union casualties during the 
battle. Blunt was enthusiastic about the blacks' conduct. 
"I never sa~ such fighting . . as wa~ done by the Negro 
regiment at . . Honey Springs,," he said. Blunt commented 
that they were as cool and valorous as old veterans. "The 
question that negroes will f~ght is settled," he said, 
"besides, they make better soldiers in every respect than 
any troops I have ever had under my command."13 
For a man who .positioned himself among abolitionists 
in general and abolitionist generals in particular, Blunt's 
use of blacks in combat and his subsequent comments seem 
belated and sparse. Certainly Blunt was interested in the 
abolitionist cause, as evidenced by. his activities in Ohio 
and pre-war Kansas. Blunt was also very excited at the 
prospect of enrolling blacks into the Union war effort, but 
in this regard he was only a yes-man to Senator/General 
James H. Lane. Bl¥nt never set a policy of his own 
regarding blacks even though there were precedents for him 
to follow. Major-G~neral Benjamin F. Butler, the 
Massachusetts politician transformed into army commander, 
adopted a "contraband" policy which other generals, 
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including John E. Wool at Fortress Monroe, Viriginia, 
followed. Essentially Butler refused to return fugitive 
slaves who crossed over the lines of his army and instead 
put them into pnion service as army teamsters, cooks, and 
officers servants. 'The second precedent came on July 17, 
1862, when Abraham Lincoln signed the Second Confiscation 
Act. The Act provided that t-he slaves of anyone who 
supported or aided the southern rebellion would become free 
when they came within Union control and the law gave the 
president the authority to employ blacks in combat roles. 
The president, however, had specifically to authorize the 
use of blacks as soldiers. James Lane's arming of blacks in 
August, 1862, and use of them against Missouri guerrillas 
in October of that same year was not technically within the 
bounds of the act. Nevertheless precedent had been set 
regarding blacks, but throughout Blunt's late 1862 
campaigns he never mentioned using organized companies of 
blacks in his army, or putting-fugitive slaves to use. 
Blunt makes no mention of his army attracting large numbers 
of fugitive slaves but his various commands did campaign in 
areas were there were significant numbers of slaves. In 
his August 1862, expedition to Lone Jack, Missouri, Blunt's 
army traversed a part of Missou~i which, according to the 
census of 1860, contained just over fifteen percent of the 
state's total slave population of 114,931. In the two 
western tiers of counties south of Missouri River, from 
which Blunt's army could conceivably have drawn fugitive 
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slaves on the march, there ilere 17,563 slaves. The two 
western tiers of counties in northwest Arkansas above and 
immediately below the Arkansas River, where Blunt 
campaigned .from October to December, 1862, held 5,003 of 
that state's 111,115 slaves, or about 4.5 percent. His 
armies, perhaps because of Blunt's penchant for speed, may 
not have drawn fugitive slaves, which an abolitionist 
general surely would have commented upon. What is 
important, though, is that Blunt,never espoused a plan of 
what to do with fugitive slaves had ~hey crossed into his 
lines.14 
Blunt's use of blacks at Honey Springs, while it 
credits his willingness to trust blacks in a fight, is no 
milestone in the black military experience. Since the War 
Department had organized the Bureau for Colored Troops on 
May 22, 1863 (a move which regularized the organization of 
black regiments by taking the responsibility away from the 
states and giving it to the federal governement), black troops 
had already participated in several engagements. Black 
regiments fought under General Nathania! Banks when he 
assaulted Port Hudson, near Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 
t' L I 
27 and settled in with Banks for a seige of that place 
which lasted until July 8. Confederates attacked a federal 
garrison, including the Black African Brigade, at· 
Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, near Vicksburg, Mississippi, on 
June 7. Blunt's battle at Honey Springs preceded by one 
day the more famous battle at Morris Island, South 
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Carolina, just outside Charleston Harbor. There the black 
Fifty-Fourth Massacusetts Regiment led an attack against a 
rebel-held island fort. Confederates met them with deadly 
fire of artillery that killed.or wounded 1,515 men, both 
black and white.15 
Blunt's actions made his glowing comments about the 
blacks following their conduct at Honey Springs hollow. 
His abolitionist record preceding the fight was, at best, 
sketchy. Following.the battle he did not recom~end any 
black soldiers for commendation, even though he rated the 
blacks above the white soldiers who fought for him in 1862. 
But other officers were recommending blacks for 
recognition, and thirty black soldiers received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor d,uring the Ci vi 1 War. 
Congress bestowed the honor on .one soldier for his 
gallantry at the battle of Fort Wagner, South Carolina, one 
day after Blunt's fight at Honey Springs.16 
Honey Springs was,not the end of the First Kansas 
Colored Regiment's combat experience, though its subsequent 
fights were not under Blunt's direction. On April 18, 
1864, the regiment met units of William.Cabell's and Jo 
Shelby's commands at Poison Springs~ Arkansas. In the 
ensuing clash the Kansas regiment suffered its worst losses 
of the war with 117 dead and 65 wounded. The regiment 
remained in service for the duration of the war, though the 
Bureau for Colored Troops changed its designation to the 
Seventy-Ninth United States Colored Regiment as part of the 
agency's plan to federalize black regirnents.17 
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Blacks were not the only minority group to fight with 
Blunt at Honey Springs. Colonel William Phillips' First 
and Second Indian Regiments also helped secure Blunt's 
line. Initially Blunt was pleased with the Union Indians. 
"The Indian regiments . . . have more than met my 
expectations as efficient soldiers," he told Secretary of 
War Stanton after the Indian Territory expedition in 
summer, 1862. By the next· summer he 1·1as telling Schofield 
how worthless the Cherokee had become. After Indians had 
fought with him at Honey Springs and lost five soldiers 
dead and another eleven wounded, Blunt appeared. to turn 
against them. In August he suggested to Schofield that he 
muster the Indians out of service, reasoning that they 
could no longer benefit the army since they had achieved 
their goal of reoccupying their homes and thus become 
" 
"nearly worthless as troops." Blunt said the Indians 
should be released from duty to tend to their crops. A few 
white troops placed among them would be adequate for their 
protection, he said.18 
Blunt's about-face with regard to the Indians may have 
been more o.f a reflection on Colonel Phillips, hmvever. 
Phillips, a Kansan, had gained his own share of fame with 
his campaign through Indian ~erritory in early 1863. Many 
Kansans believed that Phillips' new popularity alarmed 
Senator Jim Lane and that Lane ordered Blunt to block any 
furtherance of Phillips' career. The same motivation may 
have been behind Blunt's ignoring Phillips' call for 
provisions that same summer.19 
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Regardless of Blunt's professed thoughts about the 
Indians, in October 1863, the Cherokee extended special 
thanks to him for his efforts in driving rebels from Indian 
Territory. The Cherokee credited Blunt's "bravery as a 
soldier and superior skill as a military commander" with 
his becoming a ''terror to the enemies of his country." 
They said that they regarded ~ny such general who 
campaigned as vigprously as Blunt had and who had pushed 
"rebels from the soil of a loyal people" as "the true 
peacemaker and benefactor of the land."20 
Blunt's regard for the btacks and Indians of his 
command, as epitomized by the Battle of Honey Springs and 
its aftermath, revealed again that he was incapable of 
making an original_political decision without James H. 
Lane. Lane was the backbone of Kansas black recruitment, 
not Blunt, and Lane may have caused Blunt's sudden dislike 
for the Indians who had, served under him for over a year. 
Blunt was no politician, and, after serving two years in 
the politicized army of th~ trans-Mississippi, had not 
learned the skills of a politician. He had fashioned 
himself into a fair weitern army command~r arid, 
characteristically, was not content to rest on his victory 
at Honey Spring. 
After Honey Springs Blunt took his army back to Fort 
Gibson where his fever finally confined him to bed. He 
blamed his sickness on "eating nothing for several days, 
and [ drinldng] several gallons of dirty warm wate,r," while 
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campaigning. But Blunt was still sick in mid-August and he 
was eager to recover so he could begin another expedition. 
His desire to take the field peaked when he learned that 
Confederates were apparently ready to abandon Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, and he wanted to hurry them on their way. He 
also wanted to move to a better place of forage and 
hopefully capture some rebel stock as his own were dying in 
the Indian Territory heat, which Blunt said got as high as 
"ninety-eight degrees in the shape."21 
Blunt's health recovered enough so that on August 22 
he felt well en6ugh to lead forty-five-hundred troops out 
of Fort Gibson, across the Ca~adian River, and to a point 
sixty miles south of Fort Gibson where intelligence reports 
said Confederate Generals Cabell, Cooper, and Stand Watie 
had united with nine thousand men. Before Blunt arrived, 
however, the Confederates split their command, Cabell 
taking three thousand men east to Fort Smith, a group of 
Creek Indians heading west, and Cooper and Watie taJ(ing the 
remainder south to the Red River. Blunt pursued the latter 
group and on August 26 caught up with them at Perryville in 
the Choctaw 'Nation._ 
As Blunt's advance guard entered the town rebel 
artillerists hit them with caniste~ fire from two 
howitzers. Blunt dismounted th~ Sixth Kansas Cavalry and 
sent them through the timber surrounding the town to within 
three-hundred yards of the rebel line. Again Blunt used 
his favored tactic of supporting an assault with artillery. 
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In the small clash at Perryville Union gunners quickly 
dispersed the rebels, which Blunt learned were only a rear 
guard for the van of Cooper's and Watie's army several 
miles farther south. Blunt's men and stock were tired from 
their forty-mile chase and Blunt decided to halt the 
pursuit. Blunt did discover that rebels had concealed 
military stores in Perryville and he ordered his troops to 
burn the whole town.22 
Opting to let Cooper and Watie go, Blunt turned his 
attention to C~bell at Fort Smith. Blunt maiched his 
column back to the Canadian River where he sent part of the 
command back to Fort Gibson. Keeping two thousand troops 
he marched east to Fort Smith and on August 31 camped near 
the Poteau River a few miles from Fort Smith. Blunt knew 
that Cabell had twenty-five hundred men ready to defend a 
ford of the river and decided to attack the posit~on early 
September 1. When he advanced, though, Blunt discovered 
that Cabell had fled. Blunt ordered Colonel William Cloud, 
the man who had fought ~ith Blunt in the fall, 1862, 
campaign in northwest Arkansas, to take the Second Kansas 
and Sixth Missouri Cavalries, along with two sections of 
artillery, and pursue Cabell. 
About noon Cloud stumbled into an ambush set by 
Cabell's rear guard. Cloud lost two killed and nine wounded 
but steadily pushed the guard baclc to Cabell's main line, 
which Cloud described as 11 sldllfully formed 11 along the 
summit of Devil's Backbone Mountain, a landmark outside 
Fort Smith. Cloud and Cabell clashed for three hours but 
during a lull in the fighting the Confederates retreated, 
leaving their dead and wounded on the field. Cloud lost 
fourteen men .. 
While Cabell and Cloud fought atop the Devil's 
Backbone Blunt took his staff, bodyguard, and the First 
Arkansas Infantry and quietly occupied Fort Smith. There 
were no rebels to offer resistance. "I lowered the rebel 
flag ... and raised upon the same staff the stars and 
stripes," Blunt later wrote. 
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Then Blunt suffered a relapse of the sickness he had 
had since arriving at Fort Gibson in July. Doctors 
confined him to his bed and Cloud took over command of Fort 
Smith. On September 12, when he felt strong enough to ride 
in a carriage, Blunt left for Fort Scott, Kansas, where he 
intended to organize two new regiments and then move the 
District of the Frontier headquarters to Fort Smith. 
Blunt captured Fort Smith with relatively little enemy 
contact and he did not direct· the fight atop Devil's 
Backbone Mountain. The entire expedition required little 
more than personal drive, something of w·hich Blunt had 
plenty. It was, however, perhaps the most significant 
victory Blunt had yet won. With Fort Smith in their hands, 
federals controlled the Arkansas River from Fort Gibson to 
Little Rock, which also fell to Union troops within a 
month. Thus federals split the state and controlled its 
main waterway to the Mississippi River, which of course had 
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been in Union hands since the fall of Vicksburg, 
Mississippi, July 4. The capture of Fort Smith also 
sparked Unionist sentiment, just as Blunt had predicted 
after the Battle of Prairie Grove the previous December. 
After Little Roclc fell on September 10 Colonel Cloud began 
exploring the Arkansas River. Three hundred loyal 
Arkansans joined him in a fight with rebels at Dardanelle, 
where three rebel officers and one hundred men whom he had 
fought at the Devil's Backbone also assisted him. When 
Little Rock fell they deserted Cabell's army and joined 
Cloud's federals.23 
Blunt's final military engagement of 1863 was not a 
campaign, nor was it even of his own design. At Baxter 
Springs in southeast Kansas near the Indian Territory 
border, rebel guerrillas led by the notorious William 
Clarke Quantrill ambushed Blunt and his small escort of 
about one hundred men. Eighty-seven of Blunt's men died, 
many shot in the head after falling wounded on the 
battlefield. The dead included one of Blunt's staff, Major 
H. z. Curtis, son of General Samuel Curtis. Baxter Springs 
became Blunt's worst defeat. 
After tending to district administrative duties and 
recuperating from the fever that had plagued him all 
summer, Blunt prepared to move his headquarters from Fort 
Scott to Fort Smith in early October. Taking with him his 
district records, part of his staff, and a small escort 
Blunt left Fort Scott on October 4. Blunt intended to 
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march by way of a small federal post at Baxter Springs, 
Kansas, located on the military road between Fort Scott and 
Fort Gibson in Indian Territory.24 
Federal tro?ps favored Baxter Springs, located 
one-half mile north of the Kansas-Indian Territory border, 
as a stopping place. It was a beautiful spot, near a 
spring of pure, cool water. In spite of its beauty the 
location was within ten miles of a wooded area, known to be 
a haven for guerrilla raiders who preyed upon Union supply 
trains that traversed the military road. Fear of attack 
became so great that in August, 1863, Colonel Charles 
Blair, commander of the District of Southern Kansas, 
stationed detachments of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry and 
Second Kansas Colored Infantry at the springs. They built 
a blockhouse and surrounded their camp with breastworks. 
In late September guerrilla activity near Baxter Springs 
intensified and Blair"ordered Lieutenant James B. Pond to 
take another company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry and 
twelve-pounder howitzer to the post. Pond arrived October 
5 and took command.25 
Quantrill himself \vas the cause of the guerrilla scare 
as h·e took six hundred of his follmrers south for the 
-vrinter. Quantrill had been a Kansas Jayhawker but switched 
his sympathies when the war started, claiming that Kansans 
had killed his brother. He earned a reputation as a 
plunderer and murderer, and in August 1863, his infamy 
reached its peak when he sacked and burned the former 
free-state stronghold of Lawrence, Kansas.26 
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Quantrill's raiders wandered through Missouri and into 
southeast Kansas on their trek south and on October 6 
discovered fifteen federals guarding a lumber train. The 
guerrillas attacked, captured the lumber and scattered the 
soldiers, whom they followed. To their surprise the 
guerrillas found the fort at Baxter Spri~gs. "None of us 
had ever heard that there was fort there with a command of 
troops," said Quantrill's scout Joh:n McCorlcle. 
The guerrillas were a cowardly lot arid a few days 
earlier Quantrill had allowed a federal supply train bound 
for Fort Scott to pass unharmed since Union guards 
outnumbered his own men. But Quantrill thought the post at 
Baxter Springs, with its small command, was ripe for 
attack. Part of Lieutenant Pond's cavalry were on a 
reconnaissance mission when Quantrill's men thundered out 
of the woods toward the fort, but Pond, Black soldiers, 
some dismounted cavalrymen, and the howitzer remained to 
defend the position. The rebels attacked so swiftly that 
they gained the interior of the fort and cut off most of 
Pond's command, l"ii"ho were eating 1 unc~1, from their 1veapons. 
Pond and his ~en ran, unarmed, through the enemy lines, 
reached their rifles and began returning fire. Here the 
Second Kansas Colored Regiment, ·just as its sister regiment 
the First Kansas Colored had done in July, distinguished 
itself in close combat with rebels. "The volleys of 
musketry and the yells of the enemy nearly drovned every 
other noise," remembered Pond. He yelled for men to help 
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him roll the howitzer into place but finally had to do it 
himself. He fired three rounds into the guerrillas and 
drove them from the fort. They retreated over a hill north 
of the camp. 
But Blunt's little command vas also over that hill. 
By coincidence Blunt had arrived at Baxter Springs just as 
the fighting began but he could neither see the fort, 
hidden by the hill, nor hear the fighting. Quantrill 
recognized Blunt's column as another easy mark and formed 
his men in line. Blunt, seeing that the line of cavalrymen 
wore federal uniforms and fle'tv a Union banner (a common 
guerrilla tactic in the trans-Mississippi theater), let 
them approach unharmed. Blunt became suspicious, though, 
when he saw men whom he supposed to be officers riding up 
and dmm the approaching line. He rode fon·rard himself for 
a better look and then could hear the firing from the fort. 
But it was too late and Quantriil yelled for his men to 
charge. A stray artillery round sailed up from Pond's gun 
and decapitated one of.the rebels just as Blunt wheeled 
around to order his command to fire. But to the general's 
dismay and anger his troops were in .full fl~ght, galloping 
in retreat across the prairie. 
Sensing disaster Blunt pulled Mrs. Chester Thomas (a 
federal contractor's wife who had accompanied the column to 
Fort Smith to meet her husband) out of her carriage, put 
her on a horse and sent her galloping to the rear. Blunt 
and his assistant adjutant-general, Major Curtis, tried in 
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vain to rally the command but quickly found themselves 
passed by one line or rebels and hotly pursued by another. 
They could do nothing but flee and they put their horses in 
a gallop towarq a deep ravine. Many federals lay dead or 
wounded at the ravine, shot ·when their horses failed to 
make the jump. At it started to jump the obstacle Curtis' 
horse fell with a bullet wound and threw the major to the 
ground. Blunt's horse made the jump but the landing threw 
Blunt out of the saddle and onto the horse's neck where he 
wisely rode for another mile, using the horse as cover. 
Blunt's regimental band also made the trip and in the 
thick of the battle the fourteen band members, their 
civilian driver, a twelve-year-old boy who was a servant of 
the band leader, and James O'Neal, a correspondent for 
Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, tried to escape in the 
bandwagon. Guerrilla Bill Bledsoe rode up to the wagon and 
demanded the people surrender. · One of the musicians 
instead shot him and the driver put the team to a run. As 
Bledsoe lay dying on the ground he tolo fellow guerrilla 
Fletch Taylor "that outfit have shot and killed me, take my 
t1vo pistols and kill all of them." Taylor chased the wagon 
' ' 
and only caught it when a wheel fell off, tossing the 
occupants to the ground. Taylor murdered them all. He and 
other guerrillas tossed the bodies under the wrecked 
bandwagon, then burned·it. 
Blunt chased the survivors of his command for over a 
mile before he succeeded in rallying fifteen of them. He 
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sent six of them to Fort Scott to get help and with the 
other nine returned to the battlefield. Blunt refused to 
leave until he knew what had happened to the federal 
wounded. He could not fight Quantrill but stayed hidden 
close enough that he could watch the guerrillas. 
Quantrill was jubilant. He had captured nine wagons 
loaded with federal provisions, one buggy, an ambulance, 
Blunt's personal baggage wagon containing his sword, 
general's commission, and headquarter's papers, and t"tvo 
stand of colors. He was also confident that he had killed 
Blunt and reported as much to Confederate Major-General 
Sterling Price. He also captured a five-gallon jug of 
whiskey from Blunt's wagon and proceeded to get drunk on 
it. It was the only time Quantrill's men had seen him 
drink and he danced ~round ranting "By God, Shelby could 
not ·whip Blunt; neither could Marmaduke, but I ·whipped 
him." Obviously the name of Blunt carried some weight with 
the guerrilla chieftain. 
Quantrill and his men .finally resumed their march to 
the south and Blunt rode in to survey the damage. He found 
the remains of the band members, teamsters and office 
clerks, but he could not find the body of Curtis. The next 
day Blunt found Curtis' body near where his horse had 
thrown him. He had been shot through the head. Blunt sent 
riders ahead to warn the countryside of Quantrill's 
approach and vm1ed to "follmv the hounds through the entire 
southern Confederacy as long as there is a prospect of 
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overtaking them." Then Blunt issued a stern warning to his 
mvn troops, ordering than "any man . . . lvho again breaks 
from the 1 ine . . shall be shot on the spot. "27 
The ambush at Baxter Springs was Blunt's last 
engagement with rebels in 1863. Even though it ended with 
a defeat, .the year was another winning one for Blunt and 
included his victories at Honey Springs, Perryville, and 
Fort Smith. During the Honey Springs campaign Blunt proved 
that he was learning more about handling an army in combat, 
although his basic plan of attack was still a 
straightforward infantry ass~ult supported by artillery. 
But the campaign also pointed up Blunt's flaws. His 
disregard for the Indian troops after the battle at Honey 
Springs, probably at Senator James H. Lane's behest, 
indicates Blunt's inability, or unwillingness, to distance 
himself from a poor political mentor. His limited use and 
recognition of black troops.also tarnished Blunt's 
reputation as an abolitionist general. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISPUTES AND. CONTROVERSIES 
1863 
General James G. Blunt was an able commander, albeit 
unschooled, uhile leading arr.1ies in the field. 
Unfortunately the same aggressive, hard-nosed attitude that 
earned him victories on the battlefield worked against him 
in his military and political relationships. Blunt 11as 
argumentative and prone to accept only one idea--his own--
as the correct idea. He frequently eie not communicate with 
his superiors and feared that they conspired against him. 
Blunt earned his military victories on his own but any 
political achievements that he gained had come by way of 
James Lane. Lane, 'though, was a poor political mentor. Aside 
from creating a spot for Blunt in the Kansas military and 
nominating him for his first g8neral's star (to be sure, no 
small measures of political support) Lane' had. done little 
for Blunt since early 1862. Surely the men corresponded 
during the var but very fev records of such correspondence 
remain. By and large Lane left Blunt to fend for himself 
in the day-to-day political arena of the trans-Mississippi 
west. Unfortunately that theater was as highly political 
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as any in the nation, even though volunteers, as untrained 
in the arts of war as Blunt, largely made up the military 
population. Blunt could not play the political games that 
would have enhanced the reputation he had earned on the 
battlefield. He frequently quarreled with his superiors 
instead of working with them and ih late 1863 his various 
feuds culminated in his relief from command and eventually 
his banishment to an obscure Indian war in western Kansas. 
Blunt's relations with the two wartime governors of 
Kansas were poor. As already noted Blunt ran afoul of 
Governor Charles Robinson soon after assumi~g command of 
the Department of Kansas in May 1862. Robinson, an 
anti-Lane man, and Blunt clashed when the governor tried to 
fill the department with officers of his own choosing. 
Blunt, perhaps with Lane's helr, met the threat 
straightfonvardly and ordered that no officer holding a 
Robinson commission be mustered into service without 
express orders from department headquarters. Blunt also 
restored officers who were thrown out of positions when 
Robinson issued commissions for jobs already filled. Blunt 
then referred the matter to the Wa~ Department aqd 
Secretary of War Stanton referred it to Attorney General 
Edward Bates. In June Bates upheld Blunt's action.1 
Blunt had no further conflicts with Robinson as he was 
campaigning in Missouri a~d Arkansas for the remainder of 
the governor's term. When the general returned to Kansas 
in 1863 after the Prairie Grove campaign, Kansans had just 
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elected Thomas Carney as governor. "I had reason to 
believe [Carney] was cooperating with me for the public 
good," said Blunt, but the general's hopes faded quickly. 
Carney, a Leavenvorth, Kansas, businessman, rode into 
the governor's office on Jim Lane's coattails; in fact, 
Lane virtually secured Carney's election through the 
- ' political patrona~e he had acprued in the organization of 
regiments. Carney was a political chameleon; though, and 
changed his color soon after the election. Instead of 
bowing to Lane~ Carney determined to act as governor in his 
own right. The men squabbled ov~r military patronage and 
Carney set his ~ights on Lane's own senatorial seat.2 
Carney's transformation i~~o an anti-Lane man presaged 
doom for any relationship he,and Blunt might have. As 
could be expected, they quar're'led. Their first fight was 
over the trial by a citizens' court and hanging of 
suspected murderers in Atchison, Kansas, in May, 1863, a 
result of increased attacks by border raiders. Throughout 
the spring guerrilla activity along the Kansas-Missouri 
border increased and Blunt, still in charge of the District 
of Kansas before Schofield divided it, attemp-t;-ed to counter 
the depredations. In Mar6h, Department of the ~iisouri 
commander General Samuel Curtis warned Blunt to put his 
'best troops on the border since Missourians were afraid 
that Blunt, given his past affiliations wi~h Kansas 
abolitionists and Jayhawkers, would not deal harshly with 
Kansas border raiders. They expressed particular concern 
135 
about whether Blunt would corral the Red Legs, which in 
fact he and General Thomas Ewing, Jr~, created the previous 
year to serve as border guards. Blunt assured Curtis he 
would handle the Red Legs roughly. "I expect to hang a fe"'iv 
of them soon by'i•Tay qf example," he said. On April 16, 
1863, Blunt told Colonel E. Lynde, commander of the Ninth 
Kansas Volunteers, not to extend the rules of civilized 
"'ivarfare to ·any captured border raiders. "They must be 
treated as insurgents and shall suffer ·death," Blunt 
mandated. His o~ders applied especially to the Red 
Legs.3 
But throughout May border raiders continued their 
rampage and even be9an attacldng the stag·e lines running 
from Kansas City to Council Grove, Kanias. Blunt 
complained he did riot have enough men to combat the 
guerrilla threat. "I am greatly embarrassed for want of 
troops," he told Colonel N. P. Chipman, Curtis' chief of 
staff, explaining that he did· not have the manpower to 
support Colonel William Phillips, who was garrisoning Fort 
Gibson, and combat the border raids. He tried to counter 
his deficiency tn numbeT,s with local resources, though. 
Blunt authorized sheriffs in border counties to raise 
posses of county citizens for their·ovn protection. The 
general supplied the posses with arms and directed them to 
cooperate vri th regular troops. "This is· the only ·way that 
loyal people can be protected until I can have troops 
furnished me," said Blunt.4 
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In late May one such posse in Atchison, Kansas, caught 
four men suspected of robbery and murder. On May 21 
Atchison County sheriff Donald Carmichael and eleven other 
citizens visited Blunt at Fort Leavenworth and asked the 
general what to do with the prisoners: They suggested that 
justice might be best served, in light of-the scarcity of 
' ' 
federal troops, if they turned the sus~ects ~ver to the 
citizens of· Atchison for trial.. Blunf agreed. The 
Atchison citizens held the trial and convicted the men, 
jailing two and han~ing the others. Blunt was pleased and 
said the result "[struck] terror to the evil-doers [in 
northeast Kansa~]."5 
But Governor Carney vas not pleased. He drafted a 
letter to President Lincoln in which he charged Blunt with 
instigating a reig~ of terror in Kansas and with sharing in 
the plunder of the Red L~gs~ Blunt learned of the letter 
and on July 31, while he was in the ~ield at Fort Gibson, 
drafted a vehement reply to the president. He called 
Carney a "thief and a liar" and a "fool for the w·ant of 
brains." Blunt said Carney vras trying to discredit him 
because of the' general's allegations th~t the governor ~nd 
Indian a~ent Coffin were defrauding the refugee Indians in 
Kansas. Lincoln wrote back to Blunt that he had no 
intention of acting on Carney's charges. While Lincoln 
expressed some concern that B·lunt ·had alloived "Judge Lynch" 
to control affairs in Atchison, he planned to take no 
action against Blunt on that count either.6 
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Blunt was apparently justified in his suspicions about 
the governor. After the war Blunt met Carney and the 
latter agreed that Blunt's decision in the Atchison case 
was the correct one. Blunt said Carney admitted that he 
was trying to discredit Blunt and ''intended to use all-the 
weapons [he] could get."7 
By fa~ the bitterest of· Blunt's feuds·y~~ with Gen~ral 
John M. Schofield. In Blunt's mind Schofiel~ became a 
military incompetent the moment he failed to attack in 
concert with Blunt at Newtonia, Missouri, 'in October, 1862. 
Blunt hated Schofield for his ta~diness and had no further 
use for the man,.even though Schofield would be Blunt's 
commander for over a year. Schofield came to hate Blunt 
also, but gradually. Schofield praised Blunt after the 
battle of Old Fort Wayne, October 22, 1862, saying the 
battle "illustrated in a high degree the energy and 
gallantry for which Genera~ Blq~t and his division are so 
justly celebrated." But after,Prairie Grove Schofield had 
nothing but contempt for Blunt. He told General Curtis 
that operations of the Army of. the Frontier while Schofield 
was away siclc "were a series of blunders, from \vhich. it 
narrowly escaped disaster where it should have met with 
complete success." Schofield said Blunt and Herron were 
"badly beaten in detail," and mved their escape to false 
reports that Schofield was returning to Arkansas with 
reinforcements. Schofield said Blunt's performance at 
Prairie Grove satisfied hir.t that Blunt was "unfit in any 
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respect for the command of a division of troops against a 
disciplined enemy." Blunt never believed Schofield was 
sick when he left the army before Prairie Grove and as far 
as he was concerned, Schofield's actions before that battle 
earned him a reputation for "cq~ar~ice and imbecility" that 
would make his military record "one of infamy rather than 
glory."8 As already explained the Battle of Prairie 
Grove, wher~. Blunt allowed Confederates- to slip around his 
flank and interpose themselves between two Union armies, 
was one of his worst battlefield- performances. In his 
comments Schofield may not have been far from wrong. 
When Schofield replaced General Curtis as commander of 
the Department of the Missouri in May 1863, he reorganized 
the department, cutting Blunt's district in half and 
renaming it the District of the Frontier. Blunt received 
his major-general's commission at about the same time and 
wryly commented that his command decreased in proportion as 
his rank increased. Blunt ~bspected Schofield was in 
league with Governor-carney in an attempt to discredit him 
with the Atchison hanging case, and he believed Schofield 
resorted to the reduction i~ command -as a last resort to 
take away his power. Since Blunt planned to campaign in 
Indian Territory anyway, he .did not object to the 
redistricting. He objected to the size of his army, 
however, vhich dwindled to about three thousand men. Blunt 
was convinced that Schofield reduced his command just as 
rebels in Indian Territory intensified their raids on 
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supply lines to Fort Gibson in order to "sacrifice this 
command . . and get rid of me."9 
Schofield came close to relieving Blunt over an 
argument in in late June 1863. From his new· district 
headquarters at Fort Scott Blunt began giving orders to 
Major L. c. Easton, chief and depot quartermaster at Fort 
Leavenworth, even though Schofield's redistricting took 
jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth away from Blunt. Blunt 
acted on General Orders No. 48, which redistricted the 
department and said Easton was ''assigned to duty as chief 
quartermaster of th~ Districts of Nebraska, of Colorado, o£ 
the Border, and of the Frontier,." In interpreting the 
orders, Blunt assumed that Easton was quartermaster for 
several districts. Easton protested, claiming Blunt did 
not have the right to make orders to him directly. Instead 
all district commanders should apply to their district 
quartermasters for supplies, vrho then should apply to the 
depot quartermaster i£ needed. Easton sent the matter to 
Schofield for mediation.lO 
Blunt's insistence on issuing orders to the Fort 
Leavenworth quartermaster may have ·been at Lane's urging. 
Lane rebelled when Schofield took over the Department of 
the Missouri, since he was a conservative general replacing 
the more radical Curtis, vhose .views on slavery and 
secessionists were in line with Lane's. President Lincoln, 
of course, replaced Curtis with Schofield as the latter was 
more apt to appease Missouri conservatives. Lane hmvled 
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once again vlhen Schofield divided Blunt's dis_trict as it 
put General Ewing, also a conservative, in charge of the 
quartermaster's depot at Fort Leavenworth and interfered 
with Lane's control of commissary stores. Lane frantically 
marshalled Kansas newspapers, including the Leavenworth 
Daily Conservative, Kansas WeeJ~ly Tribune,, and the Kansas 
State Record, and radical Missouri papers in a push to have 
the War Department create a Department of the Frontier with 
Blunt at its head. President Lincoln, however, ignored the 
noise Lane was,making in Kansas and let the department and 
district commands stand as they 1vere, again indicating that 
he had come to the' conclusion that Lane's radicals would 
not be the deciding factor in the uar and that he no longer 
had to worry about offending them.ll 
The success of political generals depended not only on 
their battlefield prowess, but on the support of their 
political sponsor as well. Blunt was a capable field 
general but he uas inept ~t politics and Jim Lane was a 
terrible political sponsor., Lane's actions show that he 
only worried about Blunt to the extent that the general 
could help him, which explains his limited political 
support for Blunt in other matters. Never did Lane,defend 
' . ' 
Blunt's battlefield actions, such as when Schofield so 
roundly criticized Blunt for the battle of Prairie Grove. 
Only 'i-Then a situation involving Blunt affected Lane's Oifn 
personal interests did the senator come to Blunt's side. 
Naturally opponents suspected Lane and Blunt of skimming 
profits off of quartermaster's contracts, though such 
charges were never proven. For his part, Blunt never 
commented on the quartermaster situation with regard to 
James H. Lane. 
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Schofield upheld quartermaster Easton's contention 
that Blunt had no jurisdiction over him but Blunt did not 
desist. Finally, on July 5 as Blunt embarked on the Honey 
Springs campaign, Schofield referred the matter to 
General-in-Chief Henry Halleclc, saying that he wanted to 
correct Blunt's ''irregularities and abuses," upon which he 
did not elaborate. Blunt had a quartermaster in his 
district and "can no more command Major Easton than he can 
the chief quartermast,er of the department," said Schofield. 
He said he did not want to restrict Blunt any further than 
to the proper chain of command 'but added that "if [Blunt] 
is not willing to submit to such restriction, I see no way 
[to make him obey] but by removing hin from his 
command."12 
Blunt stopped issuing orders to Easton, but he did not 
drop the matter. On July 26, 1863, after the battle at 
Honey Springs, Blunt wrote a scathing letter to Secretary 
of War Edwin M. Stanton. In it Blunt addressed the "abuses 
and irregularities" Schofield referred to in his letter to 
Halleck. Blunt said he assumed such irregularities, in 
Schofield's vievr, included his successful fall campaign in 
Arkansas while Schofield was away from the army and his 
more recent victory at Honey Springs. "I believe General 
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Schofield has been guilty of no such irregularities since 
he has been in the service," Blunt said sarcastically. In 
the same vain Blunt wryly apologized for losing a 
government mule team while crossing the rain-swollen 
Arkansas River July 16, 1863, on the march to Honey 
Springs. "For this I suppose a stoppage will be made 
against my pay . . [but I] have a_little property I 
' ' 
earned before the war [and] can afford to pay for the 
team." Blunt labeled quartermaste·r Easton a traitor 
("baser traitors ... do not exist-within Jeff. Davis' 
dominions," he vlrbte) and again charged Kansas Governor 
Carney and Indian superintendent Coffin with robbing the 
refugee Indians.13 
Five days later Blunt made many of the ~arne 
condemnations in a letter he sent to Lincoln defending 
himself against Carney'~ charges. Blunt informed Lincoln 
that he was the victim of a combination by Carney and 
Schofield and had been sent into the Indian Territory with 
a small command to be "sacrifice[d]." Blunt was preparing 
to start the campaign that would lead to the capture of 
Fort Smith and told Lincoln "I have not more than three 
thousand effective men for duty . . yet vli thin 
forty-eight hours I will cross the Arkansas River and 
attack. What the result may be I l~nmv not."14 
When Lincoln replied to tell Blunt he did not intend 
to act on Carney's charges, he also told the general he was 
displeased with his attitude. "I regret to find you 
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denouncing so many persons as liars, scoundrels, fools, 
thieves, and persecutors of yourself," said Lincoln. As 
for Blunt's military situation in Indian Territory, Lincoln 
told him not t~ complain. "Your military position loolcs 
critical, but did anybody force you into it? Have you been 
ordered to confront and fight 10, 000 men vli th 3, 000?" 
Lincoln said he appreciated Blunt's service3, as his 
brigadier's and major-general's COII'\missions "indicated, but 
added that the gove~nment could not make more m~n.15 
The argument about the qua~termaster was over but in 
October Schofield again threatened to strip Blunt of his 
command. In September, 1863, Schofield sent an 
investigative committee comprised of one colonel and two 
captains to investigate·the Districts of the Border and of 
the Frontier, Ewing's and Blunt's districts respectively. 
Schofield said he ordered the investigation because he 
continuously received reports, both official and 
unofficial, of "gross frauds and corruption" 1vi thin the 
administration of those districts, and that troops within 
them suffered from "general demoralization." Again 
complaints· centered on abuses of th~ quartermaster's.and 
commissary stores and Schofield singled out Blunt's 
district. Schofield said ·he could not implement any reform 
in that district while Blunt commanded it and therefore 
wanted to relieve him from duty. Schofield emphasized, 
though, that his investigators had not been able to 
specifically link Blunt with frauds against the government. 
Even so, Schofield wanted to be rid of Blunt in order to 
"reclaim the troops of that command from [their] 
disgraceful condition." Schofield said his investigators 
also found irregularities in Ewing's district, but noted 
that Ewing had been in command only a short time and many 
of the problems occurred before he arrived.16 
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Blunt learned of the investigative team (a "smelling 
committee" as he called it) while he was sick in bed at 
Fort Smith. He said he invited the committee to come and 
talk to him but they refused, even though they were within 
thirty miles of the place. "Neither did they make any 
inspection of my staff departments or of the troops, but 
their talent for drinking ·whiskey was remarkable," Blunt 
vrote. 17 
But Schofieldmade good on his threat. While Blunt 
was at Fort Scott, Kansas, October 28, refitting his 
command after the October 6 Baxter Springs massacre, he 
received orders relieving him of command. Schofield's 
orders had nothing to db vith Blunt's defeat at Baxter 
Springs, but with the investigation he had just conducted 
and his personal dislike of ·Blunt. ; Schofield ordered' 
Brigadier General John McNeil, formerly ~ommander of the 
District of Southwestern Missouri, to "repair to Fort Smith 
... and relieve ... Blunt." Blunt interpreted this as 
meaning he could not relinquish command until he, too, was 
in Fort Smith, thus he continued removing his headquarters 
to that post as he had been in the process of doing when he 
met Quantrill in southeast Kansas. 
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When Blunt left Fort Scott he took with him twelve 
hundred troops and three hundred wagons loaded 11ith 
subsistence and quartermaster's stores for Fort Gibson and 
Fort Smith. Since he was still in command he did not I'Tant 
to be responsible for any disaster that might befall those 
places if he left them without provisions. But on November 
2, Colonel William We~r,·now commanding the Tenth Kansas 
Volunteers, warned Schofield that Blunt was actually 
hauling "contraband of war"--provisions that he intended to 
sell to rebel troops for personal profit~ Weer accused 
Blunt of nothing less than treason but offered no evidence 
to support his charge. That such an accusation should come 
from Weer is unusual as it was Weer whose apparent 
drunkeness caused the ruin of·the Indian Territory 
expedition in 1862. Blunt had subsequently salvaged Weer's 
military career by cancelling court martial proceedings. 
Even so, Weer urged Schofield to have Blunt's train stopped 
and searched. He also warhed Schofield that Blunt was 
going to Fort Smith and Van Buren to recover buried 
treasure there. What the treasure was Weer never said, nor 
did anyone else make such accusations against Blunt but 
General Ewing validated some of Weer's thoughts about the 
wagon train. He said Blunt was carrying $100,000 worth of 
goods sent by Alexander McDonald, of the McDonald and 
Fuller Company, government contractors at Fort Scott. 
Ewing said Blunt had given McDonald a sutler's commission 
at Fort Smith and it ·was "commonly understood" that Blunt 
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would take a share of profits from the sale of the goods. 
Weer said Lane was also involved in the matter. The 
warnings were enough for Schofield to order McNeil, waiting 
at Fort Smith, to search Blunt's train. If Weer's 
accusations were true, McNeil was to arrest Blunt and send 
him to Schofield at St. Louis. McNeil was also to arrest 
Blunt if he did not relinquish command of the district. 
Otherwise he was to return to Fort Leavenworth as per his 
orders. 
Blunt arrived at Fort Smith December 1 and General 
McNeil found nothing in his train but "an ordinary stock of 
merchandise." Blunt relinquished command without 
resistance but stayed in Fort· Smith as he received orders 
from the War Depart~ent to recruit a new regiment of black 
troops, the Eleventh Regiment.18 
But Blunt found out about Schofield's orders for his 
arrest if necessary and went into a rage. He wrote 
Secretary of War Stanton another letter, detailing to him 
the circumstances of his arrival at Fort Smith. Blunt told 
Stanton that he did not intend to go to Fort Leavenworth to 
await orders from Schofield but would take orders from the 
War Department instead. And, sounding just as he had in 
1862 when he decided he would _have nothing further to do 
with General Henry Halleck, Blunt said he intended to have 
no more communications with Schofield "except to prefer 
charges against him for incompetency and cowardice in 
connection with his military operations in the Southwest 
[in 1862]."19 
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Blunt was not through. On December 11 Blunt stormed 
into McNeil's office and sought out Champion Vaughn, a 
friend of Schofield's. Blunt said he knew Schofield had 
sent Vaughn to watch him, and that- he would "facilitate 
[Vaughn's] business." With that Blunt produced a copy of 
the letter he sent to Stanton'and read it to McNeil, 
Vaughn, and several other civilians present. 'Vaughn 1vas 
furious but kept his composure and later asked Schofield to 
give him a staff position. "I will remain with you at 
least till we see the end of this Blunt business," he 
said.20 
The "Blunt business" vras not over just yet but the 
general's feud with Schofield was. The War Department 
reorganized the Department of the Missouri on the first day 
of 1864, recreated the Department of Kansas and returned 
Major-General Sa~uel Curtis to its head. At his own 
request Schofield left for a fi'eld command~ He assumed 
command of the Department of the Ohio and accompanied 
Major-General William T. Sherman on the invasion of Georgia 
the following summer. puring that campaign Schofield's 
forces participated in the battles of Kenesaw Mountain and 
Atlanta and the seige of Atlanta. In November, 1864, 
Schofield won fame for himself by defeating a rebel 
invasion force under General John Bell Hood at Franklin, 
Tennessee, all of which disproved Blunt's contention that 
Schofield was an incompetent coward. The Department of the 
Missouri reorganization, though, left Blunt without a 
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command and when he petitioned the War Department for new 
orders, he was summoned to Washington D. c. (perhaps at the 
urging of Senator Lane, in one of the few times he tried to 
further Blunt's career) to discuss a possible invasion of 
Texas with President Lincoln. When Blunt left the capital 
on February 7, he did so with Lincoln's support of a Texas 
expedition. When he returned to Kansas in late February, 
Curtis put him in charge of so much of the District of the 
Frontier as was within the boundaries of the Department of 
Kansas, which included Kansas, Indian Territory, ana the 
military post of Fort Smith.21 
Bu~ Blunt and Curtis discovered that when the War 
Department redistricted the area it included only the 
military post of Fort Smith, not its surrounding areas, in 
the Department of Kansas. Consequently all troops at Fort 
Smith were not in the Department of Kansas, but in the 
Department of Arl~ansas under General Fred Steele. Blunt 
said when he arrived at Fort Smith March 8, 1864, it would 
be easy for him to take command for the federals from Fort 
Smith commander Brigadier General John M. Thayer since many 
of the troops there belonged to Blunt's old Army of the 
Frontier and were anxious for him to take command. Blunt 
showed a remarl(able degree of control, though. He told 
Curtis that he would not assume command as that would put 
him in direct conflict with Thayer. "[I] have concluded it 
is better to lie quiet and await the development of matters 
at Washington," he said. 
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But Thayer became suspicious of Curtis and Blunt and 
wrote directly to General Ulysses s. Grant, about to become 
United States Army general-in-chief. He told Grant that 
Curtis and Blunt wanted the western tier of Arkansas 
counties placed in the Department of Kansas so they could 
command troops located there. Thayer aslced Grant to advise 
the War Department against the request since it would leave 
that area of the Department of Arkansas without troops. 
The next day Blunt forgot his promise of moderation 
and ordered all officers at Fort Smith to-report to him. 
•' 
General Steele told Thayer tha~ he and his officers were to 
obey no orders from Blunt or Curtis. 
On March 14 Grant supposedly settled the matter when 
he advised Secretary of War Stanton that transferring part 
of the Department of Arkansas to the Department of Kansas 
was "decidedly unadvisabl·e. ·~ But on March 29 Steele 
charged Blunt and Curtis with, instigating the desertions of 
some Kansas troops from,his depart~ent. 
Finally, on April 15, 1864, chief of staff General 
Henry Halleck brought the Fort Smith controversy to a head 
when he recommended that the War Department strip Fort 
Smith and the Indian Territory from the Department of 
Kansas and place them in the Department of 'Arkansas. That 
had always been his intention, Halleck said, and he could 
see no other way of clearing up the confusion. He 
suggested that the War Department send Blunt, whom Halleck 
described as a "very quarrelsome man," baclc to Kansas to 
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report to Curtis. Grant agreed and asked for Lincoln's 
approval. "Let it be done," said the president, ending the 
controversy April 16, 1864. For his part, Blunt believed 
Halleck had conspired against him in the controversy as the 
general-in-chief ~id.not want Blunt to mount a successful 
expedition into Texas.22 
It is interesting that General Grant played a role in 
ending the Fort. Smith controversy. Though Gran~ and Blunt 
were sinilar in some of their combat characteristics-- both 
were determined, .. ag_gressi ve, and not afraid to fight --they 
were completely dissimilar in regard to,politics. Until he 
ran for president in} 1868 Grant steered clear of politics, 
whether in the larger, more recognizable realm of elected 
offices, or in the more subtle realm of military politics. 
Certainly Grant owed his generalship to a politician, 
Illinois congressman Elihu B .. Washburne. But Grant looked 
to Washburne for no other favors. In fact, when General 
Henry Hallec};: decried his performance at the battle of 
Shiloh Grant quietly prepared to the leave the army. He 
asked no one to help him, pulled no strings to secure his 
command, and.only encouragement by his friend G&neral 
William T. Sherman convinced Grant to stay.23 Grant's 
political meekness magnifie~ his stolid determination on 
the battlefield and enhanced his public image. When 
General John M. Schofield cri tici·zed Blunt's performance at 
Prairie Grove, Blunt responded like an affronted chilo and 
started the worst political feud of his military career. 
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Perhaps Grant stayed a~1ay from intra-military politics 
because he saw it only a soldier's duty to obey orders and 
fight the enemy. Maybe he avoided politics because he was 
in a conspicuous position of leadership and dealt with 
highly critical military matters, or perhaps he believed he 
did not have the temper or skills to fight and win a 
political battle. James G. Blunt never bothered to make 
such a self-appraisal. If he had he would have realized 
that he vas impolitic, and should have either avoided 
military politics completely, or found a capable political 
sponsor. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FINAL BATTLES: THE PRICE RAID 
1864 
Blunt's rash action in the Fort Smith controversy cost 
General Curtis part of his department and Blunt his 
command. From April to July 1864, Blunt commanded no 
troops until his friend Curtis came to his aid. On July 23 
Curtis created the District of the Upper Arkansas, 
comprising most of vestern Kansas to the Colorado border, 
and placed Blunt in command.1 Even though Curtis kept 
Blunt in command of troops, the new· assignment 1vas 
something of an exile for Blu~t. His argumentativeness and 
questionable dealings with army contractors tainted the 
military reputation he earned in 1862 and 1863 and made him 
unpopular 1vi th other officers. Blunt's ne1v duties, vThich 
he accepted August 2, took him far away from the Civil War 
and landed him in western Kansas 9here. he would be fighting 
Indians, not Confederates. 
Curtis did not create the Departme~t of the Upper 
Arkansas just to giv~ Blunt a command, but to combat 
increased raids by the Kiowa, Comanche, and Arapaho. 
Reports of Indian depredations became so numerous that 
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Curtis toured western Kansas during the summer and found 
that Indians had stolen stock from Fort Larned to Walnut 
Creek, murdered several white men, and begun to gather 
within forty miles of Fort Riley, about sixty miles west of 
Topeka at the confluence of the Republican and Kansas 
Rivers. Curtis created the new military district while he 
was at Fort Riley and even before Blunt arrived began 
ordering the post quartermaster to buy horses for.unmounted 
troopers, and requested Kansas militia colonels to send 
seven hundred men to the fort. Curtis himself accompanied 
an expedition that scared Indians away from the Santa Fe 
trail.2 
Within a week of his arrival at Fort Riley, Blunt 
learned that Indians had stampeded government horses west 
of his position at a-crossing of the Smoky Hill River 
(known, not surprisingly, as Smoky Hill Crossing). Blunt 
petitioned Curtis for more horses, enough to mount tvo 
companies of cavalry, and for carbines and revolvers, 
noting that sabers would be useless in an Indian campaign. 
Blunt planned to lead an expedition west as soon as 
possible. 
While he ~raited, the Indian situation ·worsened. On 
August 10 the citizens of Shirley, Republic, and Washington 
Counties, located north of Fort Riley ano not in Blunt's 
district, petitioned Blunt for protection against Indian 
attacJ(s. Then Blunt learned that on August 6 Indians had 
attacked and killed four hunters about forty miles north of 
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Salina. The Indians scalped three of the men, then 
attacked an elderly man and woman in a ranch house. The 
old man shot one Indian and the rest fled. Following the 
attacks the people of Saline County held a mass meeting to 
discuss their own protection. On August 13 Blunt received 
word that a large band of Indians were on the Republican 
River with a herd of horses, perhaps stolen cavalry mounts, 
and that Indians had stolen the horses from a company of 
the First Colorado Cavalry near a crossing of the Cimarron 
River in southwest Kansas. One day later two men arrived 
at Fort Riley from the Republican River area and told Blunt 
that their neighbors were abandoning their homes and 
gathering at a point near the river where they intended to 
fight the Indians if necessary. , Blunt agreed to send arms 
and some cavalry support tp the fifty militiamen 
accompanying the settlers, but he knew he did not have 
enough men and horses to combat the growing Indian trouble. 
Finally Blunt received news that from one hundred to three 
hundred Indians had attacked seven troopers of Company H, 
Seventh Iowa Cavalry, en route to Smoky Hill Crossing. 
' -
Indians kill-ed four of the.soldiers, and the others fled to 
Salina.3 
Blunt was characteristically eager to take the field 
against the Indians, to "march on the red devils and give 
them a chastising . . a little killing," as he told 
Curtis. Even though Blunt had come to dislike the Indians 
he formerly commanded in the old Districts of Kansas and 
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the Frontier, it is not likely that his feelings for the 
warring Indians on the frontier extended to the Unionist 
Indians. Blunt's comment that the Union Indians had become 
worthless was probably more of a slur against their 
commander, Colonel William A. Phillips, than the Indians 
themselves. Blunt also became a claims representative for 
Quapaw and Cherokee Indians a~ter the war, sh~wing that he 
did not harbor aniinosi ty for all Indians.· Ironically the 
government accused Blunt of defrauding both groups, though 
it never proved the:allegations.4 
Blunt believed a campaign against the marauding 
Indians in Kansas would be an extension of his Civil War 
battles as he was convinced that the Indian attacks were 
' ' 
the result of a conspiracy bet~een Indians and Confederate 
agents. Nevertheless Blunt would not start a campaign 
until he received reinforcements.. Finally, on August 25, 
Blunt learned from Major c. s. Charlot, Curtis' assist~nt 
adjutant-general, that at le~st two companies of cavalry 
and a wagon train with 105,000 ciarbine and revolver 
cartridges were on their way to Fort Riley.5 
Reinfor.ced· Blunt startec.. his expedition. Re ilent to 
Fort Larned, 150 miles southvest of Fort Riley near the 
Arl~ansas River, where he acquired a detachment of the First 
Colorado Cavalry and·.some light artillery. There Blunt 
learned that a band of Arapaho and Cheyenne were at the 
head of the Smoky Hill River, about to cross the Arkansas 
and move south to the Cimarron. On September 21 Blunt took 
159 
his column west of Fort Larned but found no band of Indians 
moving south. He decided to march north, toward the Smoky 
Hill River, and intercept the Indians before they could 
reach the Arkansas. Still impressed with the necessity of 
scouts from ,his campaigns in Arkansas and Indian Territory, 
Blunt used belaware Indians as guides and ~arched only at 
," 
night since he thought it would be impossible to march 
undetected across the planes during the day.6 
On the third day of his march, Sept~mber 25, Blunt 
found an Indian ·lodge and some ponies about eighty miles 
northwest of Fort Larned on the Pawnee River. Blunt sent 
scouts to investigate and soon he~rd firing from their 
direction. He discovered his troop~rs were chasing the 
Indians and sent two companies of the First Colorado to 
their aid. An hour later, with no word from the advance 
guard, Blunt decided to move up the river himself with the 
rest of the command. One mile away Blunt ~ound the First 
Colorado detachment surrounded by Indians and attempting to 
fight their way back. Messengers tried to take word to 
Blunt but Indians cut them off too. When Blunt arrived the 
sight of his force put the Indians to flight. Blunt's 
cavalry suffered one killed, one missing and presumed dead, 
and seven wounded. They killed nine Indians in the 
fight.7 
Blunt followed the Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors up 
the Pawnee River for two days but, realizing the Indians 
had better mounts than the soldiers, gave up the chase. He 
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returned to Fort Larned intending to rest and prepare 
another expedition. But before he reached the fort a 
courier rode up to Blunt's column with news that ended 
Blunt's Indian fighting and returned him to the Civil War. 
Confederate General Sterling Price had invaded Missouri and 
General Curtis wanted Blunt at Fort Leavenworth as quickly 
as possible.8 
Price launched his invasion to reoccupy Missouri from 
Camden, Arkansas, August 28, and for a month made his way 
up eastern Missouri. On September 27 Price fought twelve 
hundred federals under Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, who 
had commanded the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry under Blunt in 
Arkansas. Though E1ving's men held off the rebels, they 
retreated during the night to St. Louis which Ewing feared 
was Price's target. Instead Price veered to the northwest 
and marched for Jefferson City, Missouri's capital. 
Price's rebels skirmished all the way to the Missouri 
River, arriving at Jefferson City October 7. Here Price 
intended to place a new Confederate governor in power but 
decided to bypass the city when he saw that federals had it 
heavily reinforced. He continued west toward Kansas City. 
Blunt arrived at Fort Leavenworth October 8, one day 
after Price arrived at Jefferson City. Curtis had been in 
Fort Leavenworth for a week, arguing with Blunt's old 
nemesis, Governor Thomas Carney, about the use of the 
Kansas militia to fight Price. Carney declared that Kansas 
was not in danger and would not allow Curtis to use the 
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militia. Senator Jim Lane arrived at Leavenwort~ at the 
same time as Blunt and both men convinced Curtis that if 
Carney would not cooperate, Curtis should declare martial 
law and assume control of the militia. After appealing to 
Carney again 1vith no response, C,urti~ declared martia+ law. 
That same day,· October 10, Curt.is put Blunt in command of 
the Districb of Southern Kansas, a c~mmand of about four 
thousand men. The command included the Fifteenth Kansas 
··' ' 
Cavalry under Colonel Charles R. Jennison, former Lane 
Brigade commander, a·nd the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry led by 
Colonel Thomas Moonlight, Blunt's old assistant 
adjutant-general.9 
Blunt consolidated his force at Paola, Kansas, and on 
October 13 moved it into Jackson County, Missouri, south of 
., 
Kansas City. There:more reinforcements arrived, including 
detachments of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Kansas 
Cavalries, part of t.h·e Third Wi.sconsin Cavalry, the First 
Colorado Cavalry, a section of the Second Kansas Battery, 
eight tl'lel ve-pounder hmvi tzers ,, and the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Tenth Kansas State Militia regiments. Curtis designated 
Blunt's command the First bivision, Army of the Border:10 
Immediately Blunt had problems v.ri th tv.ro of the militia 
officers. Brigadier General J. M. Fishback and Colonel 
James D. Snoddy, of the Sixth Militia Regiment, refused to 
acknovrledge Blunt as their commander and ordered their men 
back to Kansas. Sensing a mutiny, Blunt arrested both nen 
and had no further p,roblem 1li th militia troops. Blunt said 
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no other militia member questioned his authority and all 
were ""tdlling to advance into Missouri, or elsewhere, to 
meet the enemy." Fishback later appealed to Colonel Chu.les 
Blair, commanding Blunt's Third Brigade, for his release. 
Fishback admitted to Blair that he had been wrong in his 
actions and Blair agreed that the· penitent Fishback would 
probably now do his duty. "Snoddy," commented Blair, "is 
better as he is. Difficulties are bred around him wherever 
he goes, and he lives in an atmosphere of perpetual strife 
and animosity." Anyway, Snoddy's mm militiamen had. 
replaced him in an election. They chose Colonel James 
Montgomery, Blunt's old Lane Brigade commander, as their 
new leader. Lane himself had volunteered as an 
aide-de-camp to Curtis and thus four members of the old 
Lane Brigade-- Lane, Blunt, Montgomery, and 
Jennison--waited in Missouri to help fight Sterling Price's 
army.ll 
For the first time in over a year Blunt began to show 
a trace of his old campaigning self and asked to lead a 
scouting expedition east of Kansas City. Curtis, preparing 
to defend the Big Blue River between Kansas City arid 
Independence, Missouri, agreed and ordered Blunt to leave 
on October 16. Blunt took his First and Second Brigades, 
about two thousand men,_ and the next day met a band of 
Missouri militia and civilians retreating fron Warrensburg 
fifty miles to the southeast. They told Blunt that rebel 
General Jo Shelby (the same man vho had devised the clever 
rear guard that had confounded Blunt at Cane Hill, 
Arkansas, in November, 1862) had captured Sedalia and was 
marching on Warrensburg. Blunt took the Missouri militia 
into his command and sent some of them to scout 
Warrensburg. Th~y returned with news that the town was 
safe and Shelby had rejoined Price at Waverly on the 
Missouri River about eighty miles east. of .Kansas City .12 
163 
Major-Ge~~ral William s. Rosecrans, Department of the 
Missouri commander since the first of 1864, sent a division 
under Major General Alfred Pleasanton (former cavalry 
commander in the Army of the Potomac) in pursuit of Price 
when the rebels veered away from St. Louis. Now those 
troops, in brigades under Generals John Sanborn, John 
McNeil, and A. J. Smith, were close on Price's tail between 
the rebels and Sedalia. Blunt decided he would form a 
junction 1vith them, then attaCJc Price. He dispatched 
messengers to the generals and sent back to Kansas City for 
the rest of his division. Then he moved into Lexington, 
Missouri, defended only by a fev rebel guerrillas, to vait 
for his reinforcements.13 
Blunt's. plari went. sour, thou~h. At Lexington 'on 
October 19 he learned that Price's army was twenty miles 
auay but a message arrived.frorn Curtis who said the 
reinforcements Blunt wante~ vere not coming. Governor 
Carney had forbidden Curtis to send the Kansas militia any 
deeper into Missouri. An hour later at 11 a.m. Price's 
advance guard collided vith Blunt's pickets. Blunt 
f 
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reinforced his skirmishers while he arrayed his brigades in 
line southwest of Lexington. Blunt knev rebels outnumbered 
his force and he would ultimately have to retreat but 
before he left he intended to find out the strength of 
Price's army. The ground Blunt selected would force 
Price's troops out i~to the open where Blunt could estimate 
their strength. When he got a good look at them Blunt said 
he "became well convin9ed that the 'tlhole of Price's army 
was present." SJdrmishing continued for tvm hours, until 
Price brought up his. long-range artillery: As his 
howitzers were too s~all to respond and as he feared a 
flanking attack, Blunt ordered his meh to fall back along 
the Independence road. Colonel Moonlight and the Eleventh 
Kansas Cavalry covered the retreat.l4 
Captain Henry E. Palmer, Co~pany A, Eleventh Kansas, 
remembered his retreat as particularly harrowing. Blunt 
sent Palmer and about Q50 men to hold the Dover Road 
leading to Lexington to guard the inevitable retreat. 
Palmer held the J;Oad, even though he could hear firing 
behind him. But by 5 p.m. the firing stopped and·Palmer 
could tell from scattered shoo,ting that Price' had disl"odged 
Blunt and slipped between Palmer and the rest of the 
federals. Palmer came up with a daring plan for his own 
escape. He placed seventeen rebel prisoners within his 
column and with twenty Union scouts dressed as Confederates 
talcing the lead, his column marched to Lexington. Palmer 
discovered that seven thousand rebels occupied the town but 
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he boldly entered it anyvay, his column riding at a trot. 
The rebels paid little attention to Palmer until one of his 
men got nervous and shot a Confederate major. The rest of 
the column opened fire and the troopers galloped for the 
Sni River bridge, three miles away. They made it through 
Lexington without a loss but founc more rebels at the 
bridge between them and Blunt on the opposite bank. Palmer 
ordered his men to reload their weapons, then they charged 
the rebels at the bridge. The attack created enough 
confusion that Palmer's men were able to cross the river 
and within three minutes they reached the safety of Blunt's 
lines.15 
Blunt continued his retreat, stopping at the Little 
Blue river nine miles east of Independence. He intended to 
form a defensive position there and sent to Curtis for 
reinforcements. Again Curtis said he could move the 
militia no further east because of Carney's complaining and 
he ordered Blunt back to the safety of the Big Blue. Blunt 
obeyed but left Moonlight and the Eleventh Kansas behind to 
guard the river. 
On October 21 Blunt continued to urge Curtis to let 
him return to the Little Blue where he intended to hold 
Price until Pleasanton could arrive from the east. Curtis 
acquiesced and Blunt prepared to move out. But as he 
departed word came from Moonlight that he was under attack. 
Blunt hurried but he found the rebels had driven Moonlight 
back a mile from his original position. Blunt threw his 
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men into line and drove Confederates back a half-mile but 
flanJcing columns on his left and right convinced Blunt it 
was time to retreat. His brigades fought a retrograde 
action all the way back to Independence, a"fight that 
lasted almost six hours. Blunt formed his last line east 
of Independence and the rebels broke off their pursuit. 
About 8 p.m. the federals slipped into the defenses Curtis 
had constructed on the Big Blue.l6 
On Saturday morning, October 22, Blunt ordered 
Jennison's First Brigade to go south four miles along the 
Big Blue and guard a crossing known as Byram's Ford. He 
sent Moonlight and the Second Brigade tva miles south to 
Hinkle's Ford. The Fourth BrigaGe, commanded by Colonel 
James H. Ford and created from detachments of the Third 
Brigade, went along as support. Blunt wanted them to 
protect the right flanJc of the Union line from envelopment, 
a wise move since Price was plotting a desperate attempt to 
save his army. Pressed on the north by Curtis's Army of 
the Border, and on the east by Pleasanton's division, Price 
decided to carry the fight to the enemy. He sent his 
supply train south, out of danger, then oroered Generals Jo 
Shelby and James F. Fagan to turn and attacl~ Blunt's 
forces. General John s. Marma~uke, another of Blunt's old 
Cane Hill enemies, was to protect the Confederate rear from 
Pleasanton. He put his plan in action that morning, 
touching off the Battle of Big Blue. 
Blunt knew a Confederate attaclc was un~er way when he 
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heard firing from the extreme right, Jennison's position at 
Byram's Ford. He sent orders for Moonlight to reinforce 
Jennison, who had been hit by a detachment of dismounted 
rebel cavalry. Jennison hung on until Moonlight arrived 
but the rebels had edged into posit~on to flank the extreme 
federal right. Price's men were fording the Big Blue when 
Jennison and·Moonlight pitched into the Confederate right 
and stalled the flanking ~ovement. That night the federals 
camped in front of the Confederate~ near Westport (now a 
suburb of Kansas City).17 
General CurtiS ordered Colonel Charles Blair's Kansas 
militia to support Blunt, despite Governor Carney's earlier 
objections. They pulled into line about 3 a.m. Blunt 
spent the night shuttling ammunition and rations to the 
' ' First, Second, and Fourth Brigades, preparing them to 
assault Shelby and Fagan at daylight. During the night 
rebel prisoners told 1ed~rals that Price had thirty-five 
thousand men on the field, though Pleasanton was hotly 
pressing them on the east'. 
When daivn broke on Sunday, October 23, Blunt moved his 
division to an expanse of timber on the south side of Brush 
Creek. Ther~ he ~ollided with shelby's advancing division, 
touching off the Battle of Westport. The fight soon became 
general but, the bulk of his cavalrY militia not yet on the 
field, Blunt pulled his line back to the north side of the 
creek. Shelby's only assault was by a small force through 
the timber, vhich the Fifth and Nineteenth Militia 
regiments promptly beat back. 
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When all his militia were dismounted and in line Blunt 
ordered a general assault. His division surged back across 
the creek with a shout, the crackle of their small-arms 
fire punctuated by the roar of federal artillery, which 
Blunt said "punished the enemy severely." This 't·Tas 
essentially the only time during the Price Raid that Blunt 
took the offensive and his dispositions -- infantry 
supported bi artillery -~ were quite similar to those he 
used over a year earlier in Indian Territory and Arkansas. 
Blunt kept up the pressure and by noon his men had cracked 
the center of Shelby's line and Confederates began flowing 
to the rear. The retreat "soon became a complete rout, 
their brolcen lines flying· in disorder," said Blunt, 'tvho 
pressed his advantage with cavalry and artillery. 
Curtis joined Blunt and the two generals rode with the 
pursuit for nearly t'tm miles ivhen they sail a line of 
federals on their left, formed at a right angle with their 
own force. It was Pleasanton's division engaging 
Marmaduke. Quickly Blunt rolled up twenty pieces of 
artillery to 'tTithin eight hundred yards of the Confederate 
left. As the rebels launched an attack on Pleasanton 
Blunt's artillery opened fire, blistering MarmaduJce' s left 
and sending his men in a wild retreat. The battle of 
Westport 'tlas over but Curtis and Blunt sp~rred the First 
Division in pursuit, with Pleasanton's men behind them. 
The three generals met for the first time at a farm house, 
where they made plans to continue the pursuit. Pleasanton 
wanted to split the federal column but Curtis, assuming 
command of all the federals, ordered a mass pursuit with 
Blunt's division still in the lead. 
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Blunt toot: up the chase again the next morning, 
positioning Moonlight's Eleventh Kansas Cavalry between 
Price and the Kansas border. When it appeared that Price 
was retreating into Kansas, Blunt sent Moonlight on to Fort 
Scott to protect that pootly defended post. ·Blunt followed 
Price into Kansas, about four miles ahead of Pleasanton. 
Curtis, riding with Pleasanton, ordered Blunt to stop and 
let the federals close up. Then, late on October 24, 
Curtis ordered Blunt's division to fall back, rest, and let 
Pleasanton spearhead the pursuit. As a result Blunt was 
out of the fight vThen Pleasanton -.eng-aged Price at Mine 
Creek, Kansas, October 25. Th~ attack disrupted the 
Confederate retreat and federals closed in on Price's 
supply train, forcing him to burn about one-third of his 
wagons. 
Pleasanton, acconpanied by Curtis, took his division 
back to Fort Scott to rest and refit. Blunt, left in the 
field without orders, also went to Fort Scott where_he 
urged Curtis to continue the chase. Curtis finally 
consented and put the armies bacl~ in the field October 26. 
Blunt again took the lead and came acr~ss Price's trail in 
Baton County, Missouri. He made a brief bivouack at 
Carthage early October 28 and at daylight moved on, finding 
the remnant's of Price's command camped in the timber 
around Ne1rtonia. 
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Price apparently believed the federals had given up 
their chase for good and dropped his guard, allowing Blunt 
to sneak in close. When the rebels discovered Blunt's 
presence, Price ,deployed a two-thousand-man rear guard and 
hastily put his f6rce in motion. Blunt wanted to attack 
before Price ~ot away but had marched ahead of Moonlight's 
Second Brigade, violating the' same principie 6f security 
that he had at Old Fort Wayne and'Cane Hill back in 1862. 
The fact that Blunt committed the error tva years after 
doing virtually the same thing giVes little credit to 
Blunt's ability, or willi~gness, to le~rn from his 
mistakes. Blunt sent word for the brigade to hurry up, but 
assuming that both Moonlight's and General Sanborn's 
brigades of Pleasanton's division were somewhere close 
enough to support 'him if needed, Blunt launched an attack. 
When Blunt made impetuous attacks without his full combat 
force in Arkansas tva years earlier, he escaped with 
victory. Nov, in the face of an army much larger than 
those he had faced at Old Fort Wayne and Cane Hill, his 
same impetuosity almost spelled disaster. 
Blunt plac~d covering a~t!llery on a ridge, then led a 
thundering cavalry ch~rge out of the timber. The horsemen 
spurred their mounts across an open pr~irie and smashed 
into Price's rear guard. But soon a second line of rebels 
appeared from their wooded cover and Blunt realized he had 
misjudged the situation. Instead of leaving only a rear 
guard to protect his retreat, Price had committed his 
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entire force, about ten thousand men, to the fight. The 
Confederates drove Blunt's men, outnumbered ten to one, 
bacJc five hundred yards but deadly rounds of canister from 
the federal artillery on the ridge stalled Price's advance. 
Blunt considered leaving the field when he saw rebels 
sneaking through a cornfield bn his left in a flanking 
attempt. But then help arrived. Sanborn, having marched 
sixty-tva miles that day, came on the fi~ld and put his 
brigade in line on Blunt's left. His horses 'lirere exhausted 
and stone ualls on the field hindered their movement so 
Sanborn dismounted his troopers and fought them as 
infantry. The men of the Sixth Missouri Militia Cavalry 
poured volley after volley into the,rebels who finally fell 
back under the added Union veigh~. Sanborn's men pursued 
Price three miles before brealcing off the chase. 
General Curtis arrived at Newtonia after dark and he 
and Blunt planned to ~ontinue the pursuit the next morning, 
October 29. Bu~ during the night.orders arrived from 
Department of the Missouri commander General William 
Rosecrans who said that the pursuit of Price had gone on 
long enough. ~e ordered all tLoops w~thin his department 
to return to their owri districts. Curtis had·no choice but 
to abandon the chase and he and Blunt turneo their men for 
Neosho, Missouri. Once there, though, they received orders 
from Lieutenant-General Ulysses S. Grant to continue the 
chase to the Arlcansas River. 
Rosecrans' order had cost him tvo days but Blunt 
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eagerly resumed the hunt. By the time his division reached 
Cane Hill, Arl;:ansas, they had gained a day on Price. By 
the time they reached the Arkansas River November 8 they 
were three hours behind Price but Blunt halted the chase as 
per Grant's orders. Price's Missou:ri raid viTas over, and so 
was James G. Blunt's final campaign of the Civil War.18 
Blunt displayed a duality of character during the 
Price raid. In the fighting around Kansas City Blunt was 
an industrious division commander, making dispositions and 
shuttling ammunition and supplies to his brigades up and 
down the line. While pursuing the remnants of Price's 
army, though, Blunt lapsed into the rec~less style of 
campaigning that had characterize~ his 1862 northwest 
Arkansas expedition. It must be noted, though, that 
Blunt's experience during the Missouri invasion was far 
different from any other he 1;lad had in the var. Price's 
raid was the closest thing to eastern-style campaigning 
that ever occurred in the trans-Mississippi theater. While 
Price had only twelve thousand invaders (and that number 
dwindled steadily from the time he entered Missouri) the 
combined number of federals that· Curtis, Blunt, Rosecrans, 
and Pleasanton fielded reached over thirty thousand.19 
As such Blunt did not campaign on'his own, as he had in 
Arkansas and again in Indian Territory in 1863. From 
Independence to Westport Blunt was part of a larger team 
and did not bear the burden of overall command; Curtis 
filled that position. Blunt worked with the knowledge that 
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a large Union army was approaching from the east, 
endeavoring to split Price's force on two fronts. In his 
campaigns of 1862 and 1863, out in the vast arena of the 
trans-Mississippi, Blunt was hindered by the fact that help 
(whatever the small western commands could tender) was 
always sixty to one hundred miles behind h~m along 
dangerously thin supply lines. And 1fhile Francis J. Herron 
had to execute a grueling winter march dovn one of those 
overextended lln~s of communication in December, 1862, to 
help Blunt, the greai distances implicit in 
trans-Mississippi campaigning did not prevent Blunt from 
acting boldly. It did prevent him from capitalizing on his 
gains, though, as he had to continuously fall back to the 
safety of federal territory. Not until Colonel William 
Phillips captured Fort Gibson, 'Indian Territory, and Blunt 
captured Fort Smith, Arlcansas, both in 1863, were federals 
' 
able to stay in an advqnced position. Around ~ansas City, 
however, with Curtis hav~ng final say in things, Blunt had 
no such worries, oply that he use his four thousand men 
efficiently. Also Blunt fought on the defensive, a 
situation to'~hich Blunt was not entirely accustom~d. 
Defending, though, relieved Blunt of trying to orchestrate 
an attack. He had only to wait behind the defensivG works 
that Curtis had constructed east of Kansas City and respond 
to rebel thrusts. 
In the pursuit of Price, though, with shattered 
Confederates and open field before him, Blunt returned to 
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his cavalier style of fighting. He rode his rnen hard and 
finally, at Newtonia, he attacked without scouting the 
enemy position. It is unfortunate for Blunt that the Price 
raid came so late in the war for it pointed up Blunt's true 
strengths. He served better as a subordinate, free from 
all the burdens of army command. With a seasoned West 
Pointer like Curtis directing him, Blunt's laclc of a 
military education was less of a problem. Blunt could have 
had the same benefits two years earlier had he not been so 
quick to shun John M. Schofield. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
General James G. Blunt sat"out the rest of the Civil 
War at his headquarters at Paola, Kansas. Blunt ·planned to 
participate in only one more campaign and that following 
Robert E. Lee's surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia 
in the eastern theater on April 9, 1865. Federals west of 
the Mississippi River sought to move ~gainst Confederates 
still in the field under Lieutenant General Kirby Smith and 
Blunt was to lead one part of the expedition. In mid-April 
Blunt left Kansas for Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, where 
he was to put together a forc,e of ten thousand men, then 
operate against Smith's 'line near the Red River. Blunt was 
to support a main federal column descending on Smith from 
Fort Smith and Little Rock, Arkansas. The campaign never 
materialized as Smith surrendered before it could be 
fielded.1 
Blunt's final months of seivice were not without 
controversy. In December, 1~64, Bluqt got involved in 
court martial proceedings against Colonel Charles R. 
Jennison, commander of the Fifteenth Kansas Cavalry and 
former Lane Brigade leader. Jennison's men participated in 
the pursuit of Sterling Price from Kansas City to Arkansas 
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and while on the march committed a large number of 
atrocities, ranging from plundering private citizens to 
executing not only Confederate prisoners, but also some 
Kansas militiamen whom Jennison's federals thought were 
rebel guerrillas. Once back in Kansas Blunt attempted to 
sub-divide his district for efficiency and give a 
sub-district command to Jennison. Jennison prbtested 
bitterly, claiming such a command ( on'ly five companies 
under Blunt's plan) was not fit for a man of his iahk and 
insinuating that Blunt's order was a directive for Jennison 
to work for Kansas Senator James H. Lane, whom he ranked as 
a "political shyster." 
Blunt grew angry and wrote a scorching letter back to 
Jennison in which he told the colonel it was a soldier's 
duty to accept his commands, regardless of the size. He 
also charged Jennisoh's men with poor discipline during the 
pursuit of Price but noted that little more could have been 
expected since the men only followed the example of their 
leader. In a telegram dated the same day as the letter, 
December 11, Blunt arrested Jennison for insubordination as 
well as the atrocities commi t.ted during the pursuit of 
Price. In the dispute Blunt ·again proved he was no't a 
capable administrator. He acted out of anger, not rational 
thought, and the anger may have come from Jennison's 
condemnation of Senator Lane. A general cou+t-martial 
subsequently tried Jennison, found him guilty, and ordered 
him dishonorably discharged from the United State Army on 
June 23, 1865.2 
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Blunt left the army in June, 1865. He resigned his 
commission as major-general of volunteers on June 3 and the 
War Department accepted his resignation on June 29. With 
that Blunt ended four years volunteer service in the United 
States Army.3 
The Ame-rican Civil War di~ z:10t begin in the 
trans-Mississippi theater, and neit~er did it end there. 
Combatants fought as bitterly ther~ as anywhere else and 
General James G. Blunt, brusk in manner and uneducated in 
the military arts, proved to be one of the most aggressive 
campaigners of the theater. 
Blunt was a symbol of the Civil War volunteer. He 
joined the army to fight Confederates even though his 
method of fighting was rough. He still saw glory in 
warfare, with drummers beating out an order of march, 
I 
banners flying, and cavalrymen spearheading a charge. The 
fact that enemy armies (hampered by the vast area of the 
trans-Mississippi) were seldom long in contact with one 
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another did little to alter Blunt's perception of glorified' 
war. He never saw the carnage of an Antietam or Shiloh. 
Neither his men nor his enemies regulary dug earth works to 
repel attack so the gritty, muddy, stinking, trench warfare 
that men endured at Vicksburg and Petersburg never 
developed in the trans-Mississippi theater. The long 
distances combatants had to tEavel in the west added to the 
importance of cavalry as a means of speedy movement. Blunt 
was effectively using cavalry almost a year before Union 
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commanders in the east, but it was out of necessity, not 
military genius. The necessity of cavalry in the west only 
reinforced Blunt's glorious visions of mounted pursuits 
with the general himself at the head of a thundering column 
of troopers. Blunt enacted many such chases and frequently 
got so carried away that he outdistanced the van of his 
army and arrived on the field of battle without adequate 
reinforcements. A prime example is his pursuit of Sterling 
Price through southwest Missouri in 1864. Blunt led his 
division competently in the fights around Kansas City but 
once he began to chase Price he swept he~dlong toward 
battle, almost as if he believed that cavalry sabres could 
still win an engagement, even in the bloody new age of the 
rifle. 
The fact that war i~ the trans-Mississippi never 
became the full-scale modern war that Grant and Sherman 
waged in the east enabled merr like Blunt and his opponents 
Shelby, Cooper, and Hindman--all volunteers with no formal 
training--to fight with a modicum of success. While Blunt 
scored victories at Old Fort Wayne, Cane Hill, Prairie 
Grove, Van Buren, Honey Springs, and Fort Smith, he never 
destroyed an enemy army. ·Neither did the Confederates 
ever destroy Blunt's army. While Blunt displayed a 
rashness that was a combination of his personal temperment 
and uneducated style of fighting, he still trusted his 
common sense enough to practice, albeit unwittingly, many 
of the nine principles of warfare. Blunt was especially 
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adept at using the small size of his armies, and their 
incidental mobility, to his advantage. In the vast arena 
of the trans-Mississippi armies had to move fast if they 
were to be effective and there were no railroads to help 
them along. Speed became Blunt's trademark in campaigning. 
His aggressive behavior led him into many battles before he 
had properly scouted his situation, both to his front and 
rear. Three times he ,\valked into fights ui thout .the bulk 
of his combat force. No doubt more formidable opponents 
would have rewarded Blunt for such brash action with 
defeat. As a com~ander, though, Blunt was well-suited for 
the trans-Mississippi theater .. Only once was he 
outgeneraled, that during the Confederate rear-guard action 
at Cane Hill. In the final tally Blunt was a match for any 
enemy he met in the trans-Mississippi. 
Politically Blu~t wa~ a failure. He practiced,no 
finesse in his dealings with other officers and was all too 
quick to label his superiors incompetents or cm1ards. He 
did not have the benefit ~f a capable and interested 
political sponsor. James H. Lane was too busy trying to 
benefit James H. Lane to aid Blunt's advancement;· the 
senator left Blunt to his own devices. Certa"inly Lan:e 
should be credited for submitting Blunt's name for a 
general's commission and for staying out of Blunt's 
military campaigris. Lane wo~ld" have done· as well to stay 
out of Blunt's administrative policies, which he apparently 
could not do, seeking instead to use Blunt for personal 
financial gains through quartermaster contracts. Blunt 
would have helped his own reputation if he had stayed clear 
of Lane's machinations, though it may be he feared for his 
generalship if he disputed Lane. This is doubtful, though, 
as President Lincoln, not Jim Lane, approved Blunt's 
major-general's stars and liked men who fought (as Blunt 
surely did) rather than play at politics. 
Blunt was argumentative and took criticism personally, 
factors which played a key role in his political troubles. 
Historian Albert Castel has surmised that even during the 
war Blunt suffered from the men~al disorder that forced him 
into a Washington, D. c. insane asylum on February 12, 
1879. Psychiatrists, _after having fully read Blunt's 
remaining correspondence, would be a better judge of that 
fact, however. There is no doubt that Blunt had a bad 
temper and did not work well with his supe~iors. In fact, 
with some of his superiors--like Generals Halleck and 
Schofield--Blunt refused to work at all. Blunt considered 
them incompetents and was not afraid to publicize his 
opinions. The only superi6r Blunt worked well with was 
Major General Sa~uel Curtis. They must have had a close 
friendshi~ as Curtis' son, H. z. Curtis, was on Blunt's 
staff until his death at Baxter Springs, and Curtis created 
the District of the Upper Arkansas fo~ Blunt when the 
latter fo~nd himself without a command folloving the Fort 
Smith controversy in 1864. Even though there is some 
evidence to indicate that Blunt was unhappy with Curtis' 
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defense of Kansas City during the Price Raio, Blunt worked 
well under Curtis, indicating that he probably would have 
made a better subordinate than army commander. Again 
Blunt's theater of operations influenced his career. 
During most of the war he was technically a division 
commander, but the large area of the trans-Mississippi 
theater tended to make whole armies out of divisions. 
Thus, Blunt frequently exercised overall command. In the 
eastern theater, Union division commanders were always 
subordinate to corps and army commanders. Even though he 
possessed a feisty temperament, Blunt never directly 
disobeyed an order. Several comments that he made indicate 
Blunt believed it was one of the first duties of a soldier 
to obey orders, even .though he did on occasion interpret 
orders to his own benefit. Blunt did just that in October 
1863, when he received word that Schofield had relieved him 
of command of the District of the Frontier. Schofield 
ordered General John McNeil to relieve Blunt at Fort Smith 
and even though he was in ·Kansas, Blunt travelled all the 
way to Fort Smith so he could comply with Schofield's 
directive to the letter. Still, Blunt did not balk.when 
General Curtis later shunted him off to western Kansas to 
fight Indians. The assignment briefly took Blunt out of 
the Civil War and the only reason Blunt had volunteered for 
the army in the first place was to fight the South. 
While Blunt did not emerge from the war with a solid 
reputation as an administrator, neither did he emerge with 
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a sound pro-black reputation. There is no doubt that he 
subscribed to abolitionist philosophy, as indicated by his 
willingness to help runaway slaves both in Ohio and Kansas. 
Blunt was also eager to see blacks under arms in the United 
States army. But there his interest seemed to stop. Blunt 
used black soldiers in combat·only'once, at Honey Springs, 
Indian Territory, in July, 1863'. And, although he wrote 
glowin~ly of their p~rformance in battle, he. did not put 
the name of any black qoldier forward for commendation. 
Blunt would not have set a pr~cedent had he done so, as 
other commanders were recognizing blacks for their efforts 
during the s~~e time period. Blunt appears to have been 
quite satisfied to base his abolitionist reputation upon 
recruiting some blacks into military service, and using 
them once in combat. 
The details of Blunt's later life are sketchy. He 
represented Indian claims before the government, twice 
facing charges of attempting to defraud both his Indian 
clients and the federal government. In 1867 he campaigned 
in Kansas for black suffrage (one of the first things he 
tried to do for blac~s since using them in·comba~ at Honey 
Springs four years earlier). He proved that he was not so 
progressive as to allow women to .vote., ,joining ten other 
Kansas Republicans on an anti-female suffrage committee. 
Blunt's job as Indian claims rep~esentative led him to 
Washington D. c. where he eventually sickened and was 
placed in St. Elizabeth's government hospital for the 
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insane. Doctors there diagnosed Blunt as having "softening 
of the brain.'' He remained in the hospital for over two 
years and died there July 27, 1881, six days after his 
fifty-fifth birthday.4 
Historians have never regarded James G. Blunt as one 
of the great generals of the American Civil W~r and 
probably never should. In fact, he usually gets only a few 
lines of recognition from writer~· who cite Prairte Grove or 
Honey Springs as significant battles in the 
trans-Mississippi theater. Blunt, however, is a fine 
example of the largely non-professional United States Army 
of the Civil War. Uneducated in the military arts, he 
taught himself on the battlefield~ of Missouri, Arkansas, 
and Indian Territory what he needed to know about leading 
armies. A study of Blunt is essentially a study of the· 
backbone of the Union army-~the volunteers. Like so many 
other soldiers in the, Civil War Blunt learned the soldierly 
trade as he went along, he was resistant to authority, his 
fighting was rough but effectivs, and he joined the army 
out of the strength of his philosophical convictions. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lBlunt; · "Blunt's Account," 264. 
2Jennison to Assistant Adjutant General Captain 
George s. Hampton, December 10~ 1864, Blunt to Jennison, 
December 11, 1864, 0. R., 1st ser., val. 411,, pt. 4', 843, 
844-46, 873; C~stel, Frontier State, 228-29. 
3Blunt, "Blunt's Account," 264. 
4rbid., 211; Wilder, Annals, 460, 609, 680, 844, 
955. 
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May 
July-August 
September 
October-
November 
April 8-May 5 
June-July 
August 11-26 -
October 1-4 
October 15-20 
APPENDIX 
A CHRONOLOGY OF BLUNT'S 
MILITARY CAREER 
1861 
Blunt joins Tenth Kansas Infantry as a 
private. 
Blunt helps recruit Third Kansas 
regiment; members elect him as 
lieutenant-aolonel. 
Blunt takes command of Fort Scott, 
Kansas; hunts down and kills guerrilla 
leader Mathews. 
Blunt leads reconnaissance expedition 
fr~m Karisas City; accompanies Federals 
to southwest Missouri. 
Blunt c.ommissioned brigadier general; 
given command of Department of Kansas. 
1862 
Blunt authorizes Indian Territory 
expedition; campaign subsequently 
aborted by troops in the field. 
Blunt leads expedition to Lone Jac.k, 
Missouri. 
War Department disolves Department of 
Kansas; Blunt given command of District 
of Kansas and ordered to join Brigadier 
General John M. Schofield in Missouri; 
debacle at Newtonia. 
Blunt and Schofield enter Arkansas and 
split their army. 
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October 22 
November 28 
December 7 
December 28 
May 
June 14 
July 5 
July 17 
August 26 
September 1 
September 
October 6 
October 28 
January 27-
February 7 
February 
March-April 
July 23 
Battle of Old Fort Wayne, Indian 
Territory. 
Battle of Cane Hill, Arkansas. 
Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas. 
Capture of Van Buren, Arkansas. 
1863 
Blunt commissioned major general, 
retroactive to November 29, 1862. 
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Blunt assumes command of the District of 
the Frontier. 
Blunt starts campaign to reinforce Fort 
Gibson, Indian Territory. 
Battle of Honey Springs, Indian 
Territory. 
Engagement at Perryville, Indian 
Territory. 
Capture of Fort Smith, Arkans~s. 
Schpfield authorizes investigation of 
Blunt's district. 
Massacre at Baxter Springs, Kansas. 
Blunt.relieved of district command. 
1864. 
Blunt visits Washington D. c., gets 
approval of spring. invasion of Texas. 
Major General Samuel Curtis restores 
Blunt to command of District of the 
Frontier in newly reorganized Department 
of Kansas. 
Fort Smith controversy. 
Curtis creates District of the Upper 
Arkansas for Blunt. 
August 28 
September 
October 8 
October 10 
October 16 
October 19 
October 22 
October 23 
October 28 
October 29-
November 8 
June 3 
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Confederate Major General Sterling Price 
begins invasion of Missouri. 
Blunt campaigns against Cheyenne and 
Arapaho Indians in western Kansas. 
Blunt arrives at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, summoned by Curtis to counter 
Price's threat. 
Curtis gives Blunt command. of the 
District of .Southern Kansas~ 
Blunt leads reconnaissance expedition 
from ·Kansas City to Lexington, Missouri. 
Blunt clashes with Price at Lexington, 
begins retreat to Kansas· City. 
Battle of the Big Blue River. 
Battle of Westport, Missouri. 
Erigagement at Newtonia. 
Blunt pursues Price to Arkansas River. 
1865 
Blunt resigns from army. 
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